Israel Invades Lebanon
US and regional leaders are hoping for a limited operation.
WSJ (“Israeli Forces Conduct Operations in Lebanon After Crossing Border Overnight“):
Israeli forces were inside Lebanon Tuesday conducting a series of operations aimed at uprooting Hezbollah positions within a few miles of the shared border, people familiar with the matter said.
The operations could continue for days or weeks depending on diplomatic developments and their success in moving Hezbollah back and stopping the attacks on northern Israel that have persisted for the past year as the two sides exchanged fire, the people said.
Israel’s military published footage Tuesday of a commando division putting on body armor, helmets and backpacks ahead of battle, though a security official said troops didn’t encounter fighting in Lebanon. A reservist from Division 98, a commando outfit, said there had been no combat but that the unit had spotted scouts and had pushed them back with artillery.
Hezbollah said it targeted Israeli soldiers as they moved through orchards along the eastern end of the border. It said it fired artillery at Israeli forces inside Israel nearly 30 miles to the west along the Blue Line—a boundary drawn by the United Nations after Israeli forces withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000. Such attacks are typical of the yearlong exchange of fire between the two foes.
Overnight Tuesday, Israel launched what it called a limited operation in a number of villages in southern Lebanon near the border to attack Hezbollah targets and infrastructure. The security official said the operation was focused on villages right along the border and that there was no thought of moving up to Beirut.
Diplomats remain concerned, however, that the operations could spiral into a broader ground war between Israel and the Lebanon-based militant group. Israel warned people in Lebanon not to drive from the north of the country to areas south of the Litani River, which runs roughly parallel to the border but around 20 miles to the north, and told residents of border villages to leave their homes and move north of the river.
The ground incursion follows weeks of Israeli intelligence operations, targeted killings and heavy bombing that played to Israel’s strengths in intelligence and air power. The offensive inside Lebanon now puts troops into battle on territory where the U.S.-designated terrorist group has fought Israel to a standstill twice in the past quarter-century.
Israel’s troops are among the most battle-tested the country has ever had after nearly a year of fighting in Gaza. But a ground war in Lebanon will pose different challenges. Whereas Gaza has flat terrain, with borders now controlled on all sides by Israel, Lebanon’s rocky, mountainous landscape requires different training, which forces are now undergoing. Additionally, Israel only controls the borders on the southern side of the country.
[…]
U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, in a call Monday with his Israeli counterpart Yoav Gallant, pushed for a diplomatic solution, but said the U.S. was well-positioned to defend U.S. forces and allies against threatened action from Iran.
“I reiterated the serious consequences for Iran in the event Iran chooses to launch a direct military attack against Israel,” Austin said.
The Pentagon said Sunday it would keep the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group and its accompanying ships near the Red Sea. The Lincoln had been expected to leave when the USS Harry S. Truman carrier strike group arrived. The Truman will now be operating near the Mediterranean Sea. It is unusual for the U.S. to keep two carriers in the region.
Arab diplomats who have scrambled for days for a diplomatic solution to head off a ground operation and minimize risks of miscalculation have now shifted to trying to contain the conflict.
A broad ground incursion in Lebanon would be highly provocative in the region and a further blow to a country scarred by previous invasions that ended in 2000 and 2006. Israel’s government is under pressure to create a buffer zone to stop Hezbollah attacks that have forced some 60,000 people from their homes in the north and prevent the sort of cross-border attack that Hamas led against Israel on Oct. 7, which many in the country still fear. Hezbollah has threatened for years to invade parts of northern Israel.
The military operation heaps new stresses on Lebanon, a country in turmoil after hundreds of thousands of people fled their homes following recent Israeli bombing. Israeli attacks have killed more than 1,000 people in the country in recent weeks, according to the Lebanese health ministry.
NYT (“Israel Launches Invasion Into Southern Lebanon“):
Israeli ground forces were operating Tuesday in southern Lebanon for the first time in nearly two decades, as the military ordered evacuations of more than two dozen villages at the start of an uncertain new phase of its decades-long conflict with Hezbollah.
The Israeli military said early Tuesday that its forces had crossed into Lebanon in an operation aimed at targets belonging to the Iranian-backed militia in the rugged border region. It said that one army division — which typically numbers more than 10,000 soldiers — was involved in conducting “limited, localized and targeted raids” along the border, although it was unclear how many of those troops had crossed into Lebanon.
That appeared to be a far smaller force than the two divisions Israel sent into the Gaza Strip last October, but the number of troops deployed in northern Israel in recent days has fueled speculation that a broader operation could be coming. Three Israeli officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive military matter, said that parts of the invasion force could advance several miles beyond the border. On Tuesday, the Israeli military told Lebanese civilians in some villages to move north of the Awali River, more than 15 miles from the Israeli border at its nearest point.
U.S. officials said on Monday that they believed Israel’s invasion would be limited and that they had been assured by Israel that there was no plan for a bigger operation by conventional forces or a prolonged occupation of southern Lebanon. But several times during its nearly yearlong war in Gaza, Israel has played down the scale of its military actions only to see them grow into monthslong operations involving large numbers of troops — including in its initial ground invasion of Gaza, the push into the southern half of the strip and the incursion in Rafah.
Israel said its goal in the Lebanon operation was to eliminate Hezbollah infrastructure that poses an immediate threat to northern Israel so that civilians displaced by rocket fire there can return. The fighting has forced more than 160,000 people from their homes on both sides of the border.
Most of the major outlets are in live-blog mode, so getting a coherent picture of what’s happening is difficult. I’m skeptical both that this is a limited operation that will end soon and that Israel has the ability to sustain a two-front war at this scale. Something has to give.
For now, at least, it looks like Iran is staying out of it rather than stepping up to support its proxies.
And, despite grumblings, it appears the United States is begrudgingly supporting Israel’s play.
POLITICO (“US officials quietly backed Israel’s military push against Hezbollah“):
Senior White House figures privately told Israel that the U.S. would support its decision to ramp up military pressure against Hezbollah — even as the Biden administration publicly urged the Israeli government in recent weeks to curtail its strikes, according to American and Israeli officials.
Presidential adviser Amos Hochstein and Brett McGurk, the White House coordinator for the Middle East, told top Israeli officials in recent weeks that the U.S. agreed with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s broad strategy to shift Israel’s military focus to the north against Hezbollah in order to convince the group to engage in diplomatic talks to end the conflict, the officials told POLITICO.
Not everyone in the administration was on board with Israel’s shift, despite support inside the White House, the officials said. The decision to focus on Hezbollah sparked division within the U.S. government, drawing opposition from people inside the Pentagon, State Department and intelligence community who believed Israel’s move against the Iran-backed militia could drag American forces into yet another Middle East conflict.
[…]
In mid-September calls and meetings, Israeli officials outlined broadly that their military was preparing to make the shift. They didn’t offer details. Hochstein and McGurk relayed to their Israeli counterparts that — while they still urged a cautious approach — the timing was likely opportune for such a move, especially after Hezbollah had been significantly degraded in the months prior.
While Hezbollah had long said it would only engage with Israel if it reaches a cease-fire with Hamas militants it is battling in Gaza, U.S. assessments indicated at that point that Hamas wasn’t likely to agree to a cease-fire deal anytime soon. And that meant it could be a moment to focus more on Hezbollah alone – and to decouple the two conflicts.
While conflicts are ultimately resolved diplomatically, the military instrument can be quite persuasive in getting sides to agree to terms that would otherwise be unacceptable. Given Iran’s demonstrated reluctance to expand their proxy war with Israel into a direct fight, one presumes the Biden team sees the likelihood of the war achieving its political aims greater than the risk of escalation.
UPDATE: As Lee Corso might say, “Not so fast!”
NYT (“Iran is poised to launch an attack on Israel, U.S. and Israeli officials say.“):
Iran is poised to launch an attack on Israel in the coming hours, according to the Israeli government and two U.S. officials.
The Israeli military said Israel had been informed about preparations for the attack by the United States government.
Three Israeli officials said the attack would involve unmanned drones and missiles fired toward Israel. One of the U.S. officials said it would involve ballistic missiles, while the second said that it was unclear what kind of attack would be launched. The officials all spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive military matter.
Any attack would significantly raise the risk of an all-out war between Israel and Iran, including its proxies across the Middle East. For years, the two countries have fought a shadow war, with Iran seeking Israel’s destruction and Israel seeking to blunt Iran’s regional influence, destroy its nuclear program and unseat its government.
Now they are moving closer to direct confrontation, after a year of rising conflict between Israel and several Iranian allies including Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi militia in Yemen.
[…]
The three Israeli officials said that the target of the new Iranian attack would be three military air bases, as well as an intelligence headquarters north of Tel Aviv, which was evacuated on Tuesday afternoon.
Iran last fired a barrage of missiles and drones at Israel in April, after Israeli warplanes fired strikes that killed several top Iranian commanders as they visited Syria. At that time, an all-out war was avoided after both sides chose to de-escalate. Six months later, diplomats and experts say that a full-scale war is much likelier, with Israel expected to strike back hard after any new Iranian attack.
A group of Israel’s allies, led by the United States, helped intercept most of the missiles and drones in April, resulting in only limited damage to Israeli infrastructure.
We shall see whether this is another token, face-saving effort or a serious escalation into direct war with Israel. If the latter, it’s doubtful the Biden administration will be able to stand on the sidelines.
Predictable given Netanyahu & ilk
Overall while in near term they will fain, the logic, the ethnic blindered attitudes, and supremacist ideological views have set them on a dead end Botha-esque path.
NYT says:
@Lounsbury:
I’m not sure I understand their reasoning. Israel had a huge intel success – the pagers and the very effective decapitation strikes. This feels like an unnecessary risk. There will be Israeli casualties.
@Michael Reynolds:
The intel success had no bearing on Hezbollah being able to shoot missiles into Israel. What Israel wants is return and eternal safety for the people who are displaced, and they (and America) want it without any compromise at any level with any party. Initiating another land war is the result of that.
@Michael Reynolds:
The logic is that Bibi is getting a boost and his right is happy.
Without dragging the US into active involvement, it is difficult to see how Israel maintains a two front war. They lack the resources to carry out a clear and hold strategy in Gaza.
@Michael Reynolds: It appears to me that the reasoning is driven by the Netanyahu faction’s rather generally racist (in the broad American sense) reasoning around ‘the Arabs’ that is leading to them to a rather 19th century kind of pound the savages into submission sort of logic. Plus a Netanyahu logic of gaining time for himself at any cost in terms of risk escalation.
Even the decapitation strikes – as the US ‘War on Abstractions’ has shown, killing headline leadership of entities that control territory does rather little on a permanent basis, even on a medium term-basis (other than probably evolving leadership into more resistant fractions). Of course if one is in an ideological framework that the other side is a bunch of low-reasoning savages, then due to those blinders one rather sees the solution to every problem being simplistically to pound the savages into submission – that is the hammer solution and every problem is a nail.
To be frank from my years of exposure to Israelis, the Netanyahu types have long struck me as rather prisoner to unexamined 19th century informed colonialist reflexions, imported from their European sides and never really updated / examined (such reflexions earlier made visible in the attitudes to the mizrahine).
The e-comms sabotage was likely quite enough to paralyse Hezbullah for quite a bit, and buy time – but instead they have chosen to open wide a 2nd front, a sort of Rumsfeldian ‘roll them all up’ perhaps.
As like the Botha approach, in short term they will achieve victories (as equally the West Bank policies). In the medium term I rather think it is a Pyrhhic approach that rather than securing Israel is doing the opposite for the long-run.
Can we just have a moment of silence for Lebanon, a once small but proud and beautiful country that was a beacon of modernization… until Iran decided it was too dangerous to house Hezbollah inside its own borders and directed them to assassinate, intimidate and bribe their way to become the de facto power in Lebanon and turn it into a forward based launching pad for attacks on Israel and therefore, inevitably, a target?
@Modulo Myself: @Sleeping Dog:
I don’t know much about the ranges of Hezbollah’s missiles, but I’d be surprised if pushing Hezbollah back a few miles will make that much of a difference. As for the politics of it, getting IDF soldiers killed is not going to go over well. This is also really straining Israel’s economy.
This feels like Netanyahu should have just taken the win. One of the oldest tricks in warfare is the phony retreat in order to lure an over-confident opponent into a trap. This isn’t quite that, but the historical lesson is: don’t overreach.
One thing that seems clear is that Arafat was right to think he was being scammed in 2000. Watching the collapse of the cease-fire negotiations in Gaza due to the insanity of the Israelis, it just seems impossible that Israel and America would have ever given up actual control the West Bank, despite what any deal said.
@Michael Reynolds:
What win? There’s no way to get those people back into their homes. The only options are compromise with Hezbollah, or launch a war which would push Hezbollah far to the north and then reoccupy South Lebanon.
@Modulo Myself:
Arafat was not being scammed, he was stupidly setting the stage for this ongoing disaster for Palestinians. Arafat was a fool. He was under the impression that he had the support of the entire Arab world. And he did. For a while. But as the years dragged on the Arab powers gave up on the corrupt and incompetent PA. Now Palestinians have no real international support beyond platitudes.
Arafat could have had half a loaf. He demanded much, much more, and got much, much less. There’s a reason for the old saw that the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.
@Modulo Myself:
A ‘win’ is not the same as a ‘long-term solution.’ Hezbollah and Iran are enemies. Israel kicked shit out of Hezbollah and humiliated Iran. That is a win.
@Michael Reynolds:
The pager action revealed the location of a of the missiles Hezbollah has in residential homes in neighborhoods. Not really a viable air strike target given the civilians in the vicinity.
Not to mention, without the command and control system intact, it is more likely someone will open up a tunnel or mtn bunker holding missiles for rearming giving an opportunity for Israel to put their own missile through the open door.
@JKB: Wait. I thought that the current conventional wisdom had become “f*** those people; they deserve whatever happens to them.” I thought they were supposed to refuse to let missiles into their neighborhood if they don’t want to be targets.
So, if this is the start of a ground invasion, it’s going to mean significant Israeli soldier casualties. I wonder how this is going to play out against the continued stalling against putting the religious layabouts into uniform, like every other Jewish Israeli citizen?
@JKB:
Short range rockets can be hidden in civilian houses.
The heavy missiles are a different matter entirely.
@Michael Reynolds:
It is; but it appears Israel has decided it to wants to degrade the short-range rockets threat, and leave Hezbollah/Iran with the choice of the big missiles or nothing.
(Important: we don’t know at this point what effects Israeli strikes have had on the longer-range weapons; though the Israelis likely have a reasonable idea).
They may also have some hopes of forcing Hezbollah/Iran into offering a de facto truce in return for Israel not turning the screws still more.
Possibly up to the point of Hezbollah complying with UN Security Council 1701: withdrawal from south of the Litani River and replacement by Lebanese army and UNIFIL.
This would be a massive humiliation for Iran, and yet more damage to Hezbollah’s political position in Lebanon.
Big question now is will Iran attempt a large-scale missile strike, from Iran and Lebanon, which may lead to counter-strikes on Iran.
Or just do something token, in an attempt at saving face?
@MarkedMan: No, one should not have a moment of silence for your idealised Lebanon fan fiction – which was outside of central Beiruit a country of factional fiefdoms, divided and sub-divided along ethno-religious lines. One day Americans may eventually learn that the European language speaking segments of capital cities are not the country.
Nor did Iran create Hezbullah. The bungling of the Israeli occuption of majority Shia southern Lebanon created Hezbullah. Iran successfully latched on. Hezbullah is principally a Lebanese Shia creature in origin, however useful to Iran that it is.
@Michael Reynolds:one merely needs to look at the past three decades of Israeli interventions into Southern Lebanon. It is my expectation that this will rerun that. Short-term success bogging down. But a useful sugar high for the Netanyahu factions.
@JohnSF:
Looks like Iran has launched.
Now, on what scale?
Some indications it’s larger than the April attack.
@JohnSF:
Awesome. Israel decided to drag us into a war before our election. Fuck Netanyahu, fuck Israel. I’m fucking done with their shit. They shit themselves, they should wash their own fucking pants.
@Beth:
I rather doubt most Israelis care that much about the US elections one way or the other.
The primary drive of this was the ongoing Hezbollah rocket strikes on northern Israel, and Iran’s support of that in order to preserve its standing as leader of the “Forces of Resistance”.
Standing aside is an attractive idea in the abstract.
Unfortunately, it’s totally impossible in practice.
@JohnSF:
No, I know Netanyahu is responsible for this. This is all an extension of him and his bullshit. I might agree with you, most israelis aren’t thinking about the US elections, but Netanyahu most definitely is and is most definitely hoping that all of the mess he’s creating will help lead to a Trump victory.
What the average Israeli is responsible for, fully responsible for, is Netanyahu.
@JohnSF:
A not insignificant number of Israelis appear to care very much about the US elections. Israeli newspapers are covering them closely. Indeed, you can see and hear strong opinions about our elections from people all over, but especially from people in allied nations — Europe, Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, Canada etc. They’ve not been shy at all.
Maybe US turnout wouldn’t be so embarassingly low relative to our peers, if Americans ourselves were as invested lol.
@Beth:
The United States is not a potted plant and not choiceless. “No” is a complete sentence.
I don’t think Iran and the US are letting their problem children drag them anywhere right now — too many oligarchs with too much oil money and shipping corridors to protect in a still-recovering global economy. But there will be a lot of puffery and kabuki theatre, to misdirect chauvanists and fanatics.
More likely Iran, the US, and the Saudis are on backchannels trying to figure out how to contain the various Frankensteins and Chuckys they’ve helped create. Iran’s economy is a mess rn. Thus, Iran’s new president has mandate from above him (the clerics) and below (the people) to normalize relations with the West. A direct confrontation with the US via Israel is a sideshow they cannot afford atm.
Second wave of Iranian missiles reported.
Now reported as over; no further incoming detected.
No reports of casualties as yet.
Looks like a combination of missile defence and inaccuracy may have averted much damage.
(Looks like at least one Iranian missile hit Jordan)
Now we await the IDF response, which is likely to be major, but not necessarily rapid.
@JohnSF: Yes, indeed. But is this the consequences? Or the consequences of the consequences? Or maybe the consequences of the consequences of the consequences of the…
@Beth:
Well, yes and no.
Doubtless Netanyahu will be figuring the odds, and what’s best for Bibi.
He almost always is.
But I have serious doubts how differently a non-Netanyahu government would have acted in most key aspects, post-October 7.
Probably tried harder to get a post-Hamas governance/security deal in place for Gaza.
But the destruction of Hamas was a consensus position in Israel.
As is stopping Hezbollah rocket attacks and the depopulation of the northern border region.
@DK:
Oh, certainly, quite a few, people pay attention to what square-dance the 300-pl gorillas are currently getting up to. 😉
But for Israelis the main issue will be the security of their northern region.
@JohnSF:
This looks a lot like the last Iranian missile attack, more for show than for effect.
@Beth:
The alternative to us helping Israel stop incoming Iranian missiles is letting Tel Aviv and Haifa be hit. What do you think happens then? Israel ‘learns its lesson’? No, the alternative is Israel fires back. And in case you’re in any doubt as to how that plays out, bear in mind that 1) the Arabs are all for blowing up some Ayatollahs (Jordan is helping Israel shoot down incoming), and 2) Israel is a nuclear-armed state and Iran has dated air defenses.
Iran can fire 180 missiles (the current count) at Israel and hit nothing; Israel firing 180 missiles (or equivalent in bombs) means Iranian military bases severely degraded and quite likely some very big explosions in Teheran. At which point Iran will be very tempted to try and assemble nukes. And then the party really starts, and we will be right in the middle of it.
Americans have learned two opposing lessons from our foreign involvements:
1) We saved the world in WW2, we kept South Korea free, and we used the threat of nuclear war to outspend the USSR until it burned itself out trying to keep pace.
2) Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan.
I understand and echo the frustration, but if we bail out of the ME entirely the result will not be peace in our time. If you think this is as bad as it can get, no, this is a fraction of as bad as it can get. Right now, today, not in some dystopian fantasy, Israel can essentially end human life in large swathes of Iran. We are not just involved to help Israel, we’re trying to stop a real war, a very real war where the casualty count involves a lot of zeros.
@DK:
Iran (or rather some senior cleris and the increasingly ascendant Pasdaran) made a quite deliberate decision, for reasons both domestic and international, to insert themselves into the politics of Israel/Palestine and the Levant.
This was in no way forced upon them, nor have they ever resiled from that stance.
It’s difficult to estimate how direct their authority of Hezbollah actions may be.
But Hezbollah’s not use use of its main missile force, despite massive Israeli attacks, even now is surely indicative.
I incline to Tehran says “Hop, frog”, and Hezbollah hops accordingly, end of the scale; I might be wrong, but I doubt it.
Hence the Iranian ambassador getting caught in the “Grim Beeper” operation.
And IRGC Deputy of Operations, Brigadier General Nilforoushan getting killed in the same bunker as Nasrallah.
@MarkedMan:
Hezb’allah was not an Iranian outfit transported to Lebanon.
@just nutha:
The chain is endless.
The question is how to break it.
(Personally I’m tempted to call up the shade of Arthur Balfour and swear at him profusely.
Or to perhaps blame Admiral Sir Archibald Berkeley Milne for the consequences of HMS Indefatigable and Indomitable not sinking SMSGoeben and Breslau.
Or perhaps the Romans?)
More seriously: there are two interacting, linked but distinct, elements: the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, which may be amenable to settlement based on Israeli policy and Palestinian opinion.
And the wider politics of the Levant, of the security/legitimacy of Israel within that, and the determination of the Pasdaran to insert Iran into the equation.
That seems amenable to settlement only if Iran decides to stop striving for regional ascendancy via the “Israel issue”.
@dazedandconfused:
This is true; but nor has Hezbollah ever acted independtky of the interest of Iran, its primary sponsor and supplier.
See its intervention in Syria, which was driven primarily by Iranian desires to sustain Assad and the Alawite minority ascendancy, but which wrecked Hezbollahs standing as a champion of a unified Arab cause, by clearly acting in an Arab civil war in the interests of Iran.
@dazedandconfused: Indeed, it is the direct result of the 1982 invasion of S. Lebanon and grew out of Shia reaction to bungling by the Israelis – where they had initially been quite happy to see the Sunni Palestinian PLO militias expelled from their area, relations with the Palestinian secular Sunni factions being extremely poor.
@JohnSF: I incline to say that is what indeed the Israelis and the Iranians each think, but the Lebanese have their own logic that is not quite so simple and has its own Lebanese drivers – perhaps a 2006 logic.
@JohnSF: Again too simple. Before Iran was involved with Hezbullah, the Alaouite Baath regime was friendly – their relations as old and older than those with Iran.
and again a Lebanese logic for Syria – not only old Baath-Alaouite relations but the emergence of a likely Sunni supremacist power in Syria was (and is) in fact a significant threat for Hezbullah quite independent of Iranian interests.
They were clearly acting in Shia and Shia adjacent factional interests – but the Arab unity façade mate, that sad old masquerade has not had real legs since the 90s.
Counting national movements as merely foreign hand puppets is almost always an error.
@Lounsbury:
I’m aware of the Lebanese origins of Hezbollah; yet ever since Iran became its primary sponsor, and the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebabon, Iran has seemed to be the primary decider in the relationship
Hezbollah may have been friendly with the Alawites; but its major direct role in Syria seem to have been largely at the behest and in the interests of Iran.
A Sunni supremacist regime in Syria would obviously be a serious risk to Hezbollah whatever the position of Iran. But support for the Alawite ascendancy may have made such an outcome more, not less, likely in the longer term.
The initial protests in Syria do NOT seem to have been driven primarily by Sunni extremism; it was the Iranian/Russian encouragement to Assad to crush all protest by overwhelming force and terror that destroyed the prospect of a compromise outcome.
Indeed, Arab unity has had the quality of a mirage since at least the 1950’s.
But the hatred of many Syrians for Hezbollah is due at least in part to a perception of betrayal by what was seen, rightly or wrongly, as a remaining champion of the Arab cause.
All movements tend to have their own motivations, as well as sometimes being of utility to external supporters.
(See national vs Soviet communist parties during the lifetime of the USSR)
The question is the balance.
In recent years, at least, Iran and the Pasdaran seem to been able to direct Hezbollah as they wished.
@JohnSF:
Consider the possibility all the minority sects rallied around Assad because they didn’t believe they would’ve gotten a fair shake from the sort of Sunnis who dominated the rebellion.
A lot of the “enemy” has convinced themselves that everything Israel does is on behalf of the US too, but as someone from an imperialist nation like yourself should know simply giving someone stuff and money doesn’t mean they ignore their own interests to favor of yours.
@JohnSF: Not may have been friendly. The Baath regime was their early friend (for factional and sectarian reasons related to that self-same regime’s intervention in Lebanon and the Syrian dynamics with it). History.
As for the Syrian civil war, it was more than painfully clear very quickly that the Sunni majority was going to be dominated by radical Sunni supremacism (and rather likely of the very nasty Al Qaeda variety) – not secular liberalism or non-sectarianism deeply stained by the Baath. As violent disorganised civil wars tend to produce – the domination of themost organised radical factions, while the poor centrists get buggered by all sides.
No non-Sunni minority was going to feel good about that risk given demostrable track record in Iraq. Had Iraq not preceded, maybe it wouldn’t have been top of mind, but no one in Mashreq-Iraq neighbourhood failed to see the likely path.
It was Western fantasy that the play out was going to be different once the Assad regime turned to the gun.
Hezbullah certainly needed Iranian backing for the means, but they had and have more than sufficient own-Lebanese logic, not simple minded hand-puppetism. Their Shia Lebanese (strong sectarian factional) interest aligned with Iranian gaming. Not mere orders following.
There has not been a moment of critical deviation in their interests quite as yet. If that real moment comes then one can judge how much of a hand puppet Hezbullah is for the Iranians. I would on my own Lebanese experience expect the Iranians will not be so pleased if such a clear divergence ever comes. For the time being however from their own logic – not yours but theirs – they have a southern Lebanese power logic including e.g. Shebaa Farms that aligns them with Iranian games, of course such expression of interest mediated, guided and obviously very influenced by Iran but it is not the mere creation of Iran nor mere Iranian hand-puppetry.
Regardless, I rather expect the most likely path is a sad repetition of 06
@Lounsbury: I should make clearer “Shia adjacent” are the Alaouites, the Ismaili and in a sense although a weak sense the Druuze. and in a vague sense even the xian Orthodox from the long assholery of the Catholics (or more correctly the Catholic faction leaderhips)
.
@dazedandconfused:
Indeed, and this informs a good deal of my thoughts on the matter. Some of whom got cut off at the knees when they crossed British interests.
As I say, degrees of influence/control vary.
As is evident enough from the less-imperialist side of my ancestry.
@Lounsbury:
A reasonable and cogent argument.
All I can say, is, my view, which is largely based on that of some Lebanese seculars I know, differs.
That view is that there was a genuine prospect for the “poor centrists” NOT “getting buggered” before Iran on the one hand and the al-Saud on the other intervened.
To repeat: this objective/ideal/fantasy was not confined to naive Westerners, but shared by Syrians.
Possibly naive, possibly not.
As I think I said, Hezbollah are not, as most people and organizations are not, entirely the “puppet” of an external “puppet-master”.
But Iran DOES seem to have had some crucial strings they have been able to pull, over crucial decisions. Of course, its easier to exert such influence if the junior partners can be convinced, or convince themselves, such decisions would have been made by them anyway.
Shebaa Farms: “We justifiably immolate Lebanon over eight and a half square miles of land that almost everyone reckons was Syrian in the first place”
It’s merely a grounds for ongoing “resistance”.
Of course, ongoing “war of resistance” serves both Hezbollah politics and those of Iran.
It seems to do little for the interest of the Lebanese in general, but then, who cares about the Lebanese in general?
The Alawites are indeed “Shia” adjacent” so long as that suits Iran.
If have a sneaking suspicion that if the ayatollahs ever had the opportunity, the Alawites (never mind the Druze) would be in for a very unpleasant episode of religious purging.
@dazedandconfused: What JohnSF said. Whatever Hezbollah started as, they are now Iran’s cannon fodder, bringing Lebanon in with them.
@JohnSF: Solve it? Easy. All you have to do is exchange current ME leadership across the region for leadership that will commit to living at peace with their neighbors.
And then assassinate them. (No. It can’t be solved.)
@JohnSF:
https://www.christianitytoday.com/2011/07/syria-christians-assad/
It’s not as if 100% of the Sunnis are fighting against Assad either. The moderates could see the revolution became dominated by the radicals.
@just nutha:
That has often been said of other conflicts.
And yet, such conflicts often ended, in the end.
One way or another.
If you looked at Western Europe over most of its history from the Dark Ages to 1945, could you expect half a continent at peace? Yet so it is.
(Except at football matches)
@dazedandconfused:
Indeed, neither side was monolithic.
And some moderates who initially supported Assad as a source of stability became disgusted at the regimes proclivity for mass killing and industrial scale torture.
Once again: a long term regime based on suppression of three quarters of the populations in unlikely to be viable.
Of course, to judge what the proportion of support is, free elections might be held.
At which point the Syrian government line seems to be:
“Why should our people desire Western style democracy?”
To which I might reply:
“Maybe they don’t. Do they get a vote on it?”
Assadite/Mullah/Russian response, short form:
“Remember, commoners: your life belongs to the ruler! Submit or die!”
@Beth:
Maybe.
On the one hand, Likud at the last election only received 23.41 % of the vote.
But then, if you add up all the coalition parties that ended up supporting Likud, you get over half the total votes.
Unfortunate.
But then, would it be impossible for a similar sort of thing to happen in the US, or in various other countries, and perhaps with less understandable motivations?
If you consider the backgrounds of the population of Israel, and the history and pre-history of Israel from c. 1920 to date?
@JohnSF:
If we re-elect Trump we won’t be in a position to criticize anyone’s voters or leadership.
@JohnSF: I see where you’re coming from, and there is some truth in it. Dictatorship is bad in general. However it’s a bit like how George W Bush thought: Just take out the dictators and by golly an Iraqi George Washington would spring up and transform the place into something resembling Texas.
You may be right and I once thought much the same way, but came by the hard way to view it as quixotic. Some societies have a better shot at that outcome than others, but some have hardly any shot at all. Not ready or not suitable for their conditions. The Arab Spring sprung and slinkied right down the stairs. After the MB started running things in Egypt the people put a dictator right back up there, pronto. That was not because the loved being under a dictator.
@JohnSF: The Alaouites are Shia adjacement from Levantine history and dynamics, Iranian Ayatallahs have nothing to do with the story. Your over concentration on Iran is bad history and superficial understanding of the the Levantine dynamic. You are rather writing in the same form and blinders as the people who wrote in same fashion about the Sovs relative to any of their allies. This is a profound analytical error.
@JohnSF: What people deserve or desire is not the question – I wrote quite precisely, once Assad used the gun…. What might have happened if a a Tunisian or even Egyptian type scenario played in Syria is one thing (and it was not impossible that the Assads got ejected by own power). But once the Assads went the route they went and the security force stuck with them, the only path was going to be a multi-sided civil war and those always always produce radicalisation.
And sorry, Anglophone urban bourgeousie who speak with Westerners are to my long experience poor ways to have a sense of how the broad societies are – I am perfectly fluent in Arabic and have had the dubious pleasure of direct exposure to the non-mediated. It has taught me the lesson from direct experience that in crisis what you read from W. journos and from the anglophone bourgeouisie
(of course in USA land one can see that such festering socio-cultural divides are not the aberations only of sad little Arabs etc)
@dazedandconfused: The Egyptian people … well the Egyptian urban cores. In any case, it was less once the Ikhwan / Brotherhood took over and more “once the Brotherhood spent a year bungling and enacting an autistic Brotherhood centric program” that triggered mass backlash. Had they played the more clever game of their Tunisian equivalents they might not have been ejected, in fact I think likely not. of course since 2019 the Tunisian case has gone sideways but there the lesson is not snapback to dictatorship but rather poor structure that paid over-attention to Ben Ali allies return and over-attention to settling of political scores, and too little attention to economics. Economic stagnation led to what is going on in Tunisia and that economic stagnation was from a political system that post Revolution was paralysed between an over parliamentary division (too much democracy too soon frankly) and petty short-term scores settling.