Competitive Authoritarianism
A four-pronged test.
Steven Taylor’s post “Has the Constitution Failed?” takes on Dan Nexon’s argument that the United States has fallen into a state of competitive authoritarianism. Since neither Steven nor Dan define the term, which is well known in the comparative politics literature, some readers were confused.
The concept was first described by political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Wray in an April 2002 article in the Journal of Democracy titled “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.”
In competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy. Examples include Croatia under Franjo Tudjman, Serbia under Slobodan Miloševiæ, Russia under Vladimir Putin, Ukraine under Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, Peru under Alberto Fujimori, and post-1995 Haiti, as well as Albania, Armenia, Ghana, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, and Zambia through much of the 1990s. Although scholars have characterized many of these regimes as partial or “diminished” forms of democracy, we agree with Juan Linz that they may be better described as a (diminished) form of authoritarianism.
Competitive authoritarianism must be distinguished from democracy on the one hand and full-scale authoritarianism on the other. Modern democratic regimes all meet four minimum criteria: 1) Executives and legislatures are chosen through elections that are open, free, and fair; 2) virtually all adults possess the right to vote; 3) political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom to criticize the government without reprisal, are broadly protected; and 4) elected authorities possess real authority to govern, in that they are not subject to the tutelary control of military or clerical leaders. Although even fully democratic regimes may at times violate one or more of these criteria, such violations are not broad or systematic enough to seriously impede democratic challenges to incumbent governments. In other words, they do not fundamentally alter the playing field between government and opposition.
In competitive authoritarian regimes, by contrast, violations of these criteria are both frequent enough and serious enough to create an uneven playing field between government and opposition. Although elections are regularly held and are generally free of massive fraud, incumbents routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulate electoral results. Journalists, opposition politicians, and other government critics may be spied on, threatened, harassed, or arrested. Members of the opposition may be jailed, exiled, or—less frequently—even assaulted or murdered. Regimes characterized by such abuses cannot be called democratic. [footnote references omitted for ease of readability]
There has, obviously, been a whole lot written about the subject since then, including a 2020 follow-up by Levitsky and Way titled “The New Competitive Authoritarianism.” I’m sticking with the original, though, because it predates the debate over whether the United States falls into this category.
The range of examples somewhat muddies the water, in that casual readers will rightly note that we’re not Putin’s Russia. But it’s worth noting that neither was Putin’s Russia in 2002. The gradual erosion of rights and consolidation of power over time can make regimes worse and, indeed, it’s likely that today’s Russia is fully authoritarian.
Looking at Levitsky and Wray’s four criteria for being fully democratic, however, and it’s rather clear that the United States does not quite measure up and, indeed, hasn’t in some time.
1) Executives and legislatures are chosen through elections that are open, free, and fair
One can debate the fairness of the Electoral College system, which has produced two minority vote winners in the last quarter-century, but I would argue that our presidential elections have been most open and free. Ditto the wildly unrepresentative nature of the Senate; we’ve at least had largely open and fair elections for those seats.
Even aside from the systemic unrepresentativeness of those institutions, which we (particularly Steven) have written a lot about over the years, there is also the human element. Partisan gerrymandering has made the House of Representatives wildly problematic. Add to that various voter suppression schemes, and it’s hard to argue that we live up to this standard.
2) virtually all adults possess the right to vote
If we take for granted that only citizens should vote, we’ve largely met this criterion, at least since the Civil Rights Act of 1965. We expanded it further in 1972, lowering the age of adulthood from 21 to 18. One can debate whether the incarcerated, which are disproportionately Black and Hispanic, should be deprived of the franchise. And we incarcerate citizens at a much higher rate than other democracies. And then there’s the fact that felons who have served their time are often still deprived of their vote. Oh, and there’s the aforementioned voter suppression effort.
3) political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom to criticize the government without reprisal, are broadly protected
I would have said we fully meet this standard a few months ago. Now, not so much.
4) elected authorities possess real authority to govern, in that they are not subject to the tutelary control of military or clerical leaders.
As written (and I’ll defer to Steven’s expertise as a comparativist), I would say we still meet this qualification. The military remains subordinate to civil authorities and, while church leaders are influential in our politics, they have never exercised direct governing power. One could, however, make the strong argument that, since the President is currently riding roughshod over Congressional authority without consequence, the legislature lacks a real authority to govern.
I would amplify #3 and #4 insofar as as you note, in re #3, there have been clear erosions of free speech rights of late, whether it is detaining foreign-born students for various things they have said, including something as innocuous as co-authoring an op/ed to the FCC, using its leverage to get concessions out of corporations, to Trump essentially extorting those corporations for millions to the abuse of lawe firms and universities. There are also due process problems. (I honestly was only going to write a short set of examples, but they kept coming, and this is just a sample.)
#4 is, to amplify a point in the OP, deviates a bit from Letivsky and Wray’s bullet point, but I think that the way in which the president has been able to ignore the Congress and to have done to a degree with the courts/SCOTUS practically unshackling him to do as he pleases, fits the basic notion that the president is ignoring, with impunity, the elected Congress.
I think it is fair to say that he is governing like this is a competitive authoritarian regime, and now we wait to see how much he deepens that fact and what the elections look like as a way of assessing where we are regime-wise.
It’s good that we don’t meet the standard for competitive authoritarianism today, what about tomorrow? As Dr T pointed out yesterday, the real test of free and fair elections is 2026. I’m certain that the felon and his minion will do all they can to subvert the electoral process and reject it if Dems were to win.
@Steven L. Taylor: Agreed.
@Sleeping Dog: We clearly don’t meet the tests of a functioning democracy laid out by the authors who defined the term.
Why is the tutelary criterion limited to clergy and military? I think I know the answer, but I am sure my view is little more than a sketch.
It may be worth working through whether some clergy wield enough indirect electoral influence to warrant a discussion.
@Kurtz: Think Iran, where the clerics have real power.
And to answer the basic questions, when looking at most authoritarian regimes of the type that L&W are talking about, the independent power that exists that supercedes the people is usually the military, but can also be theocrats. They are both examples of institutionalizing authoritarian control.
Nexon’s phrase, that started all this was “ consolidating competitive authoritarian regime” Consolidating, present tense. They aren’t finished. Yes, the 2024 election was free and fair. 2028? 2026? And yes, military and a church leaders are not exerting control. While they don’t have veto power, does the Heritage Foundation with Project 2025 count, the Federalist Society influence on SCOTUS? Come to think of it, that last does have veto power.
@gVOR10:
Agreed. And I don’t think my post suggested otherwise (nor does James’).
Indeed, it is what I was noting with my comment above:
@gVOR10:
Outside activist groups are legitimate factions and can often serve a useful function. I don’t like Project 2025’s policies and methods, but they’re no less legitimate than the Center for a New American Security or New America Foundation, which had major impacts on shaping Obama and Biden administration policy.
When looking at local and state elections, #1 becomes a lot more pertinent. Due to gerrymandering and voter suppression, only a few legislative seats are actually competitive; Wisconsin is a perfect example, where election after election, the minority preference is able to capture majority power.
@Steven L. Taylor: would an oligarch, or group of oligarchs, also qualify as unelected controllers of elected officials similar to religious leaders if they had sufficient say?
To that point, expanding on @gVOR10: if any lobby group had sufficient sway over elected officials this would seem indistinguishable in practice from a religious group. Or does the power of the unelected group need to be codified, as in Iran, for it to qualify?
Does your employer’s social media policy allow you to say this?
I was trying to put together a more thought through comment, but I think that question summarizes everything. And the fact that you have to consider it.
On the other hand, it’s not like anyone is going to put you in jail, so whatever grey area we live in is clearly not Putin’s Russia.
And the UK is making noise about restricting repeated protest. Not quite sure how that works out, since I just skimmed it and thought “but the UK is supposed to be the stodgy ineffective one, how are they giving us any competition in sprinting towards fascism?”
@Steven L. Taylor:
Yeah, Iran is likely the government that first comes to mind among readers as an example of formal clerical power. And your answer is what I expected in terms of why L&W chose those two groups.
I imagine you have some idea about where I would go if we were having a broader conversation that goes beyond formal power structures.
The elephant in the room is SCOTUS, and to a lesser extent, other members of the Federal Judiciary.
@Erik:
If we are talking about #4 as L&W are discussing it, then we have to be talking about a group with formal, institutionalized power.
Put it this way, and maybe to bring in @Kurtz, the military can kill you, and the clerics can damn your eternal soul. This is why those two groups tend to be the ones we look to.
Per L&W:
I’m thinking this attribute of competitive authoritarianism – the uneven playing field – is what I found so important to discuss in yesterday’s thread. In Dr. Taylor’s framing, 4 post US Constitution outcomes are posited: Deeper Fascism, One Party CA, Two Party CA, and Pluralistic Democracy. Only one of these is democracy which is most ideal. To my mind, Two Party CA might at least be tolerable to someone in the current opposition. That is, there would be a chance every 4 to 8 years that the country is controlled by my party and government by fiat is advancing an agenda I can support. It’s not democracy, but at least, it’s not a One Party CA or Deeper Fascism, either of which would be so illiberal as to requiring fleeing the country or some kind of separatism. (I have no idea what post-Trump separatism could look like.)
So, I guess my question to the group would be: Understanding that achieving Pluralistic Democracy requires reforms that are mostly improbable or impossible, what does a liberal citizen do now to improve the odds that Two Party Competitive Authoritarianism is the floor – the least worst outcome of a failing Constitution? If authoritarian consolidation is currently happening, how does one weaken it or thwart it from going as far as it might?
Paul Campos at LGM has followed up both Nexon and Steven.
That last is why I highlight Nexon’s statement that we are IN a “consolidating competitive authoritarian regime”.
Auithoritarianism plus controlled/limited elections is a common enough pattern in recent history.
See the German Second Reich.
Or, in many respects, the UK for much of the 19th century.
@Kurtz:
The Anglican Eastablishment was a major political factor in UK politics from the 1500’s to the late 19th century.
In some ways, it still is:
The Anglican Church is still Established, it still runs a sizable slice of the education system, the Monarch must be an Anglican, Anglican Bishops still sit in the House of Lords, the PM has a nominal veto over episcopal appointments, etc.
The diffrence now is that other religous groups are not subject to legal or political penalties.
@Kurtz:
Seeing as the announced new Archbishop of Canterbury, Sarah Mullaly, is unlikely to campaign for the restoration of the Anglican Ascndancy, it’s probable the UK is not going to challenge Iran for the title of “clericalist state #1”.
Unless Mullaly, when enthroned, suddenly and unexpectedly draws a sword and proclaims “Deus vult”.
Which seems unlikely.
@Gustopher:
There are reasons for that.
Some groups are holding repeated protest marches/assmblies that are becoming extremely disruptive of some places.
The groups concerned include not just “left” protests re Palestine, “Just Stop Oil” etc, but also, perhaps even more, the far-right holding “anti-asylum/Stop the Boats” actions.
Political demonstrations are one thing: deliberate but “implausibly deniable” disruption another.
It’s also worth remembering: the UK does not have, nor does a plurality seem to wish to have, the 1st Amendment.
@Steven L. Taylor: thanks for the clarification. It seems to me that there needs to be a way to account for singular/small groups that functionally control a government, even if they don’t have any legal power to do so, at least for the purposes of considering practical solutions, but I understand the goals of an academic taxonomy and that including poorly defined things like “oligarchs” makes the analysis unnecessarily confusing.
The elaboration seems to me an unnecessary and inappropriate one. It would be better worded, I suggest, “elected authorities possess real authority to govern and exercise it“. One of America’s problems is that for decades, Congress has tended more and more to cede the legislative function to the president and to external groups by design, and to the Supreme Court by inaction. It retains the authority to govern, but not the will.
@JohnSF:
ITT, I’ve written at least twice as many words as I have actually posted. Probably because I cannot properly express what I am thinking.
The question I asked was worded poorly. The part after the quote needed context that was not present until my subsequent comment. And even then, it is still shitty.
Short version: I understand why the focus is on formal power. But part of why we are at this point is a result of informal power.
—
I was thinking about the negative space between the establishment clause and separation of church and state. That is the space in which Evangelical clergy and like-minded sitting judges operate.
Their moral compass moves to the magnetic force of their religion so criticism of clergy by political opponents can be cast as religion-based discrimination.
Simultaneously, they cast their policy preferences not as explicitly derived from their religion, but as self-evident moral claims that resolve before any analysis of harm and consequence.
Like-minded judges make a similar play with originalism. They are not basing their decisions on their religious views, but their approach to Constitutional interpretation. That their decisions align with their religious beliefs is not a sign of bias, nor coincidence, it is evidence of their premise.
The obvious objection: wait, there is no buffer, no alternative source for their moral framework beyond their religious belief. Upon even cursory examination, it appears circular.
But they do not need to provide one, because their claim isn’t that they are drawing it directly from their religious beliefs. Rather, God is the only source of any moral framework, and, that includes the moral foundation of America’s founding documents and society itself.
America, the Constitution, then, are the instrument that voices a set of morals outside time and space, beyond the reach of any analytical tool of reason. To be fair here, Adam Smith kind of did this, as well.
The key part is that because the Constitution, as a derivation, is not the thing in itself, it is contingent upon the moral state of society. If society has decayed to the point that it has de-coupled the political system from its metaphysical justification, then it is no longer valid and it can be ignored or discarded until that connection is restored.
As such, authoritarian policy is not only morally justified, it is necessary.
Also, my initial question was pointed at the wealthy, because not all of them are the Mercers or the DeVos family. They also exert influence and will abide authoritarianism if it is in their economic interest to do so. And again, their philosophy, as derived from Smith and others, relies on the same circularity whether they want to admit it or not. (They never mention Moral Sentiments for a reason.)
Aside: I think explaining some Roberts decisions via institutional concerns is only part of the story. Rather, Roberts, despite his religious beliefs and his policy preferences, likely understands this as a shell game.
@Erik:
This is exactly what I’ve been trying to detail. And I am doing it poorly.
@Kurtz:
Understood.
I’m just pointing out how damned odd the UK constitutional order is to most American, or indeed European, perspectives.
We are, nominally, a Monarchic state with an Established Church, which has considerable legal privileges.
Yet we merrily proceed as if most of that simply did not matter; and therefore, practically, it doesn’t.
It partly goes back to the aristocratic ascendancy of the 18th/early 19th centuries.
The lords of the land were quite happy to concede nominal privileges to the clerisy and the monarchy.
Just so long as both understood any attempt to actually exercise them, contrary to the prefences of the gentry, would have unfortunate outcomes.
Subsequently, a plurality of the aristocracy decided it would be better to accommodate the Protestant Non-Conformists, the Catholics, and the demands for a more democratic franchise.
But, Brits being Brits, quite a bit of the old Anglican Ascendancy still lingers on as kind of “ghost in the machine”.
It just tickles my sense of historial irony. 😉
Though it does have some actual effects even now: about a quarter of all junior schools in England are still “Church of England schools”.
I attended one such.
@Kurtz: I think there is a misunderstanding between what it means to actually have controlling power over a government (as with the clerics in Iran) and a group that has outsized influence (as with billionaires in the US).
Also, SCOTUS has influence and power now, because we all see it as legitimate. Ultimately, the courts have no guns, and at some point in the development of authoritarian governance, no power.
When discussing the accretion of power to the executive by the courts, the real power is with the executive, because they have the guns.
Or perhaps I am misunderstanding what you are getting at?
(It seems worth noting that oligarchs in Russia eventually found themselves in thrall to the executive (Putin) not the other way around).
@JohnSF:
Indeed! 🙂
How about this: as various institutional actors and structures lose power and influence, the actor left standing is the one with guns.
The clerics often are among those left standing if the populace is inclined to be concerned about the divine.
The very wealthy are often amongst those who hold out the longest, or even find a kind of détente with power, but it is the guns that win when everything else collapses or is undercut.
@Steven L. Taylor:
Fair enough. FWIW, I understand that having actual control over the government is fundamentally different.
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And yet another long post banished to an iPhone note. This may be my personal record.
I just can’t shake the feeling that we are missing something. But the medical examiner is ready to take the body to the morgue. And we canvased the crime scene as well as we could.
@Steven L. Taylor:
Just as the German and Italian “conservative establishments” discovered that Mussolini and Hitler were not, in the event, content just to serve their desires.
Attempting to ride a tiger is always a perilous option.
(See also Napoleon and the “directors”, or Caesar and the optimates)
@Steven L. Taylor:
If the military elite are inclined to defer to some traditional focus of allegiance, the situation may be stabilised.
That might be clerical, or royal, or constitutional.
Historically, it seldom seems to be just “defer to the rich, because reasons”.
If no superior allegiance is available to constrain the military, the outcome is often a chaos of contending warlords: see late imperial Rome, or some periods in Chinese, or Islamic, or Indian history.
In which case, you’d better hope there are no “barbarian outsiders” waiting to take advantage.
@Gustopher:
*On the other hand, it’s not like anyone is going to put you in jail, so whatever grey area we live in is clearly not Putin’s Russia.*
There is, of course, the unspoken “yet”.