Outside the Beltway

Did Gaza Cost Harris the Election?

The evidence is thin.

James Joyner · Monday, February 23, 2026 · 4 comments

Axios (“Scoop: Dems working on secret report found Gaza cost Harris votes“):

Top Democratic officials who worked on the party’s still-secret autopsy of the 2024 election concluded that Kamala Harris lost significant support because of the Biden administration’s approach to the war in Gaza, Axios has learned.

The Democratic National Committee’s research on what went wrong in 2024 has been under lock and key since party leaders decided last year to hide it from the public — a reflection of how explosively it could resonate within the party and beyond. Progressive and moderate Democrats are particularly divided over Israel, with the left more critical of that nation’s actions against Palestinians in Gaza and many questioning the U.S.’s unwavering support for Israel.

[…]

Activists from the IMEU Policy Project told the DNC that the Biden-Harris administration’s support for Israel was a factor in the party’s losses because it drained support from some young people and progressives. Hamid Bendaas, a spokesperson for the IMEU Policy Project, said that during the meeting “the DNC shared with us that their own data also found that policy was, in their words, a ‘net-negative’ in the 2024 election.” Two other senior aides at the pro-Palestinian organization also said the DNC had drawn that conclusion.

So, what we have here isn’t a conclusion from the DNC of its wide-ranging analysis, but an imput from something called the IMEU Policy Project. Despite studying foreign policy for a living and having spent years working in the DC foreign policy think tank world, I had never heard of it before this morning (even though it has been around since 2005). “IMEU” stands for Institute for Middle East Understanding. Its mission statement:

The Institute for Middle East Understanding (IMEU) works to increase and enhance the public’s understanding about Palestine, Palestinians, and Palestinian Americans through media. We do this by offering mainstream US media organizations and journalists access to facts, resources, analysis, and experts in order to help them cover key issues with accuracy and depth, and by creating and disseminating original articles, fact sheets, videos, photo essays, and other digital content.

There’s considerably more at the website, but you get the idea: this is hardly a neutral party.

Regardless, the topline finding is almost certainly true. The Gaza war was incredibly controversial. It’s almost certainly the case that the Biden-Harris administration’s siding with Israel cost Harris some votes. Hell, taking a stand on any controversial issue will cost any candidate some votes.

But, of course, the Democratic Party has traditionally done quite well with Jewish voters. If the exit polls are to be believed, 78% of self-identified Jews went for Harris, compared to only 22% for Trump. Tablet tells me that this was “a historically high margin.” While Jewish opinion is, of course, not monolithic on Israel or any other issue, being significantly more pro-Palestinian in the conflict may well have cost Harris enough Jewish votes to offset whatever gains with the elusive “some young people.”

IMEU claims the issue was a “net negative.” But, according to the exit polls, the country was almost perfectly split:

Of the “too strong” camp—presumably the IMEU position—67% went for Harris, compared to 30% for Trump. Of the “just right” camp, 60% went for Harris, compared to 39% for Trump. Trump dominated the “not strong enough” camp 82% to 18%.

In any relatively close election, one can point to any factor and make a case that it was decisive. It’s really hard to do here. Assuming the exit polls are relatively accurate (and, let’s stipulate, the increase in early and mail-in voting means they may not be representative), there’s just no evidence that being too strong on Israel was a net negative. Essentially, we have to conjure a large number of angry “too strong” progressives who either voted for Trump (which seems wildly implausible) or stayed home (which is quite possible, but damn hard to prove).

Beyond that, it bears repeating the point Steven Taylor spent weeks hammering: the 2024 U.S. election was part of a global anti-incumbent wave. Years of COVID restrictions, supply chain shocks, inflation, cultural conflicts, and negative-biased information flows across the West left a frustrated citizenry in the mood for someone else. Indeed, we were asking in August 2024 whether Harris would be able to overcome the incumbency curse.