How Effective Were U.S. Strikes on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities?

Maximalist claims are almost surely overstated.

Peter Beaumont, The Guardian (“How effective was the US attack on Iran’s nuclear sites?“):

Donald Trump was quick to claim that US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities had “completely and totally obliterated” them. Still, it remains unclear how much physical damage has been done or what the longer-term impact might be on Iran’s nuclear programme.

What was the target?

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) confirmed that attacks took place on its Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz sites, but insisted its nuclear programme would not be stopped. Iran and the UN nuclear watchdog said there were no immediate signs of radioactive contamination around the three locations after the strikes.

The Iranian Red Crescent Society reported no deaths from the US strikes, appearing to confirm Iranian claims they had been largely evacuated in advance. The health ministry said those who were injured showed no evidence of nuclear contamination. In the immediate aftermath, US military officials said the three sites had suffered “severe damage” after an operation that had been planned for weeks, suggesting it was coordinated with Israel.

The Pentagon said a battle damage assessment was still being conducted.

What do we know about the strike on Fordow?

Long regarded as the most difficult military target among Iran’s nuclear sites, the uranium enrichment facilities at Fordow – the primary target of the operation – are buried beneath the Zagros mountains. Reports have suggested that the site was constructed beneath 45-90 metres of bedrock, largely limestone and dolomite.

[…]

The site was hit by a dozen 13,600kg massive ordnance penetrators – known as bunker busters – at approximately 2.10am Iranian time. It was the weapon’s first operational use. The number used suggests a lack of confidence that a smaller strike could penetrate through to the target.

The result to a large extent depends on the kind of concrete inside the facility. Estimates of the bunker busters’ penetration are based largely on reinforced concrete resistant to 5,000psi. Iran is believed to have used more resistant concrete.

While video from the site showed evidence of a fire in the immediate aftermath, satellite images published on Sunday were suggestive but far from conclusive.

The main support building at the site appeared to be undamaged, but the topography of a prominent area of ridge line appeared to have altered and been flattened out, with some evidence of rock scarring close to two clusters of bomb craters around the ridge.

[…]

At odds with Trump’s claim of “complete obliteration”, two Israeli officials who spoke to the New York Times described serious damage at Fordow but said the site had not been completely destroyed.

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, added: “As for the assessment of the degree of damage underground, on this we cannot pronounce ourselves. It could be important; it could be significant, but no one … neither us nor anybody else could be able to tell you how much it has been damaged.”

What was the impact at Isfahan?

Isfahan’s nuclear technology centre was struck by Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from an Ohio-class submarine as opposed to bunker busters. Video posted on social media showed a distant detonation from the site on Saturday night.

According to the IAEA, in addition to four hit by Israeli strikes, six other buildings had now been attacked, including a fuel rod production facility. It said facilities targeted at Isfahan either contained no nuclear material or small quantities of natural or low-enriched uranium.

What was hit at Natanz?

Natanz had previously been damaged by the first Israeli strikes of the conflict, with assessments then suggesting they had hit the power plant supplying the main centrifuge hall. Uranium had been enriched to up to 60%, short of weapons-grade material.

It appears that Natanz’s underground enrichment hall was targeted. Enhancement of satellite images from the site on Sunday showed fresh damage to overground buildings and new cratering in the centre of the site.

[…]

Was Iran’s nuclear programme obliterated?

Iran has claimed that it evacuated the sites several days ago, and satellite imagery from several days ago suggests there was unusual truck traffic at Fordow. That appears to confirm the movement of some material from the site, possibly including the uranium stockpile – or parts of it – which remains unaccounted for.

Hassan Abedini, the deputy political head of Iran’s state broadcaster, said Iran had evacuated the three sites – Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow – some time ago.

“The enriched uranium reserves had been transferred from the nuclear centres and there are no materials left there that, if targeted, would cause radiation and be harmful to our compatriots,” he said.

Three days before the US attacks, 16 cargo trucks were seen near the Fordow entrance tunnel.

The head of the AEOI, Mohammad Eslami, claimed this month that Iran had another enrichment site “in a secure and invulnerable location” that could house centrifuges.

Analysts have long argued that while it is possible to disrupt the physical function of a nuclear facility and limit the scope of a programme through, for example, the killing of scientists, the breadth of technical knowledge acquired during the decades-long programme is impossible to destroy.

Ultimately, the question is whether the US-Israeli attacks are seen as sufficient for Iran to capitulate, or whether they instead encourage the regime to accelerate its efforts to produce a viable nuclear weapon.

Peter Sanger, NYT (“Officials Concede They Don’t Know the Fate of Iran’s Uranium Stockpile“):

A day after President Trump declared that Iran’s nuclear program had been “completely and totally obliterated” by American bunker-busting bombs and a barrage of missiles, the actual state of the program seemed far more murky, with senior officials conceding they did not know the fate of Iran’s stockpile of near-bomb-grade uranium.

“We are going to work in the coming weeks to ensure that we do something with that fuel and that’s one of the things that we’re going to have conversations with the Iranians about,” Vice President JD Vance told ABC’s “This Week” on Sunday, referring to a batch of uranium sufficient to make nine or 10 atomic weapons. Nonetheless, he contended that the country’s potential to weaponize that fuel had been set back substantially because it no longer had the equipment to turn that fuel into operative weapons.

[…]

In a briefing for reporters on Sunday, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dan Caine, avoided Mr. Trump’s maximalist claims of success. They said an initial battle-damage assessment of all three sites struck by Air Force B-2 bombers and Navy Tomahawk missiles showed “severe damage and destruction.”

Satellite photographs of the primary target, the Fordo uranium enrichment plant that Iran built under a mountain, showed several holes where a dozen 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrators — one of the largest conventional bombs in the U.S. arsenal — punched deep holes in the rock. The Israeli military’s initial analysis concluded that the site, the target of American and Israeli military planners for more than 26 years, sustained serious damage from the strike but had not been completely destroyed.

But there was also evidence, according to two Israeli officials with knowledge of the intelligence, that Iran had moved equipment and uranium from the site in recent days. And there was growing evidence that the Iranians, attuned to Mr. Trump’s repeated threats to take military action, had removed 400 kilograms, or roughly 880 pounds, of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity. That is just below the 90 percent that is usually used in nuclear weapons.

The 60-percent enriched fuel had been stored deep inside another nuclear complex, near the ancient capital of Isfahan. Rafael Mariano Grossi, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said by text that the fuel had last been seen by his teams of United Nations inspectors about a week before Israel began its attacks on Iran. In an interview on CNN on Sunday he added that “Iran has made no secret that they have protected this material.”

Asked by text later in the day whether he meant that the fuel stockpile — which is stored in special casks small enough to fit in the trunks of about 10 cars — had been moved, he replied, “I do.” That appeared to be the mystery about the fuel’s fate that Mr. Vance was discussing.

If so, Isfahan would not be the only place where the custodians of the Iranian nuclear program — a subject of nationalistic pride and the symbol of Iran’s ability to defend itself — were trying to move equipment and material out of sight, and harden the Fordo plant to protect what had to stay in place.

Satellite images released by Maxar Technologies at the tunnels leading into the Fordo mountain, taken in the days before the American strike, show 16 cargo trucks positioned near an entrance. An analysis by the Open Source Centre in London suggested that Iran may have been preparing the site for a strike.

It is unclear exactly what, if anything, was removed from the facility.

In fact, there was only so much the Iranians could save. The giant centrifuges that spin at supersonic speeds, purifying uranium, are piped together and bolted to the cement floor. One U.S. official said it would have been unrealistic to completely move equipment out of Fordo after the conflict with Israel began.

The official added that historical documents about the nuclear program were buried in the bowels of the site, likely complicating any efforts in reconstituting it. In coming days, both the Iranians and intelligence agencies expect to learn more about the Natanz enrichment site, which is older, larger and less well protected than Fordo. It was struck by the Israelis repeatedly, and they destroyed an aboveground enrichment center and disrupted the electrical system. Mr. Grossi later said he believed the interruption of the electrical supply could have sent the centrifuges spinning out of control, probably destroying all of them.

How long it would take the Iranians to repair and replace that equipment is unknown; it would probably stretch for years. But Iran is also building a new, deep replacement for Natanz in the south of the city. Officials in Tehran have told the I.A.E. A. that they have not yet opened the plant, so there is nothing to see.

That President Trump’s initial claims were likely wildly overstated comes as no surprise. It’s the nature of his political style. While unorthodox and frequently counterproductive from a policymaking perspective, it’s been highly effective at mobilizing and reshaping his base. It has landed him the White House on two separate occasions and made him the central figure of American politics for more than a decade.

Tactically, the decision to broadcast our intention to bomb Iran if they did not make unacceptable-to-them concessions was a mixed bag. It did not have the desired coercive effect and, rather clearly, gave them time to move materiel that could be moved, thereby lessening the strategic impact of the attack. On the other hand, it did appear to minimize noncombatant casualties.

That said, it’s rather clear that the damage was substantial. At worst, these facilities will take a long time to rebuild. At best, they’re permanently unusable.

But Sanger makes a point I’ve been making for going on twenty years:

If Iran is truly pursuing a nuclear weapon — which it officially denies — it is taking more time than any nuclear-armed nation in history. The United States developed the Manhattan Project in four years or so, developing the bombs dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki to end the war in the Pacific. The Soviet Union conducted its first test in 1949, only four years later. India, Pakistan and Israel all sped the process.

The Iranians have been at it for more than 20 years, and an archive of data stolen from a Tehran warehouse by Israel a number of years ago showed that Iranian engineers were exploring nuclear triggers and other equipment that would only be used to detonate a weapon. That was around 2003, when, according to American intelligence, the engineers received instructions to halt work on weaponization.

Comments by Mr. Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in recent days suggest they believe that work has resumed, though no evidence to support the contention has been made public. If so, the strikes on Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan may only reinforce the view among Iranian leaders that they need a weapon for survival of the government.

The mantra that “Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is unacceptable” has been a bipartisan and, indeed, global consensus for a very long time. I certainly share it. Not so much because I think they’ll immediately nuke Israel—despite eliminationist rhetoric, we have almost half a century of evidence that the Islamic Republic is a rational actor—but because it would likely set off a regional arms race. At the same time, though, we’ve seen time and again that it’s next to impossible to stop a determined regime from acquiring 1940s technology.

To the extent this attack kicked the can down the road, it was effective. But, as Sanger notes, it’s quite possible that it will have the opposite effect: convincing the mullahs that the only way Iran can achieve its rightful place as a dominant regional power is to become a nuclear possessor.

UPDATE: It’s worth noting that, whether or not the U.S. strikes were a “one-off” (which I suspect really depends on Iran’s next moves), Israel is not finished attacking Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

FILED UNDER: Middle East, Military Affairs, National Security, World Politics, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
James Joyner
About James Joyner
James Joyner is a Professor of Security Studies. He's a former Army officer and Desert Storm veteran. Views expressed here are his own. Follow James on Twitter @DrJJoyner.

Comments

  1. Michael Reynolds says:

    To the extent this attack kicked the can down the road, it was effective. But, as Sanger notes, it’s quite possible that it will have the opposite effect: convincing the mullahs that the only way Iran can achieve its rightful place as a dominant regional power is to become a nuclear possessor.

    An alternate conclusion might be, Every time we try to enrich uranium the Israelis or Americans will come along and blow shit up. So, maybe we just don’t do that. There is a huge long list of countries without nukes that do not get all blowed up. Spain? Ireland? Brazil?

    The conclusion that We need nukes, translates as, We need nukes if we’re going to continue to be sponsors of terrorism and threaten neighboring countries. So, again, maybe don’t do that. Maybe become a normal country that takes care of its people rather than taking huge risks and wasting billions of scarce dollars on terrorism and belligerence.

    That’s what a rational actor would do, because there is zero logic to maintaining this genocidal hostility to Israel. Hating on Israel does not feed or shelter the Iranian people, it doesn’t build roads or hospitals. It accomplishes nothing, and it accomplishes that nothing in a pointless cause.

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  2. Kingdaddy says:

    Rule of thumb: the first reports are always wrong.

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  3. drj says:

    @Michael Reynolds:

    Maybe become a normal country

    You are really committed to acting out the stereotype of an ignorant, blustering American.

    If there is one reason why Iran isn’t a normal country, it’s the US.

    A short history lesson for you:

    1953: The US and UK sponsor a coup against the most democratic Iranian government ever with the aim of strengthening the autocratic rule of the Shah.

    1979: The Iranians are sick of the foreign-imposed regime of the Shah. The resulting popular revolt gets hijacked by one faction (though probably the most popular) of the broad opposition against the Shah, namely the Islamists.

    1979-1981: With the Shah being a very unpopular American puppet, most Iranians really don’t like the US and the Iran hostage crisis takes place. The US doesn’t like this at all (in addition to having its puppet overthrown) and imposes sanctions that do not get relieved.

    1982: Israel invades Lebanon and tries to impose a Maronite regime on the country that commits massacres against the local Shia population. Iran sees an opportunity to build legitimacy across the Middle East, and becomes a not-too-pleasant player (among other not-too-pleasant players, including Israel) in Lebanon.

    The US, being pissed off because of the Shah and seeing Israel being threatened (despite Israel being a rather larger threat to Lebanon than vice versa), swears eternal enmity against the ayatollahs. (See also: Cheney, Rumsfeld, and McCain.)

    Iran starts a nuclear program with the main aim (I think) of achieving sanctions relief – although probably also as insurance policy against military threats of which there are plenty in their neck of the woods.

    1995 (or thereabouts): Israel starts claiming that Iran is one year away from developing a nuclear weapon.

    2025: The weakest and stupidest US government ever finally gives in to Israel and shit finally hits the fan.

    But somehow it’s the Iranians who should become a normal country.

    My God, have some fucking self-awareness.

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  4. Rob1 says:

    I’m betting that “telegraph Don” spurred the Iranians to move a significant core of their nuke operation out of Fordo. And now they’re motivated more than ever to possess nuclear armament. Not that they were headed in that direction anyway.

    If only there were another Islamic regime serving as “counterbalance” nearby. Some country that had successfully gone toe-to-toe with Iran in the past. Some country like, say, Iraq.

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  5. DK says:

    @drj: Personally, before I return to lecturing other countries on normalcy, I’m gonna wait till I’m reasonably sure Americans will no longer elect convicted felon Epstein-bestie rapists who incite terror attacks on Congress.

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  6. @Michael Reynolds:

    The conclusion that We need nukes, translates as, We need nukes if we’re going to continue to be sponsors of terrorism and threaten neighboring countries.

    No, Michael, honestly, that is not the only answer. This is where you allow yourself to be a neocon on topics related to Israel.

    Iran wants to be a regional power, as do many states of size and consequence. This alone is motivation for enhancing military capabilities, including nuclear weapons.

    But I will continue to stress that these attacks will make them want a bomb more, not less. The main reason they are currently being attacked is that they don’t have a nuke, and they know that if they get one, the odds of these kinds of attacks will be diminished.

    There comes a time when one has to step back from emotional concerns and dislike and assess what we know about nation-state behavior in international relations as well as to assess what we know about the behavior, not the rhetoric, of a given government in terms of assessing their likely responses to various stimuli.

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  7. Kingdaddy says:

    @Michael Reynolds: I suggest you do a little research on the possible motives behind Iran’s nuclear program and its anti-Western rhetoric before making any major pronouncements about it. For example, the nuclear program is a component of Iran’s domestic politics, specifically the ongoing struggle between the reformists and hard-liners. “That’s what a rational actor would do” only makes sense when you understand the actors, and the game that they are playing.

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  8. Michael Reynolds says:

    @drj:
    Yeah, everything you just lectured me on, Captain Condescension? I knew it all. I was alive then. So climb down off your soap box.

    You act as if Iran has no agency. You act as if after the Shah there was no alternative to becoming a terror sponsor. 1979 was a long time ago. It’s been 46 years since the Ayatollahs took over. In the European context that’s 1945 to 1991. Oh, and in case you didn’t know, I’m referring to the end of WW2. That was this really big war that happened.

    46 years after we burned Japan to the ground we were all scaring ourselves with the prospect of Japan outpacing the US and buying up the West Coast. The Korean War ended in 1953. (That was a war between Communist North Korea and authoritarian South Korea. Remember MASH? That war.) And 46 years later South Korea was democratizing and becoming a major manufacturing power. It’s been just 50 years since we dropped a billion tons of bombs on Vietnam and now they’re a fast-rising star in Asia. And you know what? Japan, South Korea and Vietnam didn’t have trillions of dollars of oil.

    So spare me your condescension, and your hair shirt and your hatred of Israel.

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  9. Kingdaddy says:

    @drj: Your chronology is missing one of the biggest moments in modern Iranian history, the Iran-Iraq War. That conflict had a major influence on attitudes about the threats against Iran (including the commitment to never allowing a neighboring country to attack Iran again), attitudes toward the West (since the US was backing Saddam Hussein), and the internal politics of the country.

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  10. BTW: a major reason that Iran sponsors groups like Hamas and Hezbollah is to project power in and around Israel because they are adversaries. This doesn’t make it moral or right, but if the goal is to understand behaviors before you do things like getting deeply involved in military actions, understanding is kind of important.

    The Iranians engage in asymmetrical warfare because they lack Israel’s ability to project power as effectively via conventional means.

    BTW, care to guess what would change the power balance between the two? Nukes.

    And while I am not, at all, defending Iran, it isn’t like Israeli (or, for that matter, American) rhetoric aimed at Iran is all sunshine and ponies. In other words, yes, the Israelis have reasons to feel threatened by word and deed by the Iranians. But the reverse is true as well. This matters regardless of who you think is right or wrong, if you want to try to understand the choices that have been made.

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  11. Michael Reynolds says:

    @Kingdaddy:

    “That’s what a rational actor would do” only makes sense when you understand the actors

    Baloney. Or bologna, if you prefer. Israel also has some history to deal with, and it has its own hardliners vs. reformers so by your logic they are also acting acting rationally. And Russia is acting rationally. And North Korea. And Haiti. Indeed, by your generous definition the entire world is a great big stew of rationality.

    But OK, let’s pretend that rationality is purely subjective and everyone everywhere is rational. Now explain why Iran sponsors terrorism.

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  12. Kingdaddy says:

    @Michael Reynolds: You’re being more than a little unfair to @drj. Explaining the mindset of a country does not mean that the leaders of said country lack agency. No more than saying that, post-9/11, the Bush Administration can be excused for everything it did, in the name of eliminating all threats of further terrorist attacks, the Iraq invasion being the biggest and worst mistake.

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  13. Michael Reynolds says:

    @Steven L. Taylor:

    The Iranians engage in asymmetrical warfare because they lack Israel’s ability to project power as effectively via conventional means.

    No, no, no. Why does Iran need to project power around Israel? Why? To what end? Did Israel threaten to invade Iran 46 years ago? Did they bomb Iran 46 years ago? Your excuses for Iran would apply equally well to Russia in Ukraine. You start from an assumption that Iran has a reason for hating Israel. A baseless assumption.

    Furthermore Iran lacks Israel’s ability to project power because they are run by medieval religious nuts who don’t understand basic economics. Iran could be a rich country. It could have all the conventional power it wants or needs. Its people could all be driving BMWs. The fact they are poor and their people are suffering has fuck-all to do with Israel or the United States and everything to do with their own choices. And the word is choices.

    Your attitude is one of western condescension toward ‘lesser’ peoples who somehow can never be held responsible.

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  14. drj says:

    @Michael Reynolds:

    Why? To what end? Did Israel threaten to invade Iran 46 years ago? Did they bomb Iran 46 years ago?

    As I have explained multiple times before, the IDF actively facilitated massacres of local Shiites during Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon.

    Hezbollah did not even exist before 1982.

    Iran could be a rich country.

    Not without US sanctions on any potential business partner in place. See also: Cuba.

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  15. Michael Reynolds says:

    As for the mean old sanctions we imposed on Iran, here’s what they have to do to end sanctions: stop threatening genocide and sponsoring terrorism. And just like that, no sanctions.

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  16. Michael Reynolds says:

    @drj:
    Lebanon had a civil war raging at the time, a civil war in which Shiite militias and Druze militias and Falangists and the forces of what was left of Lebanon’s government and god knows who else, were all trying to either seize or hold power. A civil war. In Lebanon, roughly 1000 km from the border of Iran. Not in Iran, right?

    So again, explain why Iran has to exterminate Israel. Because Israel meddled in a civil war on its borders and not 1000 km away?

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  17. @Michael Reynolds: Honestly, you need to read some basic IR textbooks and set aside your emotions.

    So again, explain why Iran has to exterminate Israel.

    First, you are taking the word “exterminate” too seriously.

    Second, did Israel not just start a preemptive war of choice? And this is not the first time Israel has attacked Iranian territory.

    Again, I can certainly explain why Israel did so, and I agree that the Iranian regime is morally repugnant. But the Iranians have views on all of this as well, which includes feeling threatened as a regime since 1979 from the US. And who is the US’s main ally in the region? Which state threatens Iranian hegemony the most in the region?

    Because Israel meddled in a civil war on its borders and not 1000 km away?

    As a writer, surely you see the irony of an American opining about why countries shouldn’t care about events far from their borders?

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  18. @Michael Reynolds:

    As for the mean old sanctions we imposed on Iran, here’s what they have to do to end sanctions: stop threatening genocide and sponsoring terrorism. And just like that, no sanctions.

    Because, of course, the only reason the US had sanctions on Iran was because of their rhetoric?

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  19. Kingdaddy says:

    @Michael Reynolds: You might enjoy one of the classic books in international relations, Graham Allison’s The Essence Of Decision. It looks at the Cuban Missile Crisis from three different perspectives, to see how well each of them explains the same set of events. The first is the traditional “rational actor” model, which proceeds from the assumption that nations are like chess players, crafting their optimal strategies, then moving their pieces around the board in pursuit of those strategies. What did Kennedy do to respond to the Soviets moving missiles into Cuba? Did he see the best strategy for the US, and did he make the right moves ?

    But that’s not necessarily the only, or even the best, way to look at international relations. The players in the international game may see a best strategy they’d like to pursue, but their actions are also shaped and constrained by their internal politics, as well as the ways in which big, clumsy bureaucracies operate.

    I’m recommending this to you because you seem to subscribe to the rational actor model whenever you comment on the Middle East. The governments of Israel and Iran operate in a much more complex fashion, however. Israel’s current foreign policy has a lot to do with its internal politics (the public shift rightward, the role of the religious parties in the Israeli government, etc.). So, too, does Iran’s foreign policy have a lot to do with its internal politics, such as the way in which Iran’s nuclear program has become a lightning rod for its sense of national prestige and security.

    So it’s not strictly a chess game the country is playing, in which if only Khameini or Pezeshkian just looked at the international chess board, and made the optimal moves (according to your definition of what their goals should be), everything would be hunky-dory.

    That’s not to rob anyone of agency, or to excuse the actions of a truly horrible regime. It’s just to better understand what ploys might work better than others in dealing with Iran. If the US does something that increases the Iranian public’s sense that the only way to be secure is to have nuclear weapons, then that particular move empowers the very factions in Iran we don’t want to help.

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  20. Raoul says:

    MR seems a tad testy today. True, the IDF can continue to strike Iran to prevent resumption of their nuclear program, and can do so for a very long time, but I doubt greatly that this regime or the next will stop on their quest, it’s now simply a matter of national pride. As to the current attack, I will wait for the assessment, but we can apply a little science concerning mass and energy, and there is no weapon, including the Tsar Bomba, that can penetrate 300 feet, the alleged depth of Fordow. The hope is that the bombs we used cause mountain degradation but there is no scientific basis to support such outcome. The bombing can definitely affect access to the site and it is here where I would expect a more effective result due to tactical targeting.

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  21. steve says:

    @Michael Reynolds: No. They also have to give up any ability to make nukes including allowing unannounced inspections anywhere, anytime ie give up sovereignty. They also need to give up the ability to produce longer range or more accurate missiles as that was a major reason Israel and the right opposed JCPOA. IOW, they need to be totally vulnerable to Israel leaving Israel as the only true regional power. Of course that means there is no limit on the territory that Israel can then claim. The entire West Bank will go to Israel and what are the chances they stop at the river. Base this upon their actions and not their words ie they just keep expanding.

    Anyway, Israel, with our support, has a major advantage now. If they can maintain that forever, and not do something again like moving troops away from Gaza on the days when Hamas was most likely to try a surprise attack, while also funding Hamas to keep the Palestinians at odds with each other, then it probably works well in the long term. On the bright side we know that people in the ME have short memories and dont hold grudges so we know Iran wont be looking for revenge if Israel ever makes another mistake.

    Steve

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  22. JKB says:

    One wonders why the Iranians are enriching uranium at all since many countries stand ready to supply them with nuclear warheads.

    Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said Sunday

    “What have the Americans accomplished with their nighttime strikes on three nuclear sites in Iran?” Medvedev questioned in a post on social media. “The enrichment of nuclear material — and, now we can say it outright, the future production of nuclear weapons — will continue. A number of countries are ready to directly supply Iran with their own nuclear warheads.”

    At the very minimum, we now have the bad actors speaking plainly and in the open. Social media is such a gift to get people to reveal their true nature, isn’t it?

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  23. just nutha says:

    @Rob1: Yeah, if only there were, but alas, there’s not.

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  24. just nutha says:

    @Kingdaddy: Y’all’s wasting your time. Reynolds is in the bag on Israel as completely as if he got all of is information from Hal Lindsay’s old International Intelligence Report program from Trinity Broadcasting back in the day. He’s a complete pawn to the End-Times Televangelists on this point. Has been for almost a decade.

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  25. charontwo says:
  26. CSK says:
  27. steve says:

    @just nutha: Iwouldnt say he is in the bad just presenting another side. Let’s not forget, which is easy to do in these arguments, that Iran are not good guys. They have supported terrorism. They are an active theocracy which is always a risk to the rest of the world. We, the US, also have lots of people going back and forth to Israel so we know there are a lot fo good people there. That said, the closer Israel comes to also being a theocracy the more we ought to be leery of them and Netanyahu has been elected over and over and he is either part of the increasing theocracy or is at least catering to it. For that theocracy almost no action is too extreme.

    So we have what is becoming one theocracy against another trying to solve what is essentially a “wicked” problem ie there is no obvious good solution. Michael points out that if only Iran, and Arab countries in general would just give up attacking/hatred of Israel, give up any and all means of defending themselves against Israel, the problems would all be over, but would Israel in turn give up on claiming more territory? Now that the theocratic branch is Israel is ascendant?

    Steve

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  28. Connor says:

    @Michael Reynolds:

    “You act as if after the Shah there was no alternative to becoming a terror sponsor. 1979 was a long time ago. It’s been 46 years since the Ayatollahs took over.”

    So many pages and pages of commentary of all sorts written, but this sentence distills it down to its essence. A wildly oil rich nation need have no outsized and difficult to attain ambitions for a domestic nuclear program. (What? The Ayatollah is a closet global warmist?) No need to place those assets deep in bunkers under mountains. No need to enrich uranium far, far beyond that required to produce electricity. The notion that current actions will unleash previously inoperative desires to build a bomb is just plain arrant nonsense. Its been the goal all along. And as the biggest state sponsor of terrorism in the world, it simply cannot be tolerated, no matter how vexing the issues attendant to preventing it.

  29. Connor says:

    Fordow second strike.

    “According to the Associated Press, this second strike on Fordow specifically targeted roads around the facility “to obstruct access to the site.” ”

    Ya don’t say……..

  30. CSK says:

    Per the BBC, Iran is launching missiles at U.S. bases in Qatar and Iraq.

  31. Scott says:

    @steve: The majority of the participants here don’t swim in the Christian right swamps but I have to tell you that when Trump, in this announcement of the bombing, specifically brought up God, his crowd went wild. Texas two bit legislators praised Trump for doing this and their Facebook followers were ecstatic in response. They believe we are in a religious war also. They believe that God is on our side. Ironically, Israel believes God is on their side and Iran also believes God also is on their side. It doesn’t bode well for those into realpolitik.

    As Frank Herbert wrote: “When religion and politics travel in the same cart, the riders believe nothing can stand in their way. Their movements become headlong – faster and faster and faster. They put aside all thoughts of obstacles and forget the precipice does not show itself to the man in a blind rush until it’s too late.”

    4
  32. Just Another Ex-Republican says:

    As noted by others above, Iran has been a year away from getting a nuke for 20 or 30 years now. Maybe they really are this time? But I simply don’t trust the people making that claim anymore. Netanyahu is the boy who cried wolf far too many times.

    And isn’t it strange how often something violent happens in Israeli foreign affairs when Netanyahu feels domestic political troubles creeping up on him.

    Iran is a bad actor, no doubt, and I have little sympathy for them. That fact does not automatically mean Israel are the good guys in every instance. And all this strike did is remind a bunch of bad actors (not just Iranian ones) that the US doesn’t bomb North Korea when they piss us off, and why that is the case.

    6
  33. steve says:

    @CSK: Dont worry. Israel is willing to fight to the very last US soldier.

    Steve@Connor: Didnt you used to be an engineer? It’s not that hard to build a nuclear weapon once you have the fissile material. Iran had 25,000 pounds of enriched uranium and didnt build a nuke. Per Israeli sources, and hence US sources, Israel has at least 500 kg of enriched uranium now. Why haven’t they gone ahead and built one? Based upon the actual actions of Iran, not the words of Israel, Iran has not had an interest in actually building a nuke. They, like Iraq, wanted to project the ability to build one of they wanted. So that has ended up for both Iraq and Iran as being pretty stupid, but the question can then become does this push to Iran to actually build one? How much do you trust the Israeli Intelligence and leadership that had a group of known terrorists within its own territory but decided to just ignore them so that they could engage in the biggest “surprise” attack in its history? The same government that was funding Hamas, the terrorists, to keep the Palestinians in chaos? Really, this isn’t the US leading on policy and strategy here, this is Israel doing whatever it wants and we are following along and covering them.

    Steve

    7
  34. wr says:

    @Steven L. Taylor: “Because, of course, the only reason the US had sanctions on Iran was because of their rhetoric?”

    I think you’re failing to understand the subtleties of MR’s opinions about the Middle East. They’re a little hard to summarize because of the intricate levels of nuance, but basically they go like this:

    Israel = good.

    Iran = evil.

    Once you can master that complex concept, then all of his other points make perfect sense. It might help if you read up on a little Calvinist theology.

    3
  35. wr says:

    @JKB: “Social media is such a gift to get people to reveal their true nature, isn’t it?”

    Are you offering yourself up as a test case? If so, then sure.

    3
  36. charontwo says:

    Trump was really favorably impressed with how well Israel’s attacks on Iran were playing on Fox News, and wanted his share of glory:

    https://www.politicususa.com/p/trump-had-no-intel-but-bombed-iran

    excerpts:

    The New York Times reported that Trump was monitoring how Israel’s strikes on Iran were playing on Fox News:

    He marveled to advisers about what he said was a brilliant Israeli military operation, which involved a series of precision strikes that killed key figures in Iran’s military leadership and blasted away strategic weapons sites. Mr. Trump took calls on his cellphone from reporters and began hailing the operation as “excellent” and “very successful” and hinting that he had much more to do with it than people realized.

    Later that day, Mr. Trump asked an ally how the Israeli strikes were “playing.” He said that “everyone” was telling him he needed to get more involved, including potentially dropping 30,000-pound GBU-57 bombs on Fordo, the Iranian uranium-enrichment facility buried underneath a mountain south of Tehran.

    The president was closely monitoring Fox News, which was airing wall-to-wall praise of Israel’s military operation and featuring guests urging Mr. Trump to get more involved. Several Trump advisers lamented the fact that Mr. Carlson was no longer on Fox, which meant that Mr. Trump was not hearing much of the other side of the debate.

    Trump was influenced by how the strikes Israel launched were playing on Fox News, but what about the intelligence that Trump claims to have about Iran being on the verge of a nuclear weapon?

    Rolling Stone reported that Trump has no intel:

    There is no intel,” says one of the officials, who were granted anonymity to discuss sensitive matters. “Nothing new, that I’m aware of… The president is protecting the United States and our interests, [but] the intelligence assessments have not really changed from what they were before.”

    Across the federal government, senior officials and policymakers aren’t pretending that Trump’s claims of an imminent nuclear threat are built on anything but vibes, whether intentionally manufactured or not.

    2
  37. Andy says:

    Well, this thread took a strange turn.

    Here’s my perspective on it:

    It’s been said several times that Iran and Israel are “adversaries,” and that explains why Iran has long tried to build a “ring of fire” around Israel to be able to attack it. Everyone knows they are adversaries; the question is why they are adversaries.

    drj’s theory is that it’s all about Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. That’s probably a small part of it, but it can hardly explain the totality. And if you listen to the Iranian government, who is perfectly clear about why it hates Israel, you’ll very rarely see Lebanon come up. But it’s a convenient excuse to blame Israel for Iran’s hostility.

    The IR books that have been recommended here probably talk about the various reasons why two countries may become “adversaries.” Well, let’s dig a bit deeper into that. I think what you’ll find is that most of the common reasons for an adversarial relationship don’t exist when it comes to Israel and Iran. In fact, as I’ll discuss later, on a strategic level, Iran and Israel should be natural allies.

    – Most conflicts involve territorial disputes, but that doesn’t apply here. The two countries are so distant from each other that land invasion is impossible, and the only means of attack are from aircraft and long-range missiles (and local proxy forces). There’s no historical emnity of the kind often seen from different peoples fighting over territory or control of a common government.

    – The two countries don’t have any resource disputes or have any significant economic competition (such as between the US and China, among many other examples).

    – Israel is a relatively young country, and the Islamic Republic has only governed for a bit over four decades. There isn’t a long history of grievance, and again, this is primarily a function of the two countries not being close to each other.

    This leaves four other factors that potentially explain why these countries are adversaries: ideololgy, ethnicity, religion, and, to a certain degree, regional competition.

    So Israel is a liberal democracy, and Iran is an authoritarian theocracy. Whatever one thinks of the level of democracy and liberalism in Israel, it’s indisputable that Iran rules as an authoritarian theocracy both in terms of its domestic and international politics and actions. It’s not a compatible ideology and form of government for a democracy. This is the primary driver of the adversarial relationship between the two countries.

    While some deride it as mere rhetoric and that we shouldn’t take what Iran says (and has said for 40 years) too seriously, the fact is that Iran has backed up its rhetoric with actions in the real world for a very long time. Its desire to see Israel destroyed isn’t mere rhetoric, it’s one of the core goals of Iranian foreign policy, one that Iran has spent immense resources on. As I often say here, one needs to look at what people do more than what people say – and in Iran’s case, what Iran does matches what it says.

    There is also some regional competition, but Iran and Israel share regions only tangentially. They both lie on the periphery of a region dominated by Sunni Arabs. Priot to the 1979 revolution, Iran and Israel had an active, close, albeit largely covert, relationship because the two countries actually shared many strategic interests. The alliance was natural as an offset to the various aggressive and militarized Arab dictatorships and monarchies. Israel developed a “periphery doctrine” to counter-balance the threat from Israel’s neighbors, and Iran was part of that.

    Everything changed after the Iranian revolution. The new theocratic authoritarian regime recast Israel as an ideological and religious enemy, an enmity which became a core part of the regime’s identity, which continues today. Absent that, Iran and Israel would likely still be natural allies, mutually supporting each other as a counterweight to Arab Sunni countries between them.

    And so Michael is entirely correct on the main point – It’s Iran that has chosen to be an adversary of Israel and backs up its rhetoric with action in the real world. Iran has spent hundreds of billions building and funding proxies that are adjacent to Israel and can attack Israel directly. Iran has built ballistic missile systems that it openly says are for the specific purpose of being able to attack Israel. In service of these goals, Iran has destabilized Lebanon, helped kill hundreds of thousands in Syria’s civil war, and bombed and murdered Jews and Israeli-associated targets around the globe.

    Israel, by contrast, has not made it a core goal to wipe Iran off the map. Israel has not spent the bulk of its foreign policy and military efforts building proxies to attack Iran.

    In summary, the adversarial relationship originates from Iran, specifically a consequence of Iran’s “revolutionary Islamic” government deciding from its founding that Israel is a mortal enemy that must be destroyed. Michael is right that it was a choice the revolutionary government of Iran made.

    6
  38. Andy says:

    Anyway, on the actual topic of this post, I highly recommend this series of tweets for Dr. Jeffrey Lewis.

    The only thing I really disagree with him on is his argument that Israel’s entire operation was about regime change, but he knows his stuff on weapons programs, I’ve communicated with him frequently over the years, especially back when his blog was active, so he’s one of the more credible commentators IMO. Assuming the facts are accurate, Israel and the US made some serious errors in terms of attacking Iran’s nuclear program.

    2
  39. JKB says:

    The mullahs have lobbed a 6-10 ballistic missiles at Qatar, ostensively at the US base 40 miles outside the city.

    The New York Times reports that Iran coordinated the missile attacks on the U.S. air base in Qatar with Qatari officials, providing advance warning to minimize casualties, according to three Iranian officials familiar with the plans.

    1
  40. charontwo says:
  41. @Andy:

    In summary, the adversarial relationship originates from Iran, specifically a consequence of Iran’s “revolutionary Islamic” government deciding from its founding that Israel is a mortal enemy that must be destroyed. Michael is right that it was a choice the revolutionary government of Iran made.

    I, for one, am not disputing this.

    But, “they started it,” while true, does not tell us whether the current hostilities are a good idea or not. Moreover, and this has been a point I have been trying to make in a variety of ways, I am unconvinced that any of this is any more effective in forestalling Iran’s nuclear ambitions than continued diplomacy would have been. I certainly am not convinced the cost has been worth it (and I don’t just mean US costs).

    Really, I think over-focusing on certain bits of Iranian rhetoric is overshadowing how much of what we are currently witnessing is being driven by Israeli domestic politics and the simple-mindedness of the US administration.

    I still say that the lesson from all of this is that Iran will now accelerate plans for a bomb, not the opposite.

    They have also been taught that having regional proxies, like Hezbollah, is to their security benefit. This will encourage more, not less, of those kinds of actions.

    It is possible that Israel will utterly degrade Iran’s ability to do any of that, but I have my doubts. We have seen effective terrorism from pretty low-power actors.

    And if there is regime change in Iran, there is zero guarantee that it will be towards a more Israel-friendly one.

    7
  42. charontwo says:

    @Andy:

    If you don’t like X, the same skeets are on Bluesky:

    https://bsky.app/profile/did:plc:qu4xxcvwtudykd3mbchawpz6/post/3lsageddlpk2l

  43. Andy says:

    Wow, Iran really wants to avoid escalation. It conducted a completely performative attack on Al Udeid, which the US evacuated several days ago.

    5
  44. tl;dr: The focus on the moral preferences we might have for Iran or Israel doesn’t change the dynamic and likely unpredictable nature of the current conflict.

    And there are good reasons to think it will stop neither nuclear development nor terrorism.

    So, the question is: is it all worth whatever pause it may have created? Maybe, but I have doubts given the way that these things end up not being what anyone expects.

    2
  45. @Andy: I agree. It does seem like the kind of performative response they did against Israel a few years ago.

    3
  46. Andy says:

    @charontwo:

    I don’t like either of them – my opinion has long been that Twitter/X is a kind of mind cancer, and Bluesky is no different. I still have an X account, only because there are still respectable people there who insist on posting (Like Lewis) on these platforms instead of a more sane choice, like his blog.

  47. Kathy says:

    @charontwo:

    Who’d have guessed that in real life there is no sign labeled DESTROY THIS TARGET TO WIN WAR?

    5
  48. drj says:

    @Andy:

    So Israel is a liberal democracy, and Iran is an authoritarian theocracy. […] It’s not a compatible ideology and form of government for a democracy. This is the primary driver of the adversarial relationship between the two countries.

    Israel has reasonable relations with Saudi Arabia (although both countries pretend otherwise). So, no. This isn’t the primary driver of the hostility between Iran and Israel.

    the fact is that Iran has backed up its rhetoric with actions in the real world for a very long time. Its desire to see Israel destroyed isn’t mere rhetoric, it’s one of the core goals of Iranian foreign policy

    Despite its rhetoric, Iran has never done anything that amounts even remotely to an existential threat to Israels existence. There is certainly a contest about who controls southern Lebanon, or even perhaps northern Israel, but Israel’s existence has never been threatened by Iran. (I would be willing to admit that Iran has never had the capacity to threaten Israel’s existence, but that still means that Israel’s existence has never, in fact, been threatened by Iran. And, if so, how could it be one of the core goals of Iranian foreign policy? Do countries typically strive for things they can’t realistically achieve?)

    Moreover, it wouldn’t even make sense. Let’s assume that Iran destroys Israel, who is going to live there? It certainly won’t be Shiites. So what’s in it for them?

    Everything changed after the Iranian revolution. The new theocratic authoritarian regime recast Israel as an ideological and religious enemy, an enmity which became a core part of the regime’s identity, which continues today.

    That is certainly true (and Iran bears responsibility for the resulting rhetoric), but I see this more as a way for Iran to break its isolation in time of great hardship during the Iran-Iraq War. And I don’t think it would have happened (certainly not to the same degree) without Israel invading Lebanon and fucking over the local Shiites.

    On a final note, I find it notable that yesterday you argued that Iran wouldn’t close the Strait of Hormuz since that would be a course of action that would result in great and immediate harm to the country. But today you are saying that, due to its ideology, Iran is committed to the destruction of Israel, the consequences be damned.

    So what is it? Are the Iranians rational actors or not? You can’t have it both ways.

    2
  49. @drj:

    Israel has reasonable relations with Saudi Arabia (although both countries pretend otherwise). So, no. This isn’t the primary driver of the hostility between Iran and Israel.

    I agree, BTW. The conflict is not democracy vs. authoritarianism. (See also the US and Saudi Arabia over the long haul, among a number of other examples.)

    I think that Israel has long been a major foil in the region because of the Palestinian issue, which makes for a useful adversary for domestic political consumption. And, more importantly, Iran wants to be a regional power.

    On a final note, I find it notable that yesterday you argued that Iran wouldn’t close the Strait of Hormuz since that would be a course of action that would result in great harm to the country. But today you are saying that, due to its ideology, Iran is committed to the destruction of Israel, the consequences be damned.

    So what is it? Are the Iranians rational actors or not? You can’t have it both ways.

    I think you make an excellent point.

    3
  50. Gustopher says:

    @JKB: Medvedev

    A number of countries are ready to directly supply Iran with their own nuclear warheads.

    I am pretty sure that it was not a major foreign policy objective of the Trump administration to get Russian officials to start openly considering giving nuclear weapons to Iran.

    It is possible that such a development might suggest a need to reassess whether US actions are advancing our policy goals, or running somewhat counter to them.

    5
  51. @Andy: Thanks for the Lewis link.

    But doesn’t think largely comport with what I have been saying?

    1
  52. Gustopher says:

    @drj:

    So what is it? Are the Iranians rational actors or not? You can’t have it both ways.

    Why not?

    Is the US a rational actor? Sometimes, but we’re also threatening Denmark with tariffs to try to get Greenland.

    4
  53. @Gustopher: I need to write more about this, but being a rational actor doesn’t mean you don’t make mistakes.

    The point with what drj notes is that if Iran, as a state, can assess that closing the Strait of Hormuz comes with significant downsides that it wishes to avoid, it should be able to do the same thing if it had a nuke despite its “wipe them off the map” rhetoric.

    If Iran is a rational actor and can be seen to assess the cost/benefit in one scenario, that would suggest that it could do so in other scenarios

    Keep in mind that doesn’t mean that a rational actor cannot make a mistake.

    BTW: threatening Denmark with tariffs isn’t irrational. It is just stupid.

    2
  54. Andy says:

    @Steven L. Taylor:

    But, “they started it,” while true, does not tell us whether the current hostilities are a good idea or not.

    In my view, war is rarely a good idea. I think Hezbollah and Iran have both learned the hard way that the current hostilities were probably not a good idea, and they probably shouldn’t have gone down that road and escalated along the way.

    Moreover, and this has been a point I have been trying to make in a variety of ways, I am unconvinced that any of this is any more effective in forestalling Iran’s nuclear ambitions than continued diplomacy would have been. I certainly am not convinced the cost has been worth it (and I don’t just mean US costs).

    I agree, which is why I’ve been consistent that attacking Iran’s program is temporary at best and inadvisable and extremely risky. For its part, Iran has done little to allay fears about its program and has, in fact, done the opposite.

    As far as judging whether the costs are worth it, that’s a subjective value proposition, and we don’t really know what the costs will be. I don’t yet have enough info to make any determination here.

    Really, I think over-focusing on certain bits of Iranian rhetoric is overshadowing how much of what we are currently witnessing is being driven by Israeli domestic politics and the simple-mindedness of the US administration.

    On the contrary, Iranian rhetoric is consistent with Iran’s actions over a very long period of time, and it’s the actions that are what’s important. As noted above, it was Iran’s proxy, with Tehran’s green light, that started attacking Israel on October 8th, 2023. Iran then directly attacked Israel twice with the largest ballistic missile attacks in history. The idea that Israel’s response and retribution are not driven by Iranian aggression and its choice to ratchet up the escalation ladder and are instead products of Israeli domestic politics seems absurd to me.

    The whole theory about domestic politics driving this – specifically Bibi trying to save his political skin – probably has a bit of truth, but little factual evidence. It’s discussion of this theory that is overshadowing the actual actions happening in this war. It’s more mind-reading, in my opinion, assuming one knows what’s really motivating Netanyahu. By contrast, Iranian attacks on Israel are clear and present and need no theories about domestic politics.

    I still say that the lesson from all of this is that Iran will now accelerate plans for a bomb, not the opposite.

    I think that’s likely, but we’ll have to see.

    They have also been taught that having regional proxies, like Hezbollah, is to their security benefit. This will encourage more, not less, of those kinds of actions.

    It is possible that Israel will utterly degrade Iran’s ability to do any of that, but I have my doubts. We have seen effective terrorism from pretty low-power actors.

    I don’t agree with that at all. Hezbollah was supposed to be a hammer providing both a means to attack Israel and, thanks to a huge amount of firepower, serve as a conventional deterrence to allow Iran more freedom of action. It was never designed to be terrorism from low-power actors.

    Iran miscalculated, and Hezbollah’s military strength proved to be oversold. The billions Iran spent on Hezbollah were wasted. Now that Assad is gone, Iran has no way to rebuild Hezbollah. In fact, Hezbollah may need to worry about its eastern flank now that Syria is controlled by an unfriendly government.

    In short, Hezbollah was not a security benefit. The resources spent on Hezbollah and others would have been better spent on Iran’s own military capabilities.

    Iran will probably continue to support terrorism. But terrorism isn’t nearly as big a threat as Hezbollah’s conventional capabilities were. After all, Hezbollah attacked Israel for almost a year, forcing Israel to evacuate tens of thousands of citizens.

    And if there is regime change in Iran, there is zero guarantee that it will be towards a more Israel-friendly one.

    That’s the nature of any regime change that doesn’t follow the post-WW2 Germany and Japan model. But Iran is currently at the extreme end of the scale in terms of hostility to Israel. A change in regime is much more likely to result in one less hostile to Israel.

    Fundamentally, nothing will change until Iran’s government stops prioritizing fighting and the destruction of Israel as a core goal. Maybe when the current Supreme Leader dies and a new generation takes over, they will still be a theocratic autocracy, but focus their efforts on other priorities.

    1
  55. CSK says:

    @Steven L. Taylor:

    Threatening Denmark with tariffs isn’t irrational. It is just stupid.

    It’s Trump.

    3
  56. drj says:

    @Gustopher:

    Let me rephrase: one can’t make an argument saying “country x won’t do y because it would be irrational” while also saying “country x will do z despite it being irrational.”

    Saying both things at the same time means that there is no (stated) basis for the claim that you are making. Just vibes.

  57. clarkontheweekend says:

    Iran, the US. Umm, can I say I just don’t know enough to have a strong opinion. Seems like too many of you have, which on this site warrants credibility, but really, hard to know where to come down on this opinion wise, other than to say of course 45 has no idea what the f he’s doing.

    2
  58. DK says:

    @CSK:

    It’s Trump.

    So both irrational and stupid, plus incompetent.

    2
  59. just nutha says:

    @steve: I’m not making any moral judgement about MR. I’m saying he’s completely sold on the conventional Israel justifications. If you think that’s good/bad/indifferent, fine. I no longer care about this issue to any great degree. I’m observing that he makes the same arguments that I’ve heard in Evangelical circles for 40 or 50 years. It’s an article of faith with him. No dispute will break through.

    3
  60. CSK says:

    @DK:

    That sums it up nicely.

  61. just nutha says:

    @CSK: “This is what we’ve waited for. This is it, boys, this is war.”

    All we need now is the balloons.

    2
  62. just nutha says:

    @wr: Not so much Calvinist as dispensationalist. I will admit that most dispensationalists are also Calvinist at this period in history.

    Wasn’t always that way, tho.

    1
  63. just nutha says:

    @Andy:

    Israel is a liberal democracy

    I wouldn’t go quite that far, but point taken. (And frankly, I question the extent to which the label fits the US currently. 🙁 )

    4
  64. just nutha says:

    @Steven L. Taylor: Over and over, people here reinforce my contention that “just war” is a misconception. The FP objective should be “avoid stupid wars.” That’s the one we keep f***ing up on.

    3
  65. just nutha says:

    @Steven L. Taylor: You and Andy seem to talk past each other a lot. Just sayin’.

    2
  66. Andy says:

    @drj:

    Despite its rhetoric, Iran has never done anything that amounts even remotely to an existential threat to Israels existence.

    Threats don’t have to be existential to be serious.

    I would be willing to admit that Iran has never had the capacity to threaten Israel’s existence, but that still means that Israel’s existence has never, in fact, been threatened by Iran. And, if so, how could it be one of the core goals of Iranian foreign policy? Do countries typically strive for things they can’t realistically achieve?

    Maybe Iran’s goals are wildly unrealistic or illogical to us in the Western world, but that doesn’t mean they aren’t Iran’s goals.

    Any analysis or theory must contend with the incontrovertible facts that Iran is crystal clear about what it wants to do and the level of effort it has put toward that goal for a very long time.

    Moreover, it wouldn’t even make sense. Let’s assume that Iran destroys Israel, who is going to live there? It certainly won’t be Shiites. So what’s in it for them?

    They are not looking for lebensraum for Shiites. It’s like you haven’t read anything about Iran’s positions and goals on Israel. Here’s a quick summary – Iran, specifically:

    – Wants to dismantle or “Erase” the Zionist State. Given relative Israeli military strength, Iran prioritizes a strategy that it hopes will result in long-term collapse from within.
    – It wants to end Israel’s military superiority. This is to give Iran and its proxies more freedom of action, but is also a necessary element to defeating Israel in any future war.
    – Support Palestinian “liberation.” Consistent with Iran’s nature as a theocratic regime, they see themselves as an essential part of a broader Islamic duty to fight Zionism and other unbelievers. Hence, they support both Hamas and PIJ.

    Once Israel is gone, Iran envisions a Palestinian theocratic state that aligns with and supports Iran’s other goals.

    And I don’t think it would have happened (certainly not to the same degree) without Israel invading Lebanon and fucking over the local Shiites.

    Defending Shiites was an important goal of the regime, especially from non-Muslims. But Iran was already committed to the goals detailed above. They also saw it as a huge opportunity – they saw a Shi’a population ripe for radicalization and organization that was right on Israel’s borders that they could transform into a means to attack and deter Israel.

    On a final note, I find it notable that yesterday you argued that Iran wouldn’t close the Strait of Hormuz since that would be a course of action that would result in great and immediate harm to the country. But today you are saying that, due to its ideology, Iran is committed to the destruction of Israel, the consequences be damned.

    I never said “consequences be damned.” Iran is committed to conflict with Israel and Israel’s destruction. This is indisputable given the vast sums and effort spent by Iran so far and all the actions its taken over decades, including recent decisions to attack Israel directly.

    But that doesn’t mean Iran is stupid, or suicidal, or has no other priorities or doesn’t care about effectiveness or consequences. Clearly, they do. They aren’t stupid and they see this as a long game that they must play very carefully. Unfortunately for them, they are prone to misjudgment, as recent events should clearly demonstrate.

    3
  67. Andy says:

    @Steven L. Taylor:

    But doesn’t think largely comport with what I have been saying?

    You’ve been saying a lot of things. But on this point, I think I have been clear and consistent for many, many years that attacking Iran’s program is probably a bad idea, so I think on that point we agree?

    1
  68. @Andy:

    You’ve been saying a lot of things

    No doubt.

    Nice non-answer, at any rate.

    3
  69. @just nutha:

    You and Andy seem to talk past each other a lot. Just sayin’.

    Very likely.

    2
  70. Daryl says:

    So essentially he started a war because his parade sucked?

    3
  71. dazedandconfused says:

    @Andy:

    Thank you. I don’t fully subscribe to the assertion Iran is utterly dedicated to destroying Israel, but it’s just my opinion. I really appreciate the time you took to wrote that.

    One minor quibble: The relationship between Israel and Iran did not utterly change with the Revolution. When Iraq was still powerful the alliance against the Sunni Arabs continued. Iran was one of the major suppliers of arms to the Revolutionary government of Iran during the Iran Iraq war.

    Seems to me the Israeli government’s public opinions of the Revolutionary Iranian government’s total evilness only became strident after Iraq was no longer a threat.

    1
  72. CSK says:

    @Daryl:

    Would you be surprised if that were to prove the case?

  73. @Andy: Let me try this.

    I think we agree on the following.

    1. This attack is unlikely to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program.
    2. This attack is likely to increase, not decrease, their nuclear ambitions.
    3. It is difficult to know what this war leads to.

    I think we disagree on.

    4. Precisely to how to understand and apply Iranian rhetoric towards Israel.
    5. Iranian motivation to engage in further terrorism.
    6. The degree to which the Iranians, if they had nukes, would be deterred from using them.

    Fair or unfair?

    I will add that I am not sure I understand what seems to be a general defense of MR’s hawkishness as well as at least some level of support for the bombing.

    1
  74. DK says:

    @just nutha:

    You and Andy seem to talk past each other a lot.

    I’ve noticed it typically begins with Dr. Taylor being rankled by the sometimes condescending tone. Taylor is a extremely educated man, with a lot of experience. So. Such individuals tend not to enjoy being talked down to.

    1
  75. drj says:

    @Andy:

    Given relative Israeli military strength, Iran prioritizes a strategy that it hopes will result in long-term collapse from within.

    In other words, a complete pipe dream.

    Iran envisions a Palestinian theocratic state that aligns with and supports Iran’s other goals.

    Because a Sunni theocratic state would align with a Shiite theocratic state? Or would there somehow be mass conversions? Speaking of far-fetched…

    Iran is committed to […] Israel’s destruction. This is indisputable given the vast sums and effort spent by Iran

    Or they spent all that money and effort on creating legitimacy and prestige – both domestically and in other non-Sunni parts of the Middle East (specifically, Syria and Lebanon). Because who else can they turn to?

    Assuming Iran’s leadership doesn’t consist of a bunch of hopelessly naive optimists (which I doubt), you are perhaps being a wee bit too credulous when it comes to Iranian rhetoric.

  76. Andy says:

    @Steven L. Taylor:

    Nice non-answer, at any rate.

    JFC dude, did you not read the rest of that comment:

    But on this point, I think I have been clear and consistent for many, many years that attacking Iran’s program is probably a bad idea, so I think on that point we agree?

    Which was a response to this:

    @Andy: Thanks for the Lewis link.

    But doesn’t think largely comport with what I have been saying?

    I gave you an answer, not a non-answer! I don’t understand why it’s a non-answer. If we both agree with what Lewis is saying, then I don’t know what the problem is.

    I think we agree on the following.

    1. This attack is unlikely to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program.
    2. This attack is likely to increase, not decrease, their nuclear ambitions.
    3. It is difficult to know what this war leads to.

    I would add some qualifiers, but yes, we generally agree.

    4. Precisely to how to understand and apply Iranian rhetoric towards Israel.
    5. Iranian motivation to engage in further terrorism.
    6. The degree to which the Iranians, if they had nukes, would be deterred from using them.

    On #4, it’s not about the rhetoric. As I frequently repeat here, it’s the actions in the real world that matter, not the words. I am not hung up on Iranian rhetoric, I simply don’t downplay it in the way you and many seem to, as if it doesn’t matter at all. And the reason I don’t dismiss it is because it’s consistent with Iran’s actions. And, and I constantly repeat, it’s actions that matter. If Iran had the same rhetoric but different actions, then I’d dismiss the rhetoric.

    On #5, I don’t know/understand your position on this. My position is that Iran is likely to utilize terrorism in the future. The scale, scope and how it exactly manifests are not something I can accurately judge at this point. A lot depends on Iran’s choices and how much damage Israel has done to the IRGC and lots of other factors. And it’s certainly possible that Iran will completely reevaluate its strategy in light of recent decisive failures. It could very well conclude that it needs to fundamentally change its strategy…or it might not. We will have to wait and see.

    On #6, since Iran continues to claim that it is not pursuing nuclear weapons, we are all guessing at what their nuclear doctrine might be. This is more mind-reading, trying to divine how Iran would use nuclear weapons and under what conditions, and a lot of, IMO, mirror-imaging assumptions.

    That said, I would just repeat that I’ve never been in the camp that believes Iran is so committed to ending Israel that it would commit suicide by MAD. To me, that is as dumb as the idea Iran would commit economic suicide by trying to close the Strait of Hormuz.

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  77. Chip Daniels says:

    My “Why won’t the Iranians just be like a normal country that doesn’t go around meddling in other countries’ business and trying to become a superpower?” tee shirt is answered by my “America Fuck Yeah!” tee shirt.

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  78. Chip Daniels says:

    @Kathy:

    Trump was given a briefing that one of the Iranian engineers secretly designed a special ventilation shaft which led directly to the main reactor room and would detonate the entire complex with one well aimed shot.

    At the end of the briefing he greenlit the idea, and also scribbled in the margins that the chick in the gold bikini should be given a more prominent role.

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  79. Andy says:

    @dazedandconfused:

    Thank you. I don’t fully subscribe to the assertion Iran is utterly dedicated to destroying Israel, but it’s just my opinion. I really appreciate the time you took to wrote that.

    Thank you for the comment!

    Seems to me the Israeli government’s public opinions of the Revolutionary Iranian government’s total evilness only became strident after Iraq was no longer a threat.

    You’re right that Iran and Israel cooperated against their common enemy Iraq. That was a limited alliance of necessity, similar to our alliance with Stalin in WW2.

    The stage was set before that, however, long before. Khomeini in exile was explicitly anti-Israel/anti-zionist. As soon as they took over, Khomeini made anti-Zionism a core pillar of the new regime’s ideology. Iran cut ties with Israel and turned over the Israeli embassy to the PLO. The new Iranian government started labeling Israel a “cancer,” and Khomeini gave speeches about how Israel must “vanish” and similar terms.

    Iran couldn’t act on that because they were is an existential war with Iraq, and the regime was new and had limited capabilities. Iran took weapons from Israel because the war against Iraq was going badly, and they were desperate with no allies. But this was an alliance of convenience and was never destined to last.

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  80. @Andy:

    JFC dude, did you not read the rest of that comment:

    I will admit to focusing more on the first part of the response than the second, for which I apologize.

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  81. @Andy:

    That said, I would just repeat that I’ve never been in the camp that believes Iran is so committed to ending Israel that it would commit suicide by MAD.

    Thanks for this clarification. This was not clear to me–perhaps I overlooked it.

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  82. @DK: I will cop to this.

    And I will add that I should be less sensitive. Discussion via text box is not optimal.

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  83. Andy says:

    @drj:

    In other words, a complete pipe dream.

    Which is why Michael, I, and so many others wish that Iran would give up that pipe dream and spend its resources and the talents of its people on something more productive.

    Because a Sunni theocratic state would align with a Shiite theocratic state? Or would there somehow be mass conversions? Speaking of far-fetched…

    This is what Iran believes. Go look it up yourself. I’m not here to rationalize their goals or argue on their behalf; if you think they are unrealistic, then I’m inclined to agree. I’ve been saying for a long time now that the various attempts by anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist governments and groups to destroy, end, vanish or whatever Israel are foolish. Every major war started against Israel has been nothing but a huge loser for Palestinians. Yet the delusion persists that armed “resistance” will eventually win. Far-fetched indeed.

    Or they spent all that money and effort on creating legitimacy and prestige – both domestically and in other non-Sunni parts of the Middle East (specifically, Syria and Lebanon).

    How is that working out for them?

    Because who else can they turn to?

    Most governments don’t want to ally with a theocratic, revolutionary, authoritarian regime that destabilizes neighbors in service of a hostile and aggressive foreign policy. They’ve turned to Russia, which is otherwise occupied and unable to offer much. They turned to Assad’s Syria, which, despite murdering hundreds of thousands with Iranian and Russian help, still lost the civil war.

    Yes, Iran is short of allies. A product of the choices they’ve made, as Michael first noted.

    Assuming Iran’s leadership doesn’t consist of a bunch of hopelessly naive optimists (which I doubt), you are perhaps being a wee bit too credulous when it comes to Iranian rhetoric.

    For the umpteenth time, the problem is Iran’s actions, not its rhetoric.

    Let’s look at some other examples:
    – Russia has some pretty extreme rhetoric when it comes to Ukraine. No one is credulous about Russian rhetoric because we can see with our own eyes that it is not merely rhetoric. When Putin says that Ukraine is part of Russia, and makes demands and war goals for the conflict he started, we take what he says seriously, because of the facts on the ground.
    – President Trump has a lot of rhetoric, yet we can see with our own eyes, through Trump’s actions, what rhetoric is important and what rhetoric is merely his peculiar style of verbal vomit. Yes, it’s difficult with him to know what to take seriously until he acts, which is kind of the point. It’s the action that matters most.
    – Chinese rhetoric focuses on its desire to return China to its former greatness before its “century of humiliation,” to include claims on Taiwan, all of the South China Sea, Tibet, and others. We take that seriously, why? Because China already swallowed Tibet, is in the process of swallowing the SCS, is engaged in cultural genocide against problematic ethnicities and religions, and has spent hundreds of billions and organized its military forces to take Taiwan and the rest of its claims by force.

    So I don’t understand why there is this idea that we shouldn’t take Iranian rhetoric seriously when their actions match it. I simply think one should take the same approach with evaluating Iranian rhetoric as with Russia’s, or anyone else’s. Don’t blindly believe everything they say, but pay attention to those things they actually take action on and spend resources on.

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  84. Andy says:

    @Steven L. Taylor:

    No hard feelings. Despite our disagreements, I have a tremendous respect for your intellect and opinions.

    And I also agree with your response to DK – this medium is not optimal. And I think I am often bad at writing narratives that disagree on substance while doing so in a non-confrontational way. It happens too often for it not to be me at some level. That is something I need to work on.

    Anyway, I’ve spent too much time on this thread and need to get back to my other priorities. I don’t think I can add anything else to this discussion on Iran. Adieu!

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  85. DK says:

    @Steven L. Taylor:

    And I will add that I should be less sensitive.

    You’re allowed to be a human being. Our hosts acquit themselves pretty darn well, considering our constant and noisy critique, objection, and second guessing.

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  86. Chip Daniels says:

    @Andy:

    Most governments don’t want to ally with a theocratic, revolutionary, authoritarian regime that destabilizes neighbors in service of a hostile and aggressive foreign policy.

    Indeed.
    Unless…Unless that government becomes too powerful to ignore by say, becoming a nuclear power. Or controlling a valuable resource like the Wahhabist Saudi Kingdom. Or having the ability to choke off the worlds oil traffic.

    As I referenced above, Iran is behaving in a manner that is, long term, counterproductive and will only lead it to poverty and isolation.

    But…nations do this all the time. The US is right now behaving in a violent irrational and counterproductive way.
    This is to say that Iran, like the US, has internal politics that have nothing whatsoever to do with Israel or the US, and power centers that have internal agendas which make no sense to us, but are perfectly sensible to them.

    We talk about Iran the way some liberals talk about Trumpists- “Surely, if they only knew the damage cuts to rural hospitals did, they would vote Democratic!”

    But history has proven that most Trumpists would prefer that their daughters die screaming from an ectopic pregnancy than vote for the black lady. I don’t know why we would expect the Iranians to be any more rational.

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  87. JKB says:

    Iran has agreed that Israel and the US can stop bombing Iran. If it holds 24 hours, then peace.

    The question is, does Iran have enough cash on hand to meet the Hamas payroll next week?

  88. dazedandconfused says:

    @Andy:

    True, but the policy of not recognizing Israel as a state was shared by nearly all the nations if the region at that time. To expect them to have continued the policies of the Shah, the US’s puppet dictator, would seem irrational. Only very recently has anyone in the region besides Jordan and Egypt recognized the State of Israel, IIRC, a few of the Gulf states but not the Saudis. I can’t see the revolutionaries not maintaining the Shah’s diplomatic policies as particularly meaningful.

    Side note On the truce. If I HAD to bet, it’s about to happen. The IDF has done about all the damage they could, Trump’s declaration of total success without evidence indicates he wants out, and if the Iranians were serious about war they probably wouldn’t have wasted munitions on a performative strike in Qatar.

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