Israel’s Next Move
Will the Netanyahu government double down on its weakening of Iran?
The Economist (“An unrestrained Israel is reshaping the Middle East“):
Israel’s 15-month assault on Gaza has battered Hamas; it can no longer mount a serious attack. Hizbullah, a Shia militia in Lebanon, is also reeling after Israel pummelled it, too. In addition, the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s dictator, has cut Hizbullah’s main supply line to Iran. The “ring of fire” around Israel that Iran had created by funding such militias has burned down to embers. And Israel has withstood Iranian missile attacks and smashed Iranian air defences in retaliation.
In years past, Israel might have been content to stop there. But its current leaders favour an unbridled assertion of power, some for pragmatic reasons, others for ideological ones. They are seizing territory beyond their borders, advocating further strikes on Iran and contemplating the outright annexation of Palestinian land. The goal appears to be regional hegemony. But the doubts about such an approach remain the same as when Mr Netanyahu first endorsed the life of the sword: can Israel sustain an indefinite war—and should it?
Israel’s changing approach to Gaza shows how its strategic ambitions have grown. During the war’s first year it was reluctant to occupy much territory within the enclave. Instead, the idf seized a buffer zone inside its borders, and two corridors that bisected it, but little else: the army feared a prolonged counter-insurgency. Then came a six-week ceasefire with Hamas, agreed in January, which was meant to buy time to negotiate a permanent end to the war.
On March 18th Israel abandoned the ceasefire and resumed attacks on Gaza. It is gearing up for a fresh ground offensive. Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, the new IDF chief, has promised more aggressive tactics. Israel plans to depopulate large parts of the strip and lay siege to anyone who remains in them. It also intends to hold territory. Israel Katz, the defence minister, has warned the occupation may be permanent. These plans have not yet been implemented, but if they are, they will escalate an already bloody war, which has claimed more than 50,000 lives in Gaza.
In the West Bank, meanwhile, the army is waging its biggest offensive in decades. More than 40,000 Palestinians have been displaced from four refugee camps in the north of the territory. Mr Katz has said that Israeli troops might remain in those camps for the rest of the year. Far-right lawmakers are pushing ahead with plans to expand Jewish settlements, which are illegal under international law. On March 23rd the security cabinet voted to legitimise 13 “outposts”, wildcat settlements that had been built without the government’s approval. The right hopes to persuade Donald Trump, America’s president, to back their plans to annex part or all of the West Bank, which would make it impossible to create a Palestinian state.
Elsewhere, Israel has occupied a swathe of Syrian territory (see map), including Mount Hermon, the region’s highest point. It seems to have no intention of leaving. Israel is courting the Druze, a minority group concentrated in southern Syria. It may hope to fracture Syria into a federation of autonomous ethnic statelets; some Israeli commentators have urged the Druze to secede. Israel still occupies five hilltops in southern Lebanon, although it promised to withdraw from them in late January under the terms of its ceasefire with Hizbullah.
Then there is Iran. Mr Netanyahu has dreamed for years of conducting military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. He is energetically lobbying America’s government to bless such an attack and ideally to join in. America’s spies believe that Israel is likely to act within six months.
There’s a lot more to the piece, including speculation that Netanyahu is driven by domestic politics (keeping hard-right parties in his coalition) and personal (staying out of prison) considerations.
Catching up on the War on the Rocks “Net Assessment” podcast this morning, the gang asked “Will Israel Strike Iran?” It was based on a recent piece in the magazine by Michael Allen, former senior director for counterproliferation strategies on the National Security Council, asking, “Will Israel and the United States Diverge on Iran?“
The setup:
Israel’s recent military success has left Iran uniquely vulnerable, but for how long? Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu celebrated President Donald Trump’s reimposition of “maximum pressure” sanctions, but unless that pressure yields Iranian concessions soon, U.S. and Israeli national interests may diverge. The first Trump administration concluded that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was a flawed agreement and withdrew from the deal. In his second term, it seems that Trump is willing to give time to find a tightened and lasting diplomatic solution to curbing Iran’s nuclear program — time Israel may not have. If Iran poses an existential threat to Israel, how long can it wait for maximum pressure to bear fruit?
There are a number of variables contributing to Israel’s current sense of urgency. First, the overthrow of the Bashar al Assad regime, Iran’s ally, has allowed Israel to strike Syrian air defenses that would threaten Israeli fighters on their path to Iran. Now, any operation against Iran is less likely to be detected before Israeli fighters enter Iranian airspace. In addition, Israel’s October 2024 raid against Iran destroyed its three remaining Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missile systems. According to a former U.S. official, “Iran is essentially naked” — nearly defenseless against future air strikes.
But Iran has options to harden its defenses. 25-year oil-for-security accord between Iran and China is flourishing. Iran has received Chinese precursor chemicals essential for rebuilding its ballistic missile program and solid rocket fuel production. Also, an Iranian-Russian strategic partnership has deepened since Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine. Iran supplies thousands of drones to Russia and helped Russia open its own drone factory. In exchange, Iran is seeking to upgrade to Russia’s S-400 system, some variants of which are equipped with radars that can defeat stealth technology used by fifth-generation fighters like the F-35. The New York Times reported in August 2024 that “two Iranian officials … confirmed that Iran has made the request [for advanced air defense systems] and said Russia has started delivering advanced radars and air-defense equipment.” Although the timing is unclear, an improved Iranian air defense may soon be online. Israel would want to strike before then while it still enjoys the element of surprise.
Second, Iran’s primary deterrent against attacks on its nuclear facilities — the threat of retaliatory strikes by proxy forces — has been crippled. In southern Lebanon, Israel degraded Hizballah’s massive stockpiles of missiles and rockets by up to 80 percent, which could have devastated Israel in a matter of minutes. Israel now has greater freedom of action to target Iranian nuclear facilities without fear of a fierce Iranian-sponsored terrorist invasion if Israel bombed Iran. Yet, recent reports indicate that Hizballah is already rebuilding by recruiting new fighters and rearming. Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations warned “there have been several attempts to transfer weapons and cash to Hizballah.” Thus, it is clear that despite the collapse of the Assad regime, Syria will remain the primary smuggling route. Iran’s proxies might be weak now, but they may not be forever. Israeli strategists may want to exploit Iran’s current weakness before it rebuilds its terrorist proxies.
Third, based on Iran’s unsuccessful October attack, Israel has proven it can absorb Iran’s best shot. Since many of the ballistic and hypersonic missiles were intercepted or inaccurate, Iran’s attack exposed that its arsenal is less of a deterrent for Israel. But Iran still has thousands of ballistic missiles, receives technical assistance from Russia, and claims to be developing “new special missiles.” As a recent report argued, Iran will likely “double down” on ballistic missiles, seeking ways to achieve greater accuracy and penetrate enemy air defenses.
Finally, and most importantly, Iran is on the precipice of nuclear breakout. On Feb. 14, 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency warned that Iran may be close to achieving irreversible gains. Indeed, it would likely soon have about 250 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, just short of the level typically needed to produce a weapon. With over 90 kilograms produced since December 2024 alone, the increased supply of near-weapons-grade nuclear material could be used to create “several” crude nuclear devices in a matter of months, not years. Alternatively, Iran could choose to produce fewer bombs using less enriched material, trading quantity for quality.
While Netanyahu no doubt has personal and political considerations, being ruthless in pursuit of his vision of Israel’s national security has been a signature going back to his first stint as prime minister, almost three decades ago. It seems obvious that, if he thinks a strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities will be successful, he’ll do it with or without US support.
Going back to his first administration, President Trump has consistently avoided wider escalations in the Middle East, including prematurely withdrawing forces from the counter-ISIL fight in Syria. But he’s also been enthusiastic about precision strikes as on-offs, whether it was the Solemani assassination, the dropping of the MOAB on Assad’s forces, or the recent strikes against the Houthis. I seriously doubt that he would allow US forces to join in on a strike inside Iranian territory but doubt he would exert any significant pressure on Netanyahu to refrain from doing so.
Certainly none of this has anything to do with the felon’s insane ramblings about forcibly clearing out the population of Gaza.
I’ve seen reports – of unknown quality – that the US has moved more B-2s to Diego Garcia, raising the number to 7. The thinking is that B-2s are not there for Houthis, but for dropping ground penetrating bombs on Iran.
Trump is so clearly the Beta Soy Boy in his dealings with Putin, that he could use a macho display to distract from his bumbling betrayal of Ukraine.
Yeah, Netanyahu’s vision of a secure Israel really paid off. The country is at the bleak Putinesque point where it can’t even imagine another course of action which would avoided 10/7. Taking out Iran’s potential nukes (which itself is part of the same authoritarian cycle) is downriver from the lack of any real humane vision. Nothing will change. Nothing will get better. Nothing will get worse. Every Israeli is pure of heart and living life as they watch snuff films of Palestinians being tortured.
Good thing we pulled out of the Iran nuclear agreement so that now they can make all of the enriched uranium and plutonium they want. So much winning.
Steve
@Modulo Myself:
Or, to quote a wise. . . well, me. . . there is no decent solution. There never was.
But you’re wrong if you think things can’t get worse. For the Palestinians things can always get worse. This is the Middle East. There’s no bottom to that barrel.
The self-harming futility of the campus firestorm over Gaza is clear now. It accomplished nothing but to squander resources that could have been used on issues that actually matter to Americans. Women’s rights, trans rights, environment. And of course helped to elect Donald ‘Gaz-A-Lago’ Trump.
1968 redux.
Well….nothing will change until things change.
I mean, the Troubles with Ireland ended, right? That took a long, long time.
The Soviet Union collapsed. When I graduated from high school, nobody thought that was ever going to happen.
(Yes, Putin is trying to bring it back. I don’t see that happening. Canada has a bigger GDP than Russia does.)
Also, I endorse the idea that yeah, things can get worse. They might even need to get worse before they get better. We are now in a generation where there aren’t that many people who can actually remember what a terrible thing war is. And we now have capabilities that can give us the illusion that it is somehow removed and clean.
It’s still terrible. That reality is going to catch up to us somehow, somewhere.
“It’s a hell of a thing to take a mans life. You not only take what he has, but everything he’s ever gonna have” – that noted left-wing pacifist, Clint Eastwood.
I am not a big fan of preemptive strikes to take out potential or existing nuclear weapons. And, yes, I know that Israel did so against Saddam Hussain back in the day. In my view, nuclear weapons have proven to be of less utility than first thought. I think they are useful as a deterrent against aggression. Imagine if Ukraine hadn’t gotten rid of its nuclear weapons. Would Russia currently occupy so much of Ukraine? I don’t think so.
On the other hand, nuclear weapons don’t seem to be particularly useful from the offensive side. Being armed, with nuclear weapons, really didn’t help the United States much in Korea, Vietnam, or Iraq. And Russia’s nuclear weapons didn’t prevent Ukraine from invading the Kursk region.
Re: B-2s, now the WSJ has it as well:
Waltz and Hegseth will loop me in later for the Signal chat detailing their plans.
@Rob Robinson:
Iran is a special case. One or two nukes could effectively destroy Israel as a country. The religious fanatics running the country might well decide that they are prepared to absorb the counterstrike. Iran is very large and very mountainous and even if it’s nuked, will still have oil.
I would urge Democrats not to automatically condemn an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, either by the US or the US in concert with Israel. If it works it will be very popular, and, IMO, worth doing.
It will take weeks for Hamas to rebuild the technology needed to be performing the sophisticated attacks that it was previously capable of.
I’m over simplifying, but keeping Hamas or equivalent successor down requires constant war forever.
Are there any hostages left alive? What value is there to Hamas in keeping them alive?
Netanyahu isn’t being deterred by risk to hostages. The international community is distracted elsewhere, and the pressure on Israel is mostly gone. What are the consequences of killing hostages that Hamas is not already facing?
Seems like a dangerous time to be a hostage.
Yes. We’re in an age of strongmen. Particularly weak strongmen who are projecting strength to try to cover their glaring weaknesses.
No. Same era of strongmen.
I think the decision to attack Yemen may tell us something.
The Houthis haven’t been hitting ships since November, and the attack we just conducted coincides with the Israeli decision to end the truce in Gaza. All along the Houthis have stated their only reason to be hitting ships has been because of the situation in Gaza, and they stopped hitting ships during the truce.
Now it seems the Israelis have decided to annex Gaza, and the US has decided is to help the Israelis accomplish that. I expect no more truces, the Israelis, with US support, are going for unconditional surrender. That we didn’t even wait for the Houthis to start hitting shipping again is meaningful.
@Michael Reynolds: Israel indeed is a small country and being hit by one or two nukes would essentially kill pretty much everybody. But it also would destroy the dome of the rock which presumably Iran wouldn’t want to do.
@Michael Reynolds:
Couldn’t Israel deter basically all Middle Eastern powers by saying they have two squadrons of 6 ICBMs with three MIRVs of five megatons each permanently targeted at Meca and Medina?
@Kathy: Israel is reported to have nuclear armed cruise missiles on their submarines. If so, that would probably be the most effective deterrent.
@Rob Robinson:
If it were me I’d aim just off the coast. Depending on prevailing winds.
@Kathy:
Many moons ago, here IIRC, I pointed out that the US itself could do just that. It was not a popular thought experiment. But if Israel were to be nuked I wouldn’t be at all surprised. Israel in the low estimate has 90 nuclear warheads.
@Michael Reynolds:
It was offered in a modest proposal kind of way.
@Kathy:
Yeah. . . that’s right. . . same here. . . ha hah. . .although. . .