Outside the Beltway

On “Realism” and Trump’s Attacks on Iran

An IR theory that is often misapplied in my view (especially by certain kinds of practitioners).

Steven L. Taylor · Monday, March 16, 2026 · 4 comments

So, I listened to last week’s episode of The Ezra Klein Show, I Asked a Former Trump Official to Justify This War, which was an interview with Nadia Schadlow. Schadlow is currently a Fellow at the Hudson Institute and was a Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy in the first Trump administration. She holds a Ph.D. from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins.

I will stress that she is not a member of the current administration, so she is not privy to updated inside information, nor is she personally responsible for current policy. Still, she made the choice to be at least a quasi-defender of the ongoing operations in Iran, so I think critiquing her in this general arena is fair game. Mostly, I have thought about her theoretical approach as much as anything.

I was struck by the following. Indeed, I was struck by quite a lot, but I will focus here.

Klein: In 2018, you described Donald Trump as a “conservative realist.” What did you mean by that?

Schadlow: “Realism” essentially means that you look at the world the way it is, not as you wish it to be. And Donald Trump is someone who sees the world in a particular way.

It’s a world that’s competitive. It’s a world in which power matters. It’s a world in which nation-states matter, interests matter. That’s what I meant by the realism part.

The conservative part: Today, in the current National Security Strategy of 2025, which I’m sure we’ll get into, they actually use the term “flexible realism.” So I might actually say that might be more accurate today.

You don’t want to do everything everywhere. You will take risks, but essentially, you want to make sure that American power is preserved and not expended unnecessarily.

So, let me acknowledge that Schadlow’s expertise is IR, both as an academic and a practitioner, while my main area is comparative politics. Still, I have formal training in political theory, and I taught a master’s level seminar on IR theory for many years. In that context, I always find the claim that realists “essentially means that you look at the world the way it is, not as you wish it to be” to be hugely problematic.

Before I go on, please note that this post is not intended to be a comprehensive discussion of realism, and further, I am not trying to denigrate the entire theoretical school. While I do think that the approach has serious flaws, the point here is to address what I often see as a very surface-level approach to the concepts in question. It truly is something that I repeatedly saw from students (both undergrad and grad) and that I have heard from commenters and political operatives alike, my entire life. People like Stephen Miller, who likes to claim that the only tool of politics is raw power is perhaps the best example of the worst application of these notions.

Here’s Miller:

“We live in a world in which you can talk all you want about international niceties and everything else,” deputy chief of staff Stephen Miller told CNN’s Jake Tapper. “But we live in a world, in the real world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power,” Miller said.

“These are the iron laws of the world.”

Any US allies still in denial after the first wild year of Trump’s second term should listen to something else Miller said. “We’re a superpower. And under President Trump, we are going to conduct ourselves as a superpower.”

Emphases mine.

People like Miller think they are boldly proclaiming some hard truth when they talk like that, as if only people like themselves have the courage to speak about unpleasant realities. But, in truth, that is the attitude of the bully.

Don’t get me wrong: I agree that the world is governed by power, but power is not just guns, bombs, and warfighting. Sometimes power is subtle and soft. Sometimes power is deep economic ties and, dare I say it, friendship. Yes, a host of military power considerations are relevant to the existence of the EU, yet it is not maintained by a bullying imposition of order via raw power.

Who is more powerful? The burly bully who can break some skulls, who starts a barfight, or a more normal fellow who has a number of friend who has his back in that same barfight? Raw power isn’t everything.

I would note that the US is vastly more powerful than Iran. And yet that doesn’t mean we are going to get exactly what we want. Indeed, we may spend a lot of money and kill a lot of people, all while causing a global economic crisis, demonstrating our power, while all the while not getting what we want (if, in fact, we know what that is).

Plus, being powerful does not protect a person (or even a superpower) from consequences.

I could go down this rabbit hole further, but instead, we resume our regularly scheduled post, and so, back to Schadlow.

First, I would note that it is a major conceit of some “realists” that they are the ones who look at the world as it is, it’s in the name, don’t you see?

Indeed, before I continue, let me be as clear as possible on what we are talking about. “Realism” is a specific theory (really, a group of theories) that attempts, as all theories do, to explain the way in which states interact with one another in the international system. In simple terms, international relations is the study of why states sometimes go to war and why they sometimes remain at peace with one another.

Realism, as a theory, makes a number of claims about states as actors and about the international system as a whole. More on that below.

But I would hasten to add that there is a more colloquial usage of the term, such as someone saying, “I am a realist about [fill in the blank].” Such as: “I am a realist about my chances of getting a better job,” or “I am a realist about my romantic prospects,” or whatever. It simply means I am not dreaming or hoping for some unrealistic outcome. I know, to stay with the examples given, that, based on my resume and life experiences, I am not going to be hired as the CEO and make 8 figures. The basic notion is being a grounded person who accepts that life has real parameters based in reality, versus wishing for unicorns and rainbows, because wouldn’t that be nice?

What I have long found to be the case is that both lay people and often many students, here of the IR theory of realism, conflate it with just being practical, and glom onto it as the best theory.

It is also true that realism often focuses on power, and if one thinks of international relations mostly in terms of wars (as most people seem to do, especially undergraduates), then a theory that seems to focus on power is typically very appealing.

I am leaving an awful lot out, but before going on to the second point, I would underscore that being a “realist” sounds more pragmatic and obvious than being a liberal, a neoliberal institutionalist, a constructivist, or any number of other labels that other theoretical positions use.

Second, let’s get back to this claim by Schadlow, “Realism essentially means that you look at the world the way it is, not as you wish it to be.” That sounds so compelling, especially given the colloquial usage of “realism” or being “realistic.” But here’s the problem with this assertion: all theorists claim that they are seeing the world “as it is”-that’s the whole point of theories. If one is a neoliberal, a constructivist, or even a Marxist IR scholar (to name but three options), one thinks that one’s theory is based on how the world works. Theories, by definition, are meant to explain how the world works and why. So, the issue is not whether only one theory makes such claims, but the need to assess which theories do a better job of explaining reality.

Indeed, back to her more expansive definition (“It’s a world that’s competitive. It’s a world in which power matters. It’s a world in which nation-states matter, interests matter. That’s what I meant by the realism part”) I have to note that all theories that I can think of think that nation-states, competition, and interests matter. None of that is exclusive to “realism.”

Really, the contrast here is not between one approach that is clear-eyed about how the world works and a bunch of pie-in-the-sky dreamers. The contrast between different theories is based on their assumptions of how the world works.

Let me demonstrate how this might work.

A central question about the international system is how states (i.e., countries) deal with the fact that they exist in a state of anarchy. Contrary to popular usage, anarchy does not mean chaos, but rather it means the lack of an authoritative ordering principle in a given system. In other words, there is no global government that can impose order on the states that exist in the international system. In simple terms, inside the boundaries of a state, there is some amount of hierarchy, because the central government can impose order via law-making and enforcement. In the international system, there are no actors that can impose order, and therefore, that system is anarchic.*

Realists often interpret anarchy along the lines of Thomas Hobbes: that in a state of anarchy, states are basically in a constant war of all against all, and that at any moment attack is possible. This means that every state needs to arm itself and constantly prepare for possible conflict. Survival is the goal, and it can only be maintained by arming oneself against the possibility of attack. It assumes a world of “kill or be killed.”**

However, such an approach does not explain how, for example, increased globalized trade leads to more peaceful relationships between states.*** Nor does it explain how some states actually behave like friends rather than perpetual enemies (e.g., the US and Canada or the “special relationship” that the US and the UK have long maintained).****

Having perhaps confused everyone more than providing clarity, let’s circle back to the Trump administration and whether or not it is being “realistic” in either the colloquial or IR theory or senses of the term.

I would note that whether one is a realist in the sense of the IR theory discussed above, or if one is just a realist in the colloquial sense, one has to be realistic about what power can do. Despite the simplistic nonsense that comes out of Pete Hegseth’s mouth on a daily basis about warriors, war-fighting, and lethality, military operations large and small are not about just blowing up the bad guys. As Clausewitz aptly noted, “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” You fight to achieve certain outcomes, and only a fool thinks that violence alone achieves those outcomes (but, as it pertains to Hegseth and company, I repeat myself).

Anyone who knows anything about history knows that when the fighting stops, there is additional work to do. A lot of work, in fact.

But, of course, we are witnessing a war fought by fools who don’t know anything about history, so, in terms of just a basic, colloquial “realism,” I’m not seeing it.

Indeed, Schadlow herself strikes me as living in a fantasy land despite calling the Trump administration “realists.”

For example, here’s her quasi-defense of the Maduro kidnapping:

Schadlow: [Trump]’s willing to take risk, and he’s basically elevating a willingness to take risk over process. If in two years the situation in Venezuela is much better, and the millions of Venezuelans who have left their homeland go back, will people say that’s a mistake? Probably not.

I mean, sure, if things work out great, then it was all worth it. But that’s not realism of any sort. That is hand-waving hopery.

If my plan to feed my family is just to throw a bunch of seeds in the backyard, well, if in two years I have plenty of food as a result, then will people say that’s a mistake? Probably not. But anyone who knows anything about gardening would tell you that such an outcome is not likely.

She engaged in some similar talk about the Iran operation.

Schadlow: So it’s unfortunate. No one wants to see prolonged chaos. But it’s also not guaranteed. There could be opportunities for a better outcome, more stability, maybe more involvement by the Gulf states in helping that stability emerge. They should be thinking about this and planning, too, and thinking about what a better outcome would look like.

To me, “could,” “should,” and “maybe” are not the hallmarks of her own definition of realism, which again was, “you look at the world the way it is, not as you wish it to be.”

Let me circle back to a key theoretical claim made by IR realists (although not exclusively): the most important motivator for a state is its survival. As such, if the war planners in the current White House had at least a C+ understanding of undergraduate IR theory, especially of the realist flavor, they would have seen the very likely possibility of things like Iran’s indiscriminant attacks on its Gulf neighbors, and most especially the closing of the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian state wants to survive, and therefore, they are going to use whatever means they have to do so.

It also seems that the administration has failed to understand that making maximalist claims about the regime’s survival means that negotiations are moot. People tend to have no reason to negotiate when the other party has proclaimed their goal to be your demise.

To be honest, if this administration should be considered to be “realists” (whether “conservative” or “flexible”), then, at best, they are barely at the D+ level. Hegseth reminds me too much of a student I once had who thought that he was very, very special because he was on the baseball team, and that I was being unreasonable, expecting him to be in class and like, you know, learn stuff.

To be honest, it seems to me that this administration should not be seen as having much in the way of a theoretical understanding of the world beyond that of a simpleton who is a gambling bully who personally has little to lose because he is old and rich and basically immune from any legal consequences.

I will conclude by noting that a realist by any definition ought to have a plan beyond blowing things up and hoping for the best.

*BTW, it seems worth noting that the usage of various international institutions like NATO and the EU, as well as things like GATT, have lead to more order in the international system. This suggests that the pure self-help notions of certain realist approaches, including things that Schadlow talks about in the interview that I have not included, are flawed. In other words, the chance of war can be diminished in ways other than simply being powerful enough to deter an attack or being powerful enough to preemptively strike an enemy.

**I am speaking here mostly of what is called “classical realism” as derived by Hans Morgenthau. There is also a major strain of realism known as “structural realism,” which finds its source in Kenneth Waltz. For anyone who wants to read up on this topic, I recommend Donnelly, Jack.  2000.  Realism and International Relations.  Cambridge University Press. Donnelly is not a realist, and the book itself is ultimately a critique, but it also takes its subject very seriously and is one of the best texts that I have ever encountered in providing a succinct overview of the core principles of realism alongside its multiple variations.

One of the key failures of the Trump administration’s approach to foreign and defense policy is its failure to understand why there hasn’t been a global war since the 1940s and why, in particular, there was no major war in Europe until Russia invaded Ukraine. Indeed, I am of the view that realist theory does a great job of explaining European wars of the 19th and early 20th centuries, but does a very poor job of explaining the European peace for the latter half of the 20th century and the first quarter of the 21st.

For some additional definitions, see here: An Introduction to Realism in International Relations, which includes Morgenthau’s six principles of political realism.

***See, for example, work by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, especially their work on complex interdependence, such as their book, Power and Interdependence.

****To get into the possibility that anarchy does not, as the realists claim, create a static context for state interaction, see Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Relations. New York: Cambridge University Press.