Shadow War Between Russia and Europe?
Western intelligence services are sounding the alarm.
WaPo’s David Ignatius warns of “The shadow war that’s strengthening Europe.”
After four years of war, Russian President Vladimir Putin has achieved a double failure: He hasn’t conquered Ukraine, or even its eastern Donbas region. And his attempts to intimidate Europe through sabotage and subversion have backfired, triggering strong pushback from European leaders.
Europe’s escalating resistance to Putin is an often overlooked strategic factor in this conflict. Rather than being cowed by Russia’s “shadow war,” European nations are countering with their own disruption operations. Some European officials argue that Europe must now begin to plan seriously for the possibility of all-out war.
Emphasis mine. Putin is many things, but a stupid man is not one of them. While he invaded both Georgia and Ukraine, he has been quite careful to avoid actions that would trigger Article 5 of the NATO treaty. His forces are barely holding their own against Ukraine (albeit, granted, a Ukraine heavily backed by Western materiel). He’s not going to take on middle powers with modern military capabilities.
“Every missile and drone that strikes Ukraine only strengthens our resolve,” British Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper said Tuesday during a visit to Kyiv. “Putin thinks that he can outlast the U.K. and our allies. He is sorely mistaken.”
My guess is Putin just thinks he can outlast Ukraine’s willingness to absorb casualties. But European intelligence services seem to think otherwise:
Security officials from many major European countries have delivered similar warnings to Putin in recent weeks. They’ve announced new sanctions and called for tougher intelligence operations to counter Russia. This show of defiance is impressive in part because Europeans are acting largely on their own, without certainty that the United States will support their challenge to Moscow.
Russia “is preparing for the possibility of a conflict with NATO and is conducting activities to test the West’s willingness to escalate,” argued a Feb. 19 report by the Dutch intelligence agencies, titled “Between War and Peace.” The report described Russian arson, parcel bombs, disruption of air traffic and damage to undersea cables. To combat these actions, “the price has to go up, I think,” said Erik Akerboom, head of the Dutch foreign intelligence service, in September.
Blaise Metreweli, the newly appointed head of Britain’s MI6 spy service, made a similar warning on Dec. 15 in her first public speech. “Russia is testing us in the gray zone with tactics that are just below the threshold of war,” she advised, including “drones buzzing airports and bases” and “state-sponsored arson and sabotage.” She described the Russian efforts as “attempts to bully, fearmonger and manipulate,” and insisted that “countering this activity is the work of intelligence and security services across Europe and the globe.”
The “gray zone” and “below the threshold of war” are synonymous. But the problem with gray is that it has to be interpreted. Actions calibrated to be just short of triggering a kinetic response may be misperceived by either party. And, even if the target decides that a military response is inappropriate, that doesn’t mean the conflict can’t escalate.
Britain backed up its rhetoric this week by imposing nearly 300 new sanctions on people and companies it accused of aiding Russia’s war effort. The list includes restrictions on some 50 ships in the “shadow fleet” that transports Russian oil and natural gas; bans on 175 companies linked with an Azerbaijani oligarch accused of aiding the covert fleet; and sanctions on 18 companies, many Chinese, that sell military or “dual use” products to Russia.
Germany, which before Putin’s 2022 full-scale invasion was often a docile partner of Russia, is pushing back, too. “The threat emanating from hybrid warfare has been recognized,” Martin Jaeger, head of the BND, Germany’s spy service, said this month at the Munich Security Conference. To combat it, the BND “must and will become more operational,” he said.
The German Defense Ministry has prepared an operational plan for curbing Russian hybrid operations, according to a Bloomberg report last month. Russian operations against Germany and other countries are “a tool deliberately used by Russia in its security policy and its fight against the ‘collective West.’ At the same time, these measures could also serve as preparation for military conflict,” the German document warned.
It would be helpful if the United States was certain to back any play here. But, yes, there have been enough incursions to warrant significantly ratcheting up the consequences.
Putin apparently thought he could frighten Europe into accepting his assault on Ukraine. In a Feb. 24, 2022, speech announcing his war aims, he threatened: “No matter who tries to stand in our way … they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.”
The parallels with the rhetoric of the current occupant of the Oval Office are eerie.
When Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling failed to stop Western support, Putin began his “hybrid war” campaign against Europe. According to a study by Leiden University, the number of these covert attacks rose from 13 in 2023 to 44 in 2024. The Estonian intelligence service warned at the end of 2024: “Since cutting off Western support is a key precondition for Russia to subdue Ukraine, the Kremlin has decided to raise the stakes by launching a deliberate campaign of sabotage against Western nations.”
Because diplomacy with Moscow is always under a nuclear shadow, Putin is reasonably confident that such actions won’t trigger a military response—as they might well have coming from another belligerent.
But Putin badly miscalculated in assuming that Europe would retreat under pressure. The Estonian report explained: “Russia’s covert sabotage operations have consistently backfired, reinforcing the prevailing perception of Russia as a hostile force rather than achieving any strategic advantage.”
Europe’s first move was to expel Russian intelligence officers — as many as 600 have been removed, according to a report last year by the consulting firm Globsec — who were organizing covert plots. To fill the gap, the Globsec report said, Russia turned to what it called a “spook-gangster nexus” to mount operations, often recruiting online. Of the more than 130 “hybrid” operatives identified in the report, at least 35 had criminal records. Online recruitment was used in 55 percent of the cases.
What does the European pushback look like? A report on Russia’s shadow war shared with me by a leading private intelligence firm describes a string of European countermeasures over the past few months.
In September, the French Navy intercepted the Boracay, an alleged Russian shadow-fleet tanker. In December, Finland seized the Fitburg, a cargo vessel that had allegedly disrupted an undersea telecommunications cable. In January, Germany banned an alleged shadow-fleet tanker called the Arcusat. Later in the month, France seized the Grinch, another alleged shadow-fleet tanker. This month, Denmark seized Nora, a vessel that had allegedly carried Russian oil.
European countries are also rounding up Russian-linked saboteurs, according to the private security report. In October, Poland and Romania arrested eight alleged members of a sabotage ring that was preparing parcel-bomb shipments to Ukraine. In December, Lithuania temporarily closed Vilnius airport after balloon incursions. In January, Poland arrested five people in an alleged Russian plot to mail incendiary packages to the United States, Britain, Canada and Lithuania.
The Europeans have even tracked the Russian shadow war in space. According to a Financial Times report this month, European security officials identified two Russian satellites, Luch-1 and Luch-2, that may have intercepted communications from European satellites.
I’m still more than a little skeptical that this will lead to “all-out war.” But Putin is playing an incredibly dangerous game here.
I do not see how Russia can hope to profit from a war where it will clearly not have dominance in the air. They have nothing to put up against F-16s and F-35s and Gripens. Nor do I see how they could achieve surprise. And any ground they’d hope to gain in the Baltics would be made up for by the loss of Kaliningrad, which NATO would surely take, likely with the passive acceptance of most of the population there. All this gray zone activity looks like a bully pounding his chest and insisting he’s big and bad after he’s had his ass kicked by a girl.
That said, good for Europe to prepare given Trump’s betrayal of our allies.
AFAICT the only country taking any active actions inside Russia is Ukraine. Maybe that needs to change. Is that also dangerous? Maybe, but remaining passive has its own dangers.
Steve
@steve222:
The only country that is making no bones about it, and not shying away from getting bloody.
There may well be “non-kinetic” secret operations that are ongoing, but unknown; because “secret”.
I’ve long suspected that one of Putin’s objectives was to discourage other states in the RU from pulling away from the union and the open supporting of revolutions with the RU by the Western powers. It’s what we would do if the US had come apart instead of Russia in the Cold War, and 30 years later, when the US was trying to re-form, the Soviets started openly supporting anti-US revolution in the Free State of Texas.
The Russians have a deeply embedded sense of entitlement to great-nation status, perhaps even as deep as our own. Whether warranted or not, people who have that must be treated with respect or you can expect a fight.
@dazedandconfused:
The only major drive for separation from Russia within the Russian Federation was in the Caucasus. Chechnya, primarily; to a lesser extent in Daghestan, and Ingushetia.
The West conspicuously walked wide of those.
The other “republics” are either largely Russian populated, or small, remote, sparsely populated, poor. (In various permutations)
Their chances of being split off from Russia are as close to zero as makes no matter.
I suspect anyone hoping to get the Foreign Office to die laughing might try pitching “Independence for Chuvashia!”
The real problem is Russian resentment of the loss of the former Soviet/Imperial territories: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and, in particular, Ukraine.
In particular because Ukraine is “East Slavic” and Orthodox.
Though many Russian nationalists go further, and consider Russia should have a rightful hegemony or “security dominance” regarding other former Imperial territory, and more broadly the “Slavic/Orthodox” area of Europe.
Definitions vary, but can include much of east/central Europe.
It’s true Russians may have a sense of entitlement in such matters.
So have had other countries, such as variously, France (re Belgium), Britain (re Ireland), Italy (re Albania and Dalmatia) and Germany (re almost everyone nearby).
They have had to get over their disappointments.
So must Russia.
But “core Russia” is pretty secure, absent a total collapse of the Russian state due to over-extension by war.
Which is something the Russians are a bit paranoid about.
See the references in Russian nationalist conversations to the 1917 Imperial collapse, the “Time of Troubles”, the pre-Mongol “warring principalities, etc
Ironically, it’s in part just that paranoia about state-system vulnerability that has led Putin to jam Russia into a mincing-machine in Ukraine, and raise up an enemy Russia cannot put down.
@JohnSF:
If there’s an internal threat Russia should worry about it’d be Manchuria becoming an economic and perhaps demographic Chinese colony. China’s not expansionist but I gather that they still think all of Manchuria belongs to them.
@JohnSF:
“The only major drive…”??
Seems to me a drive for separation was happening in Ukraine. It’s starting to happen in Belarus too. Happened all through the Baltics. I don’t understand that comment at all.
Per my analogy, if the Soviets were successful in splitting Texas away from the US, the “core” of the US would not be threatened, but is that the reaction the US would make? Just write it off?
Ukraine is spent more than a century as “the best part of Russia”. It will become the largest nation in the EU even with the Donbas split off, and has millions of acres of some of the best farm land in the world. Can’t draw comparisons between Ukraine and those tiny enclaves in the mountains steppes and sub-artic lands, John, you really can’t. Ukraine is clearly on another level. It should not be a surprise it’s where Russia would be willing to fight.
@Michael Reynolds:
Well, I still think holding the China-Russia summit in Harbin was a bit of sly sense of humour on the part of someone in Beijing.
The Chinese economic dominance in Siberia was already underway, and since 2022 has accelerated.
That’s one reason why the fantasises of some Trumpians (Hi, Witkoff! Hello Jared!) about massive US economic opportunities in Siberia are pure fantasy. China has Moscow’s balls in a vice, and is not about to surrender their economic gains to Americans.
A recent Economist analysis was quite interesting.
Russia is floating trillions of dollars! kites to lure Trump.
Never going to happen.
imho, China is not going to seize the Russian Far East.
Why bother, when you can buy the assets, install the extraction companies, reap the profits, and get the mortgaged Russians to manage it for you on the cheap?
British Empire 101. 😉
Even climate change won’t alter that much: it seems very unlikely to unlock prime agricultural land, due to consequent reduced precipitation.
Though there does seem to be some movement of Chinese livestock and vegetable farming operations into the border river areas.
As I’ve said before.
Russia had a choice, of being a partner on equal terms with other European countries.
Or pursuing its resentments at its fall from being a “peer power” with the US and hegemon of eastern Europe.
It chose poorly.
And must now perforce be mini-me to Xi.
@dazedandconfused:
I think we may be talking at cross purposes:
I was thinking of the post-1991 Russian Federation as the current core state which might be divisible; which imho, it’s not, and no Western state has seriously considered such a policy
If I’m right (and apologies if I’m mistaking you) you are thinking of the “core Russia” of the Empire.
Ironically, it was the Soviets that separated Belarus and Ukraine, and insisted they be separate members of the UN!
It’s the diffrence between the post-1991 Russian Federation and “core Russia”.
Which is sort of, but not quite, “Imperial Russia”.
What the Russian nationalists tend to regard as “core Russia” is the Russian Federation, plus the two East Slavic/Orthodox post-Soviet states: Ukraine and Belarus.
In that worldview, the Baltics and Moldovans and Georgians etc may be “uppity forriners” who should be humble clients.
But, as you say, Belarus and Ukraine are differnt, and far more significant to the Russian nationalist perspective.
They are East Slavic and Orthodox; therefore they should and must be at minimum “friendly subordinates” to Russia.
But Ukraine, at least, does not regard itself as such.
Not any more; and almost certainly never again.
Obviously, in either perspective, it’s very different to the “pretend republics” of the Russian Federation.
So, it’s no surprise that Putin was willing to try hard to retain them.
Perhaps a bit that he’s willing to risk crashing Russia itself to do so.
From a British/Irish pov it rather recalls Ireland and it’s realations to Britain: when it’s gone, it’s gone.
The British in many ways created Irish nationalism.
Just as other nationalisms have been created by attempts at imperial domination.
It’s perhaps no surprise that Russia would be willing to fight.
What is, perhaps, remarkable is that Russia should be wholly unable to see it’s a fight they cannot win
@JohnSF:
Pretty much. I’m not the least bit surprised the war is ongoing long after it became clear there’s no winning it for Russia, in terms of the original stated intention. How long did we stay in Vietnam and Afghanistan after that was obvious? Quite a while, seeking some form of “peace with honor”.
@dazedandconfused:
It should have been obvious from the outset that the US was not willing to match North Vietnam; the moment it conceded effective dominance in Laos, it was done.
In Afghanistan, attempting to impose a central government was futile, unless combined with general imposed rule, and forcing Pakistan to stop playing silly buggers.
Neither of which were remotely likely.
I wonder how Pakistan may now fare against their former clients?
On the one hand, Pushtun gonna Pushtun.
On the other, Pakistan has history of dealing harshly with Afghan threats.
In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, the US actually had a considerable local support base.
Which gets overlooked, simply because they lost.
Losing does not mean they did not exist.
In Ukraine, Russia has no such support base; the “Donbas republics” are a joke.
Russia has created an enemy in Ukraine that makes the Taliban and North Vietnam combined look trivial.