What Are the Right Lessons Concerning Biden’s Age?
Political scientist Julia Azari has a piece worth reading from Good Politics/Bad Politics regarding the ongoing discussion of Biden’s age, We’re Learning the Wrong Lessons from Biden’s Decision to Run in 2024.
To summarize, before I provide some excerpts and additional commentary, the bottom line is that we have weak political parties that place too emphasis on the president/candidate over the institutional power of parties. (Stop me if you have heard this one before–well, don’t stop me even though I know regular readers have heard this before). Further, if we want to figure out how to avoid these kinds of problems in the future, the real solutions are about structures and institutions, not hoping that the right people behave the right way at the right time.
It’s also more productive to think about Biden’s almost-renomination in institutional terms. I made this argument last year, as the heated primary contest among Biden, Dean Phillips, and “uncommitted” raged on. Parties have learned the lesson that competitive primaries are risky and basically not done when there’s a sitting president running for reelection. The accounts of the process by which Biden stepped down really illustrate the weakness of national parties and the resulting complexity of the nomination process. There’s a formal process for the nomination, but it’s governed and buffeted by informal rules and expectations. The channels by which Biden was pressured to step down and Harris was selected to succeed him on the ticket were also informal, with influential players working largely out of public view.
This is not dissimilar to things I have noted repeatedly, including the fact that a sitting president is essentially the leader of their party and that, therefore, it is highly unlikely that a challenger would emerge in the primary should the president (or, really, when the president) seeks re-election to a second term.
It is important to remember that the party shapes around the presidential candidate/the elected president, and not the other way around.
So-called “Biden people” seem to be at the center of many of these dramatic accounts. The problem is presented as one in which Biden’s most loyal political advisors and allies refused to face the truth about his health and capacities, and to be honest with the public (more about that in a bit). Another way to think about this problem is that the larger political party – a loose conglomeration of influential players like Nancy Pelosi – had to directly confront a separate presidential organization. A presidentially-led campaign operation has the candidate the center, surrounded by people who are loyal and owe their political careers to him. This may why we see the First Lady figure so heavily into this story – she’s one of the few people in the inner circle who has something like an equal partnership with the president. This is actually a very strange way to do party politics, with a parallel, president-centered organization competing with, and within, the party organization. Such a structure really impedes the ability of the party to balance out presidential power, and pretty much guarantees we’ll run into this problem again.
Note what Azari is highlighting here are the incentives that drive people and the competing groups created by the lack of formal structures (as noted by my emphasis above).
Her observation about the role of the First Lady is worth considering as well. It shows not only how a person who is only an informal participant in party politics has a great deal of power and influence, but also underscores that her power comes from her connection to the President. This again illustrates the weakness of the formal party and the importance of the candidate/officeholder.
Remember that to get Biden off the ticket really required Biden deciding to remove himself.
Back to Azari.
…we should also ask why the incentives to act with more integrity aren’t there, and how we ended up in a place where “the president’s people” – separate from the accountability that parties can provide – have so much sway at all. The “cover up” frame lets our atrophied and distorted institutions off the hook. Accounts that emphasize the role of individuals point to solutions in which a different cast of characters – not serious structural change – can address the failures of democratic health that we face. That kind of thinking is what led to the Biden presidency, and the dilemmas it produced, in the first place.
The bolded sentence comports with the way I have discussed this (and other) challenges within our politics. As Azari notes in a paragraph preceding the one I quoted, “[The cover-up narrative] offers a story of conflict and morality, placing individual failures at the center of the narrative.” The goal, however, should be to think about how the rules and structures (i.e., the institutions) of our politics shape incentives and direct and/or bind undesirable behavior. The focus solely on the behavior of individuals ignores what allowed those behaviors to be dispositive in the first place.
There are two other side notes I want to make as inspired by her piece.
The first is about the “cover-up” narrative.
Media framing, however, seems to have zeroed in on the story of the “cover up.” Plenty of people have pointed out that this was approximately as covered up as a Super Bowl halftime show.
This is pretty much how I feel about the basics of this story. That Joe Biden was old was not an unknown factor. Indeed, a stroll through the OTB archive provides the following (all by James Joyner, all in reaction to daily headlines, news coverage, and polls).
- March 2023: Biden Too Old! Trump Pretty Old Too!
- October 2023: Biden Is Old and Feeble, Says Old, Feeble Man.
- November 2023: Old Man Biden and Young Would-Be Voters.
- January 2024: Biden and Trump Are Apparently Old.
- January 2024: The Old Man and the Felon.
- February 2024: Old Man Biden.
I mean, as I recall, Biden’s age was a constant topic of discussion. And, I would note, that discussion led to him leaving the race for the White House in July of 2024.
The point about July of 2024 needs to be underscored. The ultimate result of various actors observing Biden, and catalyzed by the debate performance, produced the appropriate outcome.* He decided not to run for re-election. One can argue that this should have been done earlier or that there was information that the public should have had, and that may well be the case. But when dealing with human beings, especially under the parameters we are discussing, it should be no surprise whatsoever that is was a slow and difficult process up and until the moment that it wasn’t.
Now, I understand that the rejoinder is going to be that he was worse off behind the scenes than we were being told. This may well be the case, and while I am not thrilled about it, I understand, as I have written before, what the incentives within what Azari calls “the president’s people” would be. To be clear, those incentives would have been to rationalize the situation in as positive a light for Biden as possible.
Again, to Azari’s point, and similar ones I have made elsewhere: if you want to avoid these kinds of problems, fix the structural context. Beating up on Biden and his allies may make some Democrats feel better so that they can blame the 2024 election results on something, and it makes Republicans feel good because it allows them to distract from the mess that their president is making.**
To that last point, I agree with Azari (and this is the second side-point I wanted to make).
The obvious perspective is that the most demanding or perplexing Constitutional crisis [as a result of an aging Biden] would still be much less threatening to the health of the republic than what has happened so far in a second Trump term. (Some recent examples: arresting a member of Congress for protesting, cuts to federal weather preparedness systems leading to unnecessary death and destruction).
Indeed, I would rather be trying to figure out how to deal with an aging, cancer-diagnosed Biden than having White House officials muse about suspending habeas corpus and relishing the rendition of people to torture prisons without due process of law. I would rather have to wonder if the 25th Amendment needed to be invoked than to have the entire basis of the post-WWII economy carelessly wrecked while also threatening the dollar as a major reserve currency, and the loss of all the power and privilege that entails.
I could go on, but the point should be clear.
*I know some may argue that Biden should have stayed in the race. I can see that perspective, but I do think his bowing out was the right move. I cannot prove a counterfactual, but I think he would have lost as well, and likely worse than Harris did. I think that whatever energy the Democrats had going into November of 2024 was because of the new candidate, but that the inflation factor had sealed the deal, and that the incumbent party was going to lose.
**And it is free and easy programming for cable news, the same way HRC’s emails were featured on air years after the 2016 elections were in the book.
Clearly, Biden had competent professionals in all of the important Executive positions, and that at least mitigated the effect of whatever mental acuity issues he himself may have been enduring. Meanwhile, Trump displays his ignorance and dishonesty every day, and Congressional hearings reveal his cabinet secretaries to be out-of-their-depth flunkies in thrall to Trump. The same media that allegedly covered up Biden’s condition now fails to note the import of Trump’s delusions – that “China will pay the tariffs,” and most especially his unshakeable belief that he won the 2020 election. There’s a difference between bluster and belief in an alternate reality. The 25th amendment isn’t for a bullshitter, its for a President who can’t discern fact from fiction.
And yes, the way we choose candidates needs to be fixed. The political consultants and the media have every rea$on to in$i$t that the $tu$ quo is ju$t fine. Hence we get 2 year campaigns in which consultants get more and more money, as do media outlets and pollsters. Qui bono? It’s certainly not we the people.
Easier said than done.
More specifically:
But do you even want strong political parties if third-party ballot access is quite a bit more burdensome compared to the automatic access granted to both Republican and Democratic candidates?
I think (almost?) all states distinguish between – usually two – “major” or “established” parties and the rest. With the latter having a real hard time to even make the ballot, let alone get elected to something.
The thing is that you can’t (or, at least, shouldn’t) have strong parties and state-sanctioned distinctions between major and minor parties. That would be wildly undemocratic for obvious reasons.
In other words, it’s not just the internal workings of political parties that need reform, you’re also looking at fifty separate state constitutions…
@drj:
Oddly enough, I am aware of this (as people always point it out).
The difficulty of the fix does not mitigate against the diagnosis, however.
As a general matter, it is almost certainly state laws and not state constitutions that are in play for what you describe (I only hedge because I do not know the contents of all 50 state constitutions, but what you are talking about area almost certainly statutory issues).
But I will stress that pointing out that the solution is hard is akin to the doctor telling Biden he has a UTI and not prostate cancer, because prostate cancer of the type under discussion is hard to cure.
I mean, sure, giving him antibiotics for a UTI is easier but that doesn’t mitigate the real problem.
Not to put too fine a point on it: if our response to real problems is that solving them is hard, then the problems will not be solved.
I will note, however, that ballot access is not the main problem. Not by a long shot.
@Steven L. Taylor:
My point is not so much it is hard to make political parties stronger, but that this is probably the wrong solution if you don’t also want to change a whole lot of state law.
Unless you want to go back to old-fashioned machine politics.
ETA: Another way of putting this is that effective and meaningful change may require quite a bit more than changing this one particular thing.
Some issues are complex and difficult but this isn’t one of them.
http://vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/8/7/16105120/politicians-elderly-death-disability-mccain-supreme-court
With Biden, it should have been apparent that he was going to crash and burn to anybody who spent time with him. That’s the structural problem. By crash and burn, I mean I would have voted for guy but I could not have watched another minute of him because it was like elder abuse. That was the outcome of the debate. That’s crashing and burning, and there’s no reasonable excuse for not knowing that would happen.
I do think there’s an enormous generational/education gap in how people deal with power and what supposedly is inevitable. Morons on the internet associate intelligence with IQ. Most highly-educated people look at intelligence as how you understand and deal with your own problems. Not being able to deal with an elderly president who was gonna lose is your own problem. And the Democrats have been running older people to the point of death because of this gap, I think, and they haven’t offered any solutions.
IMO, Biden shouldn’t have run for a second term. But having run, ge shouldn’t have dropped out.
As professor Taylor points out, though, counterfactuals cannot be falsified.
@Steven L. Taylor: You have indeed made the point that structural reform is easier said than done. That said, any idea where to start? I’ve been a modestly active member of the local D party, and I’m unaware of anything they’re doing that I can support. Any pointer to organizations trying to do anything about this?
I tend to see ’24 not as a crime, but as a Greek tragedy. There aren’t so much villains as victims. And the real problem isn’t the ’24 election. Given the close partisan split and what happened with Biden, it’s obvious why we lost in ’24. The problem is, given a totally feckless Republican Party, why was it close to start with?
You note, correctly, that the prez is the de facto leader of the party. A corollary is that without a sitting prez or nominee, the party is largely leaderless. At a time the party needs to be aggressively planning and preparing for the mid-terms and ’28.
@drj: says, “Unless you want to go back to old-fashioned machine politics.” Old fashioned machine and smoke filled room politics was hardly ideal, but right now I’d prefer it to what we have. At least it was organized. Will Rogers was right.
Which means that real solutions may never be realized given that institutional change may depend on right people behaving in right ways at right times. But I also get that you and I don’t see eye to eye on this. Please note that I hope that your faith in structures and institutions will overcome inertia and human nature and that you live to bask in that triumph.
We need better and more loyal hacks. Democratic strategists who will go on all the shows, and keep attacking the Republicans, rather than Democratic strategists that will attack Democrats.
If James Carville dies in a wood-chipping accident tomorrow, I will not mourn.
This is a thought exercise, but I am curious.
I suspect the only way to flip the dynamics of the weak formal party and the important candidate/officeholder would be for the officeholder to make it happen. I can’t imagine a scenario where the formal party would undercut their POTUS in order to claim that power, so even with a bevy of influential party players like Nancy Pelosi working behind the scenes, ultimately the important leader would need to cede some power and sell it to the public as an act of noblesse oblige.
So, imagine after Biden was elected in 2020, he and Jill decided his legacy would be a rebalancing of the power dynamics of the Democratic Party. (I think it safe to say that the rebalancing would have had to be unilateral, because the Republicans would never share the risk.) The two of them convince “Biden’s people” that the best thing they can do for their party and their country is correct our atrophied and distorted institutions – at least on the left side.
Knowing we’d have the same media environment and the same electorate, how would that have played out? Would a stronger party have pushed Biden to pass the baton? Would they have picked a better ticket than Harris/Walz considering other options available? Was there a possibility to foil Trump through institutional strength? Would the reinvigoration of the party provided a means to overcome the anti-incumbent sentiments that won the day in 2024?
I’m completely convinced of Steven’s case that we have weak political parties that place too much emphasis on the president/candidate over the institutional power of parties. But, I think translating that abstract idea into tangible potentially different outcomes would be prerequisite to convincing others of the need for the change.
@just nutha: The people ARE the system. Structures and Institutions are vehicles where norms and best practices can be passed to successive generations without the overhead of experience. They, however, are NOT a substitute for people. Lost in these discussion are the failure of the education system—which made the youth smarter but dumber at the same time. They can tell you everything about a tree but understand very little about the Forest a tree exist in. ALSO lost in these discussion are the lack of interest of seasoned young adults in governance and politics—which is the real reason the olds are able to hang on for so long. The electorate can’t resist youthful, charismatic leaders—the more youthful, charismatic leader usually wins elections—and if not the first election then the next one. Our mid 30 something’s are not interested in politics—a few are interested in governance and the the lion’s share of the rest are busy living the bon-vie, consuming an endless menu of societal entertainment. But—public service you say? See my comment on the education system—the desire to serve the public is implanted in the formatory years. If not planted early—it will never mature and grow into the impulse to serve fellow citizens.
@just nutha:
“Which means that real solutions may never be realized given that institutional change may depend on right people behaving in right ways at right times.”
I don’t think the correct word is “may”, but “will”, in both spots.
@Moosebreath: Metaphysically, I agree with you. Rhetorically, I don’t fence myself in because of all the people who have “got this” and know what the problem is.
And hypothetically, the wish hand has a more than zero chance of filling first. It’s not statistically impossible no matter how real-world unlikely it is.
Tangential, but the situation of having to choose between Trump and Biden is IMO largely the result of there being so few people willing to subject themselves and their families to the circus the process has become.
@drj:
I actually would prefer that. It would increase the chances of third-party development because it would lock out opposition forces who would have no choice but to form a new party instead of trying to retake the two existing parties via primaries.
The main reason we have only two parties is that the primary process takes away any real incentive to form a new party. See my paper on the general topic here.
@Jim X 32:
Serious question: is a football game just 22 people on the field? How do they know to play gridiron football instead of soccer?
Rules matter. Institutions structure behavior and create incentive structures.
@Steven L. Taylor: While I am passionately ambivalent about a return to machine politics, I’m hesitant to suggest that such a return is the answer to Trump or Biden. My history on the period is fuzzy after 55 or so years, but my visceral sense is that a political machine system would find ways to use both types of politicians, especially in their respective dotages.
I’m skeptical about whether they would make 3rd party formation easier also. My viscera, again, tells me that changes beyond strong/machine parties are more essential to multi-party systems than the organizational structure of the parties themselves. But I could easily be wrong on that point.
@dazedandconfused: Circuses inevitably encourage clowns to become the stars.
Republicans are enjoying themselves immensely with feigned indignation about all the latest “revelations” about Biden’s infirmities. But their messaging is deeply confused. Did everyone know because it was all public information, or was there a huge cover-up? They just look stupid claiming both are true.
The House January 6 Committee’s 21-month investigation apparently did nothing to deter Americans from re-electing Trump. I don’t imagine House Republicans investigating who knew what about Joe Biden’s health when he was president is going to influence voters in 2028, either.
@Steven L. Taylor: As do the people. Is football the same game with 22 people on the field with scoliosis? I would argue that the rules of football are different with 22 infirmed players, vs 22 average people, vs the game we see today which features the best physical specimens in the world.
I’m not making an either or argument. I’m saying people, institutions, and structures are interdependent–but people are often left out of the analysis. To build off the sports analogy, why did the San Antonio Spur cease to be a contender after the decline of Tim Duncan, Tony Parker, and Manu Ginobilli? Same structure, same, organization for Popovich’s tenure. Answer, the humans. However, one much acknowledge that the Spurs structure and organization had a profound affect on those 3 players. It’s arguable that Tim Duncan in a Hall of Fame no matter what team…but that’s certainty not the case with Manu and Tony Parker. People, structure, and organization together create opportunities for groups of people to accomplish rare feats.
@Jim X 32:
Rather obviously this matters. I am not saying that people are irrelevant. But I am pointing out that the structures and rules determine what those people can and cannot do and shapes the very interactions they have.
Changing rules can make the game better or worse.
I am reacting to this sentence in particular, “The people ARE the system.” This is simply not accurate.
A system with no people is nothing. But a bunch of people with no system are just a bunch of people.
@Jim X 32:
You are missing my point.
The post-Duncan Spurs still played basketball. They didn’t start playing ice hockey without Tony Parker.
Yes, people affect the outcomes of systems, but they are still constrained and shaped by those systems.
Steph Curry was really, really good at exploiting one aspect of the system, the 3-point shot. Shaq was terrible at free-throws. But they were still operating within the parameters of the game.
Indeed, the addition of the three-point line in 1979 was a structural reform of the game that would one day make Curry a star. If the NBA had not made that reform, Curry may have never been Curry.
Indeed, over time, the game has evolved in response to rule changes, which have been driven by certain persons, but also has led teams to go find certain kinds of people.
Adapation to the rules and structures of the game affect who gets drafted, who plays, and what kinds of plays are run.
Speaking of Julia Azari, her most famous contribution is the idea of “weak parties with strong partisanship,” which she rolled out in a Vox piece shortly before the 2016 election. It’s now paywalled, but I quoted extensively from it in late 2023:
It’s really, really hard to force a President to do much of anything under those circumstances.
I wonder if this is still true of the current GOP, though. The combination of the cult of personality around Trump and his alliance with 400x billionaire Musk leads to pretty tight party control.