I have been meaning to write a post for some time (well before the recent spate of posts about voters, structures, and such), but a poll and some analysis by G. Elliot Morris jump-started my brain (more on that in part II, as this post has gotten longer than intended). The basic goal here is to identify which variables we should think about, and in what order and rank, when trying to understand electoral outcomes this cycle (and others, too).
I would posit that the following are the variables that determine the outcomes of a given election, in ranked order of significance.
- Partisanship
- Prevailing national conditions
- Candidate quality
- Other factors, such as campaign spending
Of course, all of this is then poured into the various states and districts that further shape outcomes, which is why, for example, if a given jurisdiction has a sufficiently high partisan lean, only variable #1 matters in terms of determining the winner. This is why the Cook Report looks like this for the House. All you really need to know for the dark blue and dark red is the partisan lean of the districts in question. To calibrate the rest is a combination of the other variables.
Variable #2 is easily understood in recent elections as primarily the economy. There can be no doubt that inflation was the primary motivator in terms of prevailing national conditions in the 2024 contest. Further, I think that 2024 was also highly influenced by a hangover effect from the pandemic (which was linked to the inflation question as well).
There is zero doubt that the single most important variable as it pertains to #2 going into November 2026 is fuel prices (gasoline and diesel).
Let’s consider the Texas Senate race as an example of what I am talking about. Texas is a Republican state–here is how the state voted for president since 2000.
However, the last mid-term that had a Senate contest (2018) produced a far closer result.
In 2018, the prevailing national conditions were more Democratic-leaning, as it was a mid-term cycle wherein the president’s party historically has a harder time at the polls. According to Gallup, Trump’s approval nationally was hovering around the upper 30s and mid-40s at the time.
But also in 2018, I think that we can move down the variable ladder and note that Beto O’Rourke was a high-quality candidate, and that Ted Cruz, while the incumbent, was not the most likeable guy in the Senate. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that candidate quality was of some significance in the closer race.
I do not recall anything I would put in the #4 variable column, save that there was a ton of out-of-state money spent in that race.
Transition to 2026 in Texas, and what do we have?
- The state is still predominantly Republican, so the partisan lean of the state helps Paxton (indeed, Obi-Wan, it is his only hope).
- The prevailing national conditions are highly anti-Trump and anti-GOP. Trump’s net approval in Texas, by at least one measure, is -21, while in 2018 a poll had him at +3 in the state. Let me also note the following from Reuters: Trump’s approval falls to record low of 31% as midterms near, Reuters/Ipsos poll finds.
- Ken Paxton is a terrible candidate (the political science term might, in fact, be “loathsome”). He is not good on the stump, refuses to debate, and is even getting members of the Bush family to publicly eschew him. (See my note on variable #1). James Talarico has proven to be an excellent candidate.
- There is an amazing amount of money being spent in this campaign.
My point is here is that #1 is the guiding variable, and the question becomes can the gravitational pull of the rest make a difference? In terms of the presidential approval ratings, it would be hard to find less favorable conditions for the GOP, at least in a situation in which we are not in the middle of an obvious* disaster (an invasion, a depression, etc.). It would be difficult to conceive of a worse candidate than Ken Paxton. It would likewise be difficult to think of a much better candidate for this moment than Talarico.
And yet, the race is close because variable #1 is so powerful. Here is the FiftyPlusOne polling aggregation for the race:
I can’t run the actual experiment given the constraints of spacetime, but I do think that if John Cornyn had been the nominee, the chart above would have been flipped. Moreover, it seems more likely that the outcome would be a narrow R win in November instead of what reasonably could be a narrow D win.
I would add that the only reason candidate quality in the Texas case has a chance of mattering this much is because variable #2 creates the permissive environment for #1 to soften enough for #3 to matter. And note, again, how bad Paxton has to be, and how good Talarico has to be, for it to matter enough that a D win is possible (and still not guaranteed!).**
I think this illustrates how the foundational issue is the partisan makeup of a district (or state-as-district), and only extreme influence by the down-list variables can matter enough to derail the main variable.
This is why we are seeing competitive races in places like Iowa and Kansas as well.
If the Senate goes D, this election will have been the result of one of the greatest self-owns in all of American politics: Trump’s very, very stupid war in Iran. Sadly, the whole world, and not just the GOP, must suffer the consequences.
Part II to come, probably tomorrow.
*By “obvious” I mean a disaster that is clearly seen, felt, and understood by the populace, like the Great Depression or a global war. I think we are involved in a profound set of less obvious (to the general public) disasters, including the collapse of the rules-based international order and commensurate diminution of American power going forward, as well as a profound crisis around the erosion of American democracy. These are both self-inflicted, but also invisible to most people at the moment.
**Maybe the easier way to understand my point is this: what explains the fact that Talarico isn’t cruising to a landslide victory? It’s because of the partisan lean of the state.
