Iran War: No End in Sight
Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.
WSJ (“Israeli Officials Think Iran’s Regime Isn’t Likely to Fall Soon“):
Israeli officials now assess that Iran’s ruling regime is unlikely to fall in the immediate future, as Tehran’s battered rulers remain in control and conditions on the ground aren’t yet ripe for a popular uprising, people familiar with the matter said.
Nearly two weeks into the war, Iran’s military and political leadership appears functional and responsive to events, while its domestic opponents have been cowed by a heavy security presence. Israeli officials assess that changing the equation would likely require many more weeks or months of fighting.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Thursday that he wasn’t sure if Iranians would be able to topple the Islamic republic although he said Israel was working to create the conditions that would allow for it.
“I can’t tell you with certainty that the Iranian people will bring down the regime,” Netanyahu said. “If it doesn’t fall, it will be much weaker.”
On Thursday, the Israeli military laid out more limited goals for its activities, focusing on degrading Iran’s military capability so the regime can’t pose as much of a threat to Israel and the region.
“Our job as a military is when we see a threat to minimize it and push it away for as long as possible,” Israeli military spokesman Nadav Shoshani told reporters Thursday. “And after that there are more steps at different levels that are beyond the IDF,” he said, referring to the Israeli military.
[…]
President Trump and Netanyahu began the conflict calling on Iranians to take control of their country. Since then, U.S. officials have increasingly focused on narrower goals of destroying the country’s military capability, nuclear program and ballistic-missile arsenal.
[…]
The regime has so far proven resilient and has continued striking back, exacting a growing toll on the U.S. and its allies and the global economy.
A pair of fuel tankers were hit Wednesday night off Iraq, following attacks on cargo ships and oil tankers that have all but shut down the crucial Strait of Hormuz waterway. Dubai residents reported a series of missile warnings and intercepts early Thursday, and Gulf countries such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia continued to be targeted in attacks. Meanwhile, Iranian security services appear to have solid control of the streets.
[…]
Trump has said in interviews this week that the war in Iran could end soon, without providing a timeline. Israel hopes for additional time to fight, but officials are aware Trump faces domestic pressure and could end the war abruptly, one of the people familiar with the matter said.
The Atlantic‘s Nancy Youssef (“The Iran War Has Four Stages. We’re in the Second.“):
The death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the first day of the Iran war generated hope that the regime change the Trump administration and Israel yearned for would come to pass, perhaps with a more moderate new leader stepping up.
That, after all, is what happened two months ago in Venezuela, where Delcy Rodríguez assumed power after her boss, Nicolás Maduro, was captured by U.S. forces. The nationwide protests in Iran late last year and early this one hinted at a country potentially on the cusp of seismic change. For a few hours after the bombing started, the maximalist outcome the administration sought seemed within reach, officials told me.
Instead, the U.S. and Israel moved through their military-strike plan over the following days without a palpable change in Iran’s position. The regime named the ayatollah’s son Mojtaba Khamenei—whose ideas are believed to be more hard-line than his father’s—as successor. And rather than create the circumstances for a popular uprising, which Trump had called for in his first speech of the war, the air campaign has left Iranians feeling stuck between a regime they do not want and a war whose objectives are ill-defined. The strikes that once promised Iranians liberation have instead led to black rain caused by oil from stricken infrastructure, damage to historical sites, and, according to the preliminary findings of a U.S. military investigation, the deaths of at least 175 children and teachers from a U.S. Tomahawk missile. Trump’s assertion that Iran would “probably not” keep its borders only added to fears among Iranians that the war will lead to a divided country.
[…]
[W]hat would postwar Iran look like? “The administration still hasn’t decided what they want to see happen,” one Defense Department official told me. In a closed-door briefing yesterday on Capitol Hill, Pentagon officials didn’t offer legislators any more clarity. “They can’t give answers other than acknowledge the immediate military objectives,” a congressional official told me. (Asked for comment, the Pentagon pointed to public statements from the secretary of defense and the president.)
[…]
In the second phase of the plan, the military depends less on long-range missiles and instead is sending more aircraft over Iran to strike targets, given that the U.S. and Israel are close to controlling Iranian airspace. This could be the longest phase of the U.S. attack plan.
But at the same time, hopes of a new direction for Iran—further dashed by recent U.S. intelligence assessments that the regime is not at imminent risk, according to Reuters—have been superseded by fears that either the regime survives or, possibly worse, the regime’s ability to govern collapses, splinters, or is so weak that it leaves behind a failed state. That uncertainty raises the possibility that the U.S. and Israel could seek divergent ends to the war.
A broken Iran consumed by internal fighting poses a minimal threat to Israel. Israel’s targets expanded last weekend to key Iranian economic assets, including energy facilities, signaling an interest in weakening Iran beyond just its military capacity.
“The Israelis are looking to ensure that they don’t have a threat from the Iranians, but their way of going about it means if they are successful, Iran is a failed state, sooner or later,” H. A. Hellyer, a Middle East security and geopolitics expert for the Royal United Services Institute and at the Center for American Progress, told me.
The senior ranks of the U.S. military are divided over the prospect of a weakened or failed state. Some commanders see a benefit: Only a functional state can pursue nuclear ambitions. Others fear that an unstable and unpredictable Iran could pose a serious risk to the U.S., both economically and for long-term security, U.S. defense officials told me. A failed state could become a haven for terrorist groups that target U.S allies and interests in the region. Or one of Iran’s minority groups, such as the Kurds, could seek to grab parts of the existing state and make similar calls for greater autonomy for Kurdish populations in Turkey and Iraq. Above all, a weakened state puts 92 million Iranians in jeopardy from internal instability or, possibly, from a new emboldened regime, should one arise. If Iranians choose to leave, they could trigger a disruptive mass migration, as happened after the start of Syria’s civil war 15 years ago, a calamity with which the Middle East and Europe are still reckoning.
Israel and the U.S. have different pain tolerance for achieving their aims in Iran. Israelis consider higher gas prices caused by obstructions or threats in the Strait of Hormuz “a small price to pay” to combat their chief nemesis, Danny Citrinowicz, a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, told me from Israel.
But President Trump may balk at the prospect of sustained high oil prices, with some predictions that oil could reach $200 a barrel (from slightly less than $73 at the start of the war) ahead of November’s midterm elections. Even now, with oil about $100 a barrel, the war has caused what the International Energy Agency says is the largest oil-supply disruption in history; Gulf producers are cutting output by at least 10 million barrels a day—roughly 10 percent of global demand. The U.S. has listed a panoply of rationales for the war—10 were offered in just the first six days—suggesting that victory could have many definitions. If the principal U.S. aim is to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities, that does not require Iran’s regime to collapse but just that it be so weakened that it can’t rebuild for years. That doesn’t necessarily mean, however, that the conditions would be right for the people to overthrow their government.
“Tacitical success does not guarantee a successful post-regime Iran,” Christopher Preble, the senior fellow and director of the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center, a think tank, told me. “A strategic victory means that you are in a stronger position than when you started the war.”
The aphorism in the epigraph is attributed to Dwight Eisenhower, but he was simply repeating a line that was already old when he quoted it some seven decades ago. It was followed by this:
There is a very great distinction because when you are planning for an emergency you must start with this one thing: the very definition of “emergency” is that it is unexpected, therefore it is not going to happen the way you are planning.
So, the first thing you do is to take all the plans off the top shelf and throw them out the window and start once more. But if you haven’t been planning you can’t start to work, intelligently at least.
That is the reason it is so important to plan, to keep yourselves steeped in the character of the problem that you may one day be called upon to solve–or to help to solve.
I have no doubt that CENTCOM planners had in fact been thinking about this problem for years, if not decades. They had almost certainly updated those plans in the wake of MIDNIGHT HAMMER and the so-called 12 Day War. It explains why our tactical successes have been as great as they have been.
But the planning—informed by the longstanding consensus of the intelligence community—had also shown that simply killing the bad guys would likely not by itself lead to regime change, much less the emergence of a regime more friendly to US interests. It why President Trump’s hand-picked Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Dan Caine, advised caution.
The war has thus far cost the lives of at least 11 American servicemen, with scores more wounded. We’ve lost at least four aircraft (three fighter jets and a refueler). We’re rapidly depleting our magazine depth of critical assets like air defense and Tomahawk missiles. At least a thousand Iranian noncombatants, including some 170 at a children’s school, have been killed. All of those were known risks that the President was advised of.
The above reports confirm what I’ve suspected for days: our goals (to the extent they exist) and Israel’s are not the same. A failed state in Iran would suit them just fine. It is decidedly not in American interests or those of its non-Israeli allies and partners in the region. But it explains why Israel is targeting critical infrastructure that will be necessary to get Iran back on its feet, regardless of what regime is in charge at war’s end.
If this reporting is accurate then Fatso is stupid beyond imagination..,
https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/12/politics/hormuz-trump-administration-underestimated-iran
There’s no real end in sight to any of this. Israelis are not going to start feeling safe one of these days. The country is a sociopathic wasteland addicted to endless aggression and victimization.
Meanwhile, America is not a sociopathic wasteland. But the best parts of America are being attacked by rich hysterics who screech about Islam and who want turn everything into slop for slaves. These people are jokes, for the most part. Fewer and fewer want them. Trump and his party and the weird tech people who were like the future during one month of 2024 are now fit only for reeducation camps. They are threats to everyone around them. But they have power and weapons and dumb people who obey them. Thus, the logic of this war is going to be carried forward into the upcoming elections and how these imbeciles deal with their lack of popularity.
Iran believed it could deter the US and Israel by achieving the ability to quickly build a bomb. Now they understand that the only way to deter the US and Israel is by actually having a deliverable nuclear weapon. We’ve smashed a lot of their means of producing said bomb. They can reconstitute their program slowly while aiming for a bomb, or, they may be able to do it more quickly because they still have the enriched uranium and they have friends, Russia and China, which can help them accelerate the rebuilding.
IOW Iran has gone from, ‘we should have the means,’ to, ‘we definitely need the bomb.’ How quickly they get there may be up to China and Russia.
In the meantime they have Shahed drones. We have no doubt degraded their ability to produce thousands of them, but they don’t need thousands, they just need enough to hit the occasional ship or tanker. If ships are actually getting hit it stops being a problem of insurance alone and becomes a ‘sorry Mr. Maersk and Mr. Cosco, but I don’t want to die,’ problem.
This is not a problem that can be solved with escorts. The Gulf is 1000 kilometers long. There are thousands of ships. And the US Navy does not have an effective anti-drone defense or the ships to patrol the Gulf even if we had an effective defense. And there are the Houthis who seem to be hanging back but are just as capable of pinching off the Red Sea, which is not just oil, but the Suez Canal.
If the regime survives, they win and we lose and there’s likely a world-wide recession. If Iran can impose a recession even the dumbest MAGAts will eventually notice that their loathsome, corrupt, child-raping cult leader has impoverished them.
@Michael Reynolds: I have thought that the lesson of Iraq was: be like North Korea and get the bomb. This will greatly reinforce that notion.
And this is all made worse by the fact that other Trump administration policies are encouraging proliferation in other ways (such as making allies question our resolve to be a security guarantor).
The utter dumbassery of this administration is maddening to behold.
This has been my concern as well. I am not sure that Trump or Hegseth understands this.
Israel doesn’t care about an end game, they are content to periodically bomb Iran just as they do Gaza and Lebanon.
@Michael Reynolds:
In mentioning Russia and China as friends of Iran, a likely source of nuclear assistance in getting a bomb is North Korea, they have nothing to lose and a lot to gain.
@Steven L. Taylor:
Trump and Hegseth have the same concept of ‘just fine’ as Israel. Trump sort-of understands in odd moments that much of America is not like him. Hegseth is a product of his environment and understanding provokes aggression in him.
Iran has to provide an off-ramp. But why would they? As terrible as their regime is, it’s America and Israel who are the treacherous parties in this conflict. What possible reason do they have to believe anything they’re offered. And Iran is outsmarting American, which is not difficult. They aren’t winning but they aren’t losing.
There was a plan. It’s just that it was a plan created by macho men, sycophants and warmongers (Hegseth, Rubio, Graham) designed to appeal to a simpleton. We’re not simpletons, so it makes no sense to us, but “bomb the hell out of them, claim victory, and get out” was music to Trump’s ears.
James’ juxtaposition with Eisenhower is nicely done. Even in that short quote, DDE calls out the need for intelligence and depth of understanding of a problem as prerequisites to military engagement. The problem with the Trump administration generally isn’t stupidity, it’s shallowness. They consider only simple answers to sell to simpletons who spend all their time on social media or watching TV (including the Simpleton in Chief).
Back in the 80s, Israel bombed a half-built reactor in Iraq, which eliminated Saddam’s nuke program.
Only it didn’t.
The reactor, which BTW Iran had also attacked earlier, was a breeder design which could produce plutonium. While this element is a better choice for nukes (because it’s easier to obtain than enriched uranium), it’s not the only choice. The butcher of Baghdad went on to attempt the enriched uranium route, badly. This did end with the 1991 Gulf War.
The impression does remain that a few airstrikes can end a nuke program. This has never happened.
As explained above, it took a major war to end Iraq’s program. the only other method that has worked is diplomacy. not only the JCPOA, bu a number of other countries were persuaded earlier, in the 50s, 60s, and 70s, to end R&D for a bomb, and to sign on to the non-proliferation treaty.
So, no, neither the US nor Israel will end Iran’s program unless they put boots on the ground, and are ready for a slog that destroys the Iranian armed forces and the IRGC, so Iran will be forced to come clean on all they’re doing, and to allow international inspectors unfettered access to all facilities.
Israel lacks the means, and the US lacks leadership.
@Steven L. Taylor:
I can assure you they don’t understand. Those two are proud of their “go by their gut” prowess over expertise. It’s the brand on which they’ve sold themselves to the American people.
Sadly, there is a substantial voter bloc of people who want to be buy magic elixirs.
What has been swirling through my mind this week is that Trump, like Putin, thought his war would be short and sweet. I do wonder if Putin ultimately thought that 3-7 days after Russian troops helped secure the takeover of Ukraine (or at least its Government) that citizens would tentatively open their doors and after seeing all was safe would flood the streets with their arms held aloft singing what a wonderful day that Russia had freed them from the control of Ukraine’s Government (lol).
Instead, Russia is on year 4 of its Special Military Operation with no end in sight. We should have learned from what we have seen happening in Russia/Ukraine over the past 4 years, but nope, we learned nothing. I remember when we invaded Iraq/Afghanistan and our Government was all do not stress America, we will not be dragged into a potentially unwinnable conflict because the Iraqi/Afghani citizens will take to the streets to sing their praises that America has liberated them from oppression.
Sigh.
The whole world saw how well that worked out for us.
Also, if you want to win hearts and minds in Iran maybe don’t kill hundreds of children, rain down oil on Iranian citizens, and do not destroy historically important sites in Iran all in the first 2-3 weeks of our invading their country.
Again…sigh.
Such frustrating times we live in.
@Scott F.:
I think you’re grossly underestimating the plan. It was “bomb the hell out of them, killing the senior leadership, and whoever is left with be in awe of our strength and do our bidding.” Far manlier than just declaring victory.
Just because a plan is manifestly stupid doesn’t mean it isn’t a plan.
It’s sad that it has come to this, but lot of people in our government should understand our history of coups in South America for a lot of reasons, not least of which is the lesson that you need to have your own strongman waiting to take over.
Imperialism is bad enough. Imperialism tied to The Secret like some megalomaniacal Oprah Winfrey guest is worse.
The big winner in this debacle is Putin. Sanctions are being lifted, even though there is no proof he isn’t actually helping Iran, and Ukraine is being weakened by US burning thru precious munitions. It’s almost as though aiding Putin was the intention from the jump.
JPost produced this, but paywalled so here’s the social media version.
The IDF is attempting to hit “Basij checkpoints” within Tehran.
IMO, the goal is to destroy Basij morale. Nobody is going to be marching in the streets with things blowing up every block or two. I suppose that if Basij morale were to collapse it would be a whole new ball game for the protests, probably game-over for the regime. But if that doesn’t happen immediately it’s extremely simple for the Basij to counter. Unlikely this was part of the grand plan going in, there have been no reports, that I know of, of morale problems within the Basij.
If straws are all you have…might as well grasp them, I guess.
@inhumans99:
I wonder whether the idea that an invading army sent to topple an oppressive regime will be welcomed by the bulk of the population, may originate in rare instances in history. Specifically WWII.
US and Ally troops were welcomed in France, Belgium, Holland and elsewhere. However, they were not so much toppling a dictator as driving out an occupation force. And the locals believed, correctly, the Allies wouldn’t conquer their countries.
Of course, this idea didn’t come out of the blue. The allies had been providing intelligence, weapons, and other assistance to resistance forces in all these countries, and I assume also engaged in propaganda as well.
I don’t think the Soviets were as welcomed, either. Certainly not in Poland, where they waited for weeks while the Germans put down a Polish rebellion.
Past WWII, the only time I can think of a foreign army was welcome by the population, would be Kuwait in 1991.and that was another case of driving off an occupying army.
Signs of escalation: Marines are heading to the Gulf
It would be no surprise to learn in years to come that Pahlavi and his Iranian supporters in exile managed to persuade the White House that he had huge support among the Iranian people; that they would rise up when he told them to and overthrow the regime, whereupon (with US military support) he could reclaim the throne. As a transitional move to democracy, of course!
https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-889575
I wonder if these “allied experts” are named Witkoff and Kushner, bringing to the task all the expertise they’ve developed governing Gaza so successfully.
@Kathy: According to the article a single MEU (Marine expeditionary unit) is being deployed. A MEU is basically a reinforced Marine infantry battalion with a supporting tilt rotor squadron. While this is a potent fighting unit it is way too small for an effective ground assault on mainland Iran where the drones, missiles, and artillery are located.
@Ken_L:
I wouldn’t be surprised if the Little Prince has as much in the way of brains as those two.
@Daryl:
I guess a bit of googling could school me on how wrong I am, but I do not see this war as strengthening Putin and weakening Ukraine. Quite the opposite in fact, Putin was probably Iran’s main customer for their drones, and that supply chain has been damaged by our attacking Iran.
Less Iranian drones attacking Ukraine seems like a plus to me. Also, I could again be wrong, but we stopped providing munitions (intelligence, and continued use of Starlink terminals yes, but not munitions) to Ukraine quite a while back thanks to President Trump being angry at Ukraine for not surrendering to Russia to make our President look good to his MAGA base.
Until the regime changes in the White House Ukraine will have to continue to rely on Europe for its munitions, and it seems that Europe has stepped up enough to the point where they can keep fighting Russia for the indefinite future (and if what I have seen from YouTube posters is not all fake news, then Ukraine has definitely been putting the hurt on Putin, including his vaunted warships).
This war against Iran will eventually piss a majority of people off when they realize that were it not for the desires of the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Israel, we would not be fighting Iran and making life even more expensive than it is for many folks in the U.S..
@a country lawyer:
Who knows what those who base the conduct of their war on movies and video games think a single MEU can do.
@inhumans99:
Mad Vlad will get windfall profits from oil as 1) it costs more now, and 2) sanctions were eased for some reason by El Taco.
I don’t know what the ramifications are for arms and ability to strike. I think I’ve heard Iran sold or licensed the plans for their drones, so the Russians are either making their own or can do so.
@a country lawyer:
It’s going to Kharg Island. A MEU, plus air support out of Kuwait which is just a little over 100 miles away. There are rumors of Delta operators in the picture as well. Trump is going to steal the oil. But not right away. That MEU is almost two weeks away.
ETA: Well, I am wrong, he’s already started. https://www.thedailybeast.com/frantic-donald-trump-ramps-up-iran-war-by-personally-ordering-major-strikes/
@Michael Reynolds:
The Mullahs are threatening to go after oil infrastructure in the GUlf countries, if the US bombs their oil terminal.
According to Wikipedia, in 2022 Iran exported under 1 million barrels a day. That’s lower than Mexico. So, not a huge deal globally if Iran gets taken off the oil market.
But the rest of the Gulf countries exported over 15 million barrels per day the same year, with Saudi Arabia making up almost half of that.
El Taco is biting off a lot more than he can chew. Or, in terms of an obscure book he’s never read, he’s set to reap a bumper crop of whirlwind.
@Michael Reynolds:
imho the Iranian ploy was to have a close to weapons uranium stock, and then parlay off not going all the way to 90% in return for concessions on other matters.
It was a rather daft play, but there you go.
The likelihood now, as before, is that if Iran gets to 90% and metallized, Israel will do whatever is necessary to prevent weapoization.
Up to and including nuclear weapons use.
That’s why Iran wanted a sub-weapons threat: to bargain off stasis to protect other regime priorities, without provoking all-out war.
They miscalulated that; but going for a working nuke is an even worse miscalculation.
In re the Gulf: the Straits of Hormuz remain the key.
If the US can secure transit it can hope to grind Iran down.
If not, not.
@Michael Reynolds:
imho the obvious ground force target is Qeshm, not Kharg.
If cutting off Iranian oil shipments was the key, that could be achieved much easier by just grabbing Iran-export tankers in the Arabian Sea.
The key point now is the Straits of Hormuz.
If the US can dominate there, it can still hope to win
If not, not.
The problem will be, absent a regime replacement in Iran, a land force on the northern shore is going to be jammed into an ongoing guerilla war.
Which is part of why this entire war plan is a pile of pants.
But at least securing the north shore would avert rapid failure.
@inhumans99:
One point is: a lot of those Europeans who pay attention to such things (a minority, as in the US) regard the US lifting sanctions on Russia as a masive shiv in the back.
What’s the betting on Trump ever reimposing sanctions?
Even in sanctions enforcement on India re Russian oil, that seemed to owe a lot to his pique about India not nominating him for a Nobel; else why was Pakistan not similarly treated?
My read of the Saudi’s is they did not want this war.
Because they realised the Israeli acceptable end-state (ie Iran as “failed state”) was not theirs.
And the US was obviously not serious about the matter: no plan for ground forces, and Trump being an idiot.
The al-Saud may be nasty bastards, but naive they ain’t.
@Ken_L:
Witkoff and Kushner are fools whose stupidity is exacerbated by their cupidity.
In this matter I suspect they have been little more than messenger boys for Netanyahu.
@Kathy:
Italy in WW2 is interesting.
The Allies were generally welcomed, despite the Fascist government (gets complicated).
Whereas the Germans were not.
In WW1 the British in the Arab majority areas of the Turkish Empire were at least inititally, if often passively, welcome enough.
@Kathy:
Depends on Iran having the firepower to do so.
I think that open to doubt.
What they obviously do have is the ability to close the Straits of Hormuz.
Either the US re-opens the straits, within at least a week or so, or the US loses this war.