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Things I never really thought about.
Who Repairs the Internet in Wartime?
In spring 2026, Britain, Norway, and the United States tracked and disrupted a covert Arctic exercise off the coast of Norway involving Russian deep-sea submersibles simulating the deployment of a weapon designed to disable the two 1,400-kilometer submarine cables linking the islands of Svalbard to mainland Norway. Svalbard hosts a satellite ground station serving Europe, the United States, and Japan. This encounter revealed that NATO allies can detect a covert subsea operation and, if caught in time, disrupt it.
Had it been a real attack, the first question would have been where and how quickly internet and sensitive government traffic could be rerouted. But this requires grappling with who will repair the cables, how quickly, and what would happen if additional cables in other theaters were cut before the first repair was complete. To effectively disrupt global communications, an adversary needs only to damage cables in multiple locations faster than the repair system can restore them.
Like commercial satellites, we are dependent on private commercial firms to conduct war.
In 2017, Adm. (ret.) James Stavridis warned in the foreword to a Policy Exchange report by future U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, “It is not satellites in the sky, but pipes on the ocean floor that form the backbone of the world’s economy. … We have allowed this vital infrastructure to grow increasingly vulnerable and this should worry us all.” Since 2020, the Federal Communications Commission has implemented strong policies around submarine cable ownership and supplier screening. But the United States has no wartime repair and restoration strategy for a campaign of simultaneous cable failures across multiple theaters.
There is even a Cable Security Fleet.
The CSF helps sustain a fleet of cable vessels active, commercially viable, privately-owned cable vessels operating under U.S. registry to meet national security requirements. Participating operators are required to make their ships and commercial submarine cable services available during times of national emergency.
Now you know.
Another consequence of the Iran War.
The war on Iran is stripping the western Pacific of US naval forces
alf of the U.S. Navy’s Japan-based destroyers are currently supporting the war on Iran, belying Trump-administration strategy documents that called the Pacific theater a top priority and undermining relations with Western Pacific allies.
Five of the 10 destroyers homeported in Yokosuka, along with the Yokosuka-based aircraft carrier George Washington, are deployed to U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility to help fight a war of choice. Navy officials have told the crews of at least some of those destroyers they won’t return home until 2027.
Who needs defense when you’ve got a Department of War?
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