Israel Hits Iran With Limited Strikes
After 29 days . . . a proportionate response.
WaPo (“Israel makes retaliatory strikes against military targets in Iran“):
Israel carried out a wave of “precise strikes” against military targets in Iran early Saturday local time, as Iranian state media reported the sounds of explosions and air interceptions around the capital, Tehran, and other parts of the country over about four hours.
There were no immediate reports of deaths or injuries, and it was not immediately clear what damage the attacks inflicted on targets that Israel said would be limited to military assets, including missile factories and aerial defense sites, according to a person briefed on the planning, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive strikes.
Early reports on the scope of the attack suggested that it fell short of the massive barrage that diplomats had feared would spark further escalations.
Iran’s air defense headquarters acknowledged the attacks in a statement, saying that Israel had launched a strike “on certain military sites,” but that the assault caused “limited damage,” state media reported.
Another Israeli official, who also spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss classified plans, had said the attacks would not hit Iran’s oil production or nuclear research sites — targets considered the most likely to provoke yet another escalation in the cycle of attack and counterattack that the two countries have been engaged in for months.
Speaking privately, Israeli officials said they hoped the measured response would draw a line under the recent exchanges between the two powerful militaries.
“If the regime in Iran were to make the mistake of beginning a new round of escalation — we will be obligated to respond,” Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari, a spokesman for the Israel Defense Forces, said in a statement after the attacks concluded.
My initial reaction to the reports was . . . That’s it?
While some token strikes on some third-tier military targets is perfectly appropriate as retaliation for strikes that did not kill Israeli civilians, and both sides have made quite clear that they want to avoid a full-scale direct war, this is what I what have expected in the immediate aftermath. Nearly a month later, it seems bizarrely tepid. At a minimum, I would have expected strikes that significantly damaged Iranian capabilities.
Current NYT Jerusalem bureau chief Patrick Kingsley (“Israel’s Strike Marks New Phase of Conflict, but Stops Short of All-Out War“) seems to suggest that it was pressure from the Biden administration that yielded this result.
Israel’s retaliatory attack on Iran on Saturday morning marked the start of a new and more dangerous phase in the two countries’ yearslong conflict, but it appeared, at least for now, to have stopped short of prompting an all-out war, analysts said.
The attack was the first time that Israel has publicly acknowledged conducting a military operation inside Iran, after years of maintaining a strategic silence about its assassinations and acts of sabotage on Iranian soil. It was also one of only a handful of attacks by a foreign air force in Iran since its war with Iraq in the 1980s.
[…]
After weeks of pressure from the United States to reduce the scope of its attack, Israel avoided striking sensitive nuclear enrichment sites and oil production facilities in retaliation for the large barrage of ballistic missiles that Iran fired at Israel early this month.
On Saturday, Israel’s fighter jets focused instead on roughly 20 military installations, including air defense batteries, radar stations and missile production sites, according to Israeli officials.
The comparatively contained focus of those attacks allowed Iranian institutions to project a sense of normality on Saturday morning. The aviation authority reopened Iran’s airspace, and the state-run news agencies broadcast images and footage of life returning to normal — all signs, analysts said, that Iran’s leadership was trying to play down the significance of Israel’s attack and reduce domestic expectations of a major Iranian response.
Former NYT Jerusalem bureau chief Steven Erlanger (“In deciding whether to retaliate, Iran faces a dilemma.”) suggests that escalation will not be forthcoming, at least in the short term.
Iran faces a dilemma after the Israeli strikes on Saturday.
If it retaliates, it risks further escalation at a time when its economy is struggling, its allies are faltering, its military vulnerability is clear and its leadership succession is in play.
If it does not, it risks looking weak to those same allies, as well as to more aggressive and powerful voices at home.
Iran is already in the middle of a regional war. Since the Hamas-led attack on Oct. 7, 2023, Israel has moved swiftly to damage the militant group in Gaza and other Iranian proxies, including Hezbollah, the Houthis and its allies in Syria and Iraq.
These groups represent Iran’s “forward defense” against Israel, the heart of the nation’s deterrence. They have been badly weakened by the Israeli military’s tough response since Oct. 7, which weakens Iran, too, and makes it more vulnerable.
Iranian officials have made it clear that they do not want a direct war with Israel. They want to preserve their allies, the so-called ring of fire around Israel.
After Israel struck Iran, Tehran on Saturday publicly played down the effect of the attack and showed ordinary programming on television. It did not immediately vow a major retaliation, but simply restated its right to do so.
Adding to its reticence, Iran faces enormous economic problems, making it wary of an extended and costly war with Israel. It has been heavily penalized by the United States and Europe over its nuclear program, forcing it to move ever closer to Russia and China.
The Islamic regime is also dealing with serious domestic dissent over rising prices and its harsh rule, which play into any calculation for retaliation. The regime is both committed to the destruction of Israel, but also to preserving its power in a sophisticated country in which it is increasingly unpopular.
But, of course, all of this opens Netanyahu up to charges that the response was too weak.
WaPo (“Israel should have exacted a ‘heavier price’ from Iran, opposition leader says“):
While the IDF has posted updates on Saturday morning’s strikes on Iran, there has been little comment from Israeli politicians in government, some who are observing Shabbat until sunset.
Opposition leader Yair Lapid criticized the government’s decision not to target “strategic and economic targets in Iran.”
In a statement on X, posted several hours after Israel’s strikes on military targets in Iran, he said: “We could and should have exacted a much heavier price from Iran … Iran is the head of the axis of evil and must pay a heavy price for its aggression.” However, he praised the Israeli Air Force, without mentioning the government, saying: “Israel’s enemies know this morning that the IDF is strong, capable of striking powerfully and reaching any location.”
A person briefed on Israel’s plans, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss classified matters, earlier told The Post Israel designed its strike with the intention of minimizing casualties and keeping the impact to a level that would allow Iran to deny major damage.
Strategically, limiting the strikes to avoid escalation is almost surely the right move. But, again, the 29-day wait raised expectations.
My impression is that the main targets were air defense radars and SAM sites. The message is clear: We can hit you any time we like, and do it without losing planes or pilots. Like kicking in someone’s door when the door cannot be effectively repaired. I don’t think the Russians have any radars to spare at the moment.
The last couple of months have been instructive. I feel that Iran, and perhaps much of the wider world, had begun to think of Iran and their proxies as peers of Israel. No one thinks that now.
@Michael Reynolds: “I feel that Iran, and perhaps much of the wider world, had begun to think of Iran and their proxies as peers of Israel.”
Is there a typo here?
Just spitballing, but Israel seems stretched by fighting on two different fronts against militias and insurgents. Iran is a huge country, with an actual military with more fighters than Israel. Can they afford, without a radical change in arms production, to start a real war against an actual military? So far, everything has been spectacle for the dupes, and maybe they need that to continue. And it doesn’t seem like Iran wants more than spectacle.
@Not the IT Dept.:
Not so much a typo as a poorly constructed sentence I blame on lack of sleep. Going over on the Queen Mary 2: no jet-lag. Coming back? Much jet lag, plus delays, including a five hour layover at JFK.
The “message” of the strike may just as easily have been satisfying a domestic audience in Israel that the government was doing something, not nothing, in response to the earlier Iranian attack. It might also have been an attempt to shore up their deterrence credibility — not what Israel can do, but what Israel is willing to do, at this or an even higher threshold of destruction.
In the Fifties and Sixties, the US national security community ran wargames to test whether messaging by military action was effective. The answer was, not really. Participants regularly misinterpreted what the other side was really saying by, for example, moving a carrier battle group into the Persian Gulf in response to Soviet forces massing on the Iranian border.
I don’t discount the ability of contemporary political and military leaders to take actions counter to historical precedent and other types of insights. However, I really doubt that the Iranian leaders are clueless about Israel’s capabilities for attacking them. In fact, you can bet good money they’ve studied that question quite extensively, and the Israelis know they have. Which, again, implies that the Israeli show of strength had different motives than instructing the Iranians about what they could do.
Kevin Drum offers a one sentence history of Israel,
Was it Gandhi who had the quote about the result of an eye for an eye? Some years ago I read a good history of the agreements after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, appropriately titled, A Peace to End All Peace (B&N link, not Amazon).
My guess is that with Iran’s proxies, a significant proportion of Iran’s overall defense strategy, being in the extremely poor shape they are, it was decided that a demonstration of the ability to conduct air strikes within Iran with impunity would probably suffice.
It seems to be a limited strike on missile launch sites and radar.
Serves several purposes:
– damaging offensive and defensive capability
– indicates IDF capacity for escalation
– political effect: either humiliation accepted, or attempt to respond at extreme peril