The Army’s ‘New’ China Strategy
The Asia pivot is happening very slowly.
WSJ reporters Niharika Mandhan and Timothy W. Martin have an “exclusive” in which “America’s New Pacific Army Commander Lays Out His China Strategy.”
When Gen. Ronald Clark took charge of the U.S. Army in the Pacific in November, his boss in the region, Adm. Samuel Paparo, had a stark security assessment for him: The situation had worsened since Clark was last posted in the Indo-Pacific, three years earlier.
Six months into the new job, Clark agrees. China’s “aggressive behavior” has made the environment more dangerous, he said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal.
“These are extraordinary times,” said the commander, who has spent 37 years in the military and oversees 106,000 personnel. “Some of the things that you see our opponents and adversaries undertaking are things that really leave you speechless at times.”
Case in point: China’s rehearsals of a potential blockade of Taiwan, he said. Five years ago, Clark said, he wouldn’t have thought Beijing would consider such a maneuver. “Now it’s commonplace that the PLA would make a move like that,” he said, referring to the People’s Liberation Army, as China’s military is called.
China claims Taiwan as its territory and doesn’t rule out the use of force to seize it. One of the ways in which it could try to squeeze the democratically governed island into submission is to encircle it and cut it off from the rest of the world. Since 2022, Beijing has launched a series of military exercises that simulate such a blockade. It has also intensified its near-daily “gray zone” pressure around Taiwan using combat aircraft, warships, coast-guard vessels, drones and more.
The commander of U.S. Army Pacific—whose area of operations stretches from Hollywood to Bollywood and polar bears to penguins, he quipped—is taking notes. “It gives us an opportunity to really understand how they would go about something like a blockade or potentially a cross-strait invasion, which as we all know is exceptionally difficult,” he said, referring to a potential Chinese amphibious attack to capture Taiwan.
Unlike a blockade, such an operation would involve Chinese warships crossing the Taiwan Strait, a waterway several dozen miles wide, to land troops and equipment on Taiwan.
“To think that you could execute a mission like that over a contested space that’s roughly 80 nautical miles—it would be a challenge,” Clark said. “We just have to make sure that they understand that our efforts to deter that type of activity is exactly what we’re willing to do.”
Clark, like current Army Chief of Staff Randy George and CENTCOM commander Eric Kurilla, was a classmate of mine, although I don’t remember any of them. They’re extraordinarily capable men who have been preparing for these roles since taking the oath of office and joining the West Point Class of 1988 way back in July 1984–more than four decades ago now.
But the repetitiousness of the US military’s talk about a future fight with China, which I’ve been following since at least the 2011 Asia Pivot and, especially, since assuming my current job in 2013, is astounding.
- There’s a “tyranny of distance” in the Indo-Pacific theater
- China has an anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) system that makes our usual way of fighting next to impossible
- They’ve been massively building up their capacity while we’ve taking our eye off the ball fighting in the Middle East (or, in the case of this article, distracted by a proxy war in Ukraine)
- China is getting ever more aggressive, commensurate with its increased capabilities, and getting ever-closer to an inevitable invasion to retake Taiwan
Like the Marines, the Army is radically restructuring their force structure for a future fight in the Indo-Pacific AOR. In both cases, a big part of that is an investment in long-range fires.
That is where ground forces come in, said Clark. The Army, moving away from the earlier era of fighting insurgencies, has created agile new units to operate on front-line territories including the first island chain. In a conflict, the idea would be for these forces to disperse, hit Chinese targets from land, collect valuable battlespace information and create openings for U.S. air and naval forces to maneuver.
Two such units, called Multi-Domain Task Forces, have been constituted for the Indo-Pacific. A third is in the works.
To help them do their jobs, the Army is deploying new missile systems. That includes the Typhon, which can go after enemy ships, aircraft and land targets as far as mainland China. The Army sent the platform last year to the Philippines—where it remains—accompanied by U.S. soldiers, drawing rebukes from Beijing.
As to the fabled tyranny of distance:
Clark sees an opportunity to get around that—now. His forces are spending more time in key locations through a packed schedule of military exercises and other activities that are aimed at strengthening America’s partnerships, which also means that if a fight broke out, they would already be close by.
In recent days, as part of annual drills called Balikatan, U.S. soldiers and Marines along with Philippine and Australian forces were out on a distant beach along the South China Sea. Their mission: to practice repelling an amphibious invasion. The enemy fleet was imaginary—standing in were makeshift offshore targets, such as barrels lashed to bamboo rafts and small remote-controlled boats. But the hundreds of bullets and missiles the defenders fired were real.
The troops, many of them positioned in trenches in a tree line along the beach, unleashed a range of firepower: precision missiles, antiaircraft weapons, shoulder-fired missiles, rifles, machine guns and more. An American P-8A patrol aircraft and MQ-9 Reaper drone circled overhead.
The finale was the U.S. Army’s Himars system, which shot six training missiles at notional targets in the water. It had traveled to the Philippine island of Palawan by air, sea and land. That meant flying in a transport plane, sailing 100 miles in an amphibious boat and finally rolling off for a drive over jungle terrain to the beachside.
Balikatan has been ongoing for many years and has grown larger over time, as more allies and partners participate. I’ve never really thought of it as forward positioning, but rather as something more akin to the REFORGER exercises during the Cold War, designed both as a demonstration and building up a skillset for rapid reinforcement for forces already stationed in Germany.
Unlike the Cold War, a fight with China wouldn’t be fought against an enemy on a contiguous landmass. It makes sense, then, that our ground forces are preparing to fight it from afar, using rockets and missiles, while reinforcing our allies and partner in their homelands or, in the case of the Marines, supporting naval operations.
Regardless, we’re on our sixth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and sixth PACOM/INDOPACOM commander since President Obama announced the “pivot.” It’s probably time to stop talking about our attention having been diverted, complaining about the realities of geography, and marveling that a competitor we’ve been referring to as a “near-peer” and “peer” for many, many years will provide greater operational challenges than Third World forces.
I’m a little unclear on something: Your list of bullet points, that begins with “tyranny of distance” is meant to recapitulate recent talking points of US military figures, yes? Not expressing your own point of view, which you give subsequently.
Do I have that right?
Small editing note. I suspect “the Army is radically restricting” was meant to read “restructuring.”
What is clear is that we cannot fight China without allies willing to take enormous risks.
If you’re president of the Philippines, why would you risk Chinese military and economic retaliation? If China were willing to stop behaving like assholes in the South China Sea I would think a compromise deal on offshore development would be the far wiser move for Philippines. I don’t thing they GAF about Taiwan, their issue is territorial sovereignty.
The case against Japan joining us in a war is even stronger. Japan is not Taiwan, Japan is not going to be blockaded, they have forces of their own, and are improving same. China can hit Tokyo with missiles, lots of missiles, and lots of drones and exhaust Patriot and Aegis in a few days. The choice would be: get into a shooting war with your biggest and most proximate trading partner, or close your bases to US forces, remain above the fray and be ready to profit from the aftermath. AKA ‘pulling an America.’
As for South Korea, they face a nuclear-armed North Korea. I’d think the smarter move for SK would be to keep their powder dry and close their bases to US forces. What profit is there in getting into a shooting war with China when their own security is so threatened?
China may well be able to neutralize Philippines, Japan and South Korea with less bullying and more intelligent diplomacy. China does not present an existential threat to any of the three countries, Beijing’s shown no interest in conquering countries to which they have no pre-existing claim. Unlike Trump who has signaled an interest in good, old-fashioned imperialism, threatening Canada, Mexico, Greenland, Panama and Gaza. So far.
No one but a fool would trust their national security to Trump, Hegseth and Gabbard. Are the leaders in Manila, Tokyo and Seoul fools? If they are not fools, then we cannot fight China from Guam and from aircraft carriers that have to stand 1000 miles out to sea.
Too bad we couldn’t work a little harder at forging a relationship with Vietnam instead of slapping them with 75% tariffs. They seem to have warmed up to the U.S. in the ensuing years and amenable to expanded relations.
@Michael Reynolds: I’m more reductionist/cynical than you. The new “strategy” as performed on the ground is that China will “incur” into Taiwan, and Trump will conclude that the ROI (read: graft) for protecting Taiwanese territorial integrity is inadequate and order the troops to stand down. It’s all smoke and mirrors performance art.
Xi should be trying to convince Taiwan that there is nothing to fear from “coming home,” but ultimately, he’s no smarter than Trump is.
I don’t see what the PRC has to gain in this. TSMC is not boycotting them, and simply buying from Taiwan is a million times cheaper than a war of conquest.
I don’t see a winning strategy for the US either. We certainly are not going to defend Taiwan alone; the defenders of Okinawa suffered many multiples of KIA as the attackers in WW II. Putting together a grand alliance of Japan, the Philippines, and Australia is implausible and would produce an extremely dangerous conflagration.
The whole thing is lose-lose. Our national leadership must learn to negotiate meaningfully with the PRC. It’s better to jaw-jaw than to war-war.
@just nutha:
Indeed, Xi is no rocket scientist himself. Wolf Warrior diplomacy and South China Sea bullying are self-defeating strategies. A more constructive diplomacy, especially now with the US in decline, has the potential to severely degrade our power in the region.
Given all that, why the hell are we ‘pivoting’ to China? It might make sense in the framework of an ironclad alliance with Japan et al, but we are unable to even pretend to offer such assurances now. Absent a strong alliance and all those lovely bases, we cannot hope to beat China. Which makes more gear and new strategies probably a complete waste of time.
Japan needs to nuke up and they can tell both China and us to fuck off.
@Jay L Gischer:
“Tyranny of distance” is a military term of art – the idea that long distances and a huge operating area magnify the challenges of conducting and sustaining military operations. It’s also a term used for operations in Africa, which is a much bigger continent than most realize (thanks Mercator), and where infrastructure is sparse.
James,
The Army’s role in any war with China will be a sideshow. Any conflict there will be won and lost by naval and air forces.
As we’ve seen with Ukraine, long-range strike capabilities like HIMARS and other systems the Army imagines it would use will be limited by munition stockpiles and production capacity. Plus, if it comes to the point where Army units in the PI or TW or wherever are fighting Chinese troops that have landed in an invasion, then that likely means the sea battle has already been lost, in which case those troops are likely not getting resupplied.
One defect of the US military’s organization and the politics of resources and prestige is the presumption that all branches are equal, need to be resourced roughly equally, and can play as big a role as they can regardless of the theater. If the pivot to Asia is going to be a real thing, then the Navy needs the bulk of resources, followed by the AF and then the Army. But the way DC operates, that really isn’t possible, which is why the pivot to Asia has never actually happened.
@Slugger:
Then you need a different SOD than Hegseth and a different President than Trump.
@Michael Reynolds: I don’t think the US is as much still “pivoting toward China” as simply “continuing on the path” it was already on. What’s happening currently is part of the hard to do snap turns driving a tractor-trailer truck phenomenon.
@just nutha:
“Smoke and mirrors” are real parts of this game. Deterrence requires convincing the other guy you will fight.
Unlikely the Chinese would feel invading Taiwan is either necessary or even wise at this time. As things are now something close to 80% of their oil comes from the ME, and they are nowhere close to being able to secure that precious LOC.
And they just watched the US elect a ridiculous man to the highest office (twice!). Why should they feel any need to rush? As long as Taiwan is not a threat they can wait another 50-100 years and they pride themselves on playing the long game.
Warfare is changing very fast and not in ways that advantage us.
Factoid 1: The Ukrainians fired a missile from a sea drone (basically a jet ski) and brought down a Su 30. Factoid 2: The Houthis who we’ve been hammering for weeks, just got a missile past Iron Dome for a hit near Ben-Gurion airport.
Ukraine has fought Russia to a standstill and we all love that, but in the world of asymmetry gone mad, we are the Russians. We’re the ones with all the gear. All the big, fat targets. How many missiles and drones would it take to exhaust the very expensive defenses of a carrier and escorts? The Ukrainians used an AIM9 and with the Sea-doo spent less than 500K to shoot down a 50 million dollar jet. 100 to 1 is too rich even for a superpower.
Is it time to revive the phrase, ‘pitiful helpless giant?’
@dazedandconfused:
They could do the easy thing and bribe Trump. For a hundred billion he’d surrender. Probably a bargain for China. Wars are expensive. For an extra 50 billion he’d hand over Hawaii.
@Michael Reynolds:
Just this week China “occupied” another sand bar in the South China Sea in what are, under international law, the Philippines economic zone.
Xi is another man whose mind runs on rails.
He has a huge diplomatic opportunity, if only he was willing to to stop pissing off neighbours, treating Chinese “partners” like dupes, expand domestic consumption, court Europe, and double-cross Putin.
But he, and the CCP monolith, doesn’t seem to have the capacity to respond quickly.
Incidentally, the Australian election results and opinion polling related seem to indicate that Trump is toxic there as well.
If 60% + of Australians are now questioning the US reliability as a partner, that puts the southern anchor of the “China containment” line in doubt.
While Japan is the northern anchor, and also probably considering its options.
And I suspect the AUKUS plans for the Royal Navy to establish a submarine fleet base at Fremantle are looking more iffy by the day.
If the US is no longer a reliable ally re Europe, the UK is less likely to consider “luxury defence” options in Australasia if the priority is (as it must be) Europe/NE Atlantic/Med.
@dazedandconfused:
I also think the sensible policy would be for China to wait.
The issue is: is that what Xi thinks?
If he’s an “old man in a hurry” and thinks he sees a window of opportunity, he has options: not an invasion, but an “informal” blockade, is one possibility.
@Michael Reynolds:
Their assessment at the moment should be that, in general, the US is becoming unstable and may well be in the process of self-destruction. No reason to cut any deals for Taiwan.
@Jay L Gischer: Talking points going back to at least 2013 that were still being used in this article.
@Michael Reynolds: Yes. Fixed.
@Michael Reynolds:@Rob1: It’s just so fucking stupid, it hurts. We’ve spent generations building up goodwill around the world. US military and civilian leaders alike have long pointed out that we have dozens of allies while the PRC has essentially one: North Korea. We have pushed them closer to Russia and Iran, but there’s no goodwill there.
@James Joyner:
This ultra-nationalist, anti-globalist thing that has seized the mentality of those who have seized power in this country, is going to be our undoing. In a world, on a planet that demands cooperation and negotiated settlements for sustainability, me-first/me-only is purely dead ender. Looking further into the future, we will either learn the primary lesson our existence on this lonely planet demands, or we will pay a terrible price through the reality feedback process. I fear for our children.