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Ukraine War Has Topped 2 Million Casualties

Some 450,000 soldiers are estimated to have died.

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Helene Cooper of the NYT (“Troop Casualties in Ukraine War Top 2 Million, Study Finds“) points us to a study by Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a top foreign affairs think tank, titled “Russian Blood and Treasure: The Ballooning Costs of Putin’s War.”

I haven’t had time to read the brief and full, but the executive summary is powerful. It begins:

Russia has lost the military initiative in Ukraine as costs continue to mount. The Russian military has suffered 1.4 million battlefield casualties and as many as 450,000 deaths since its February 2022 full-scale invasion, according to new CSIS data. Russia’s territorial control in Ukraine shrank in the spring of 2026, with a net loss of roughly 400 square kilometers in April and May. In addition, Ukraine has orchestrated an increasingly successful campaign of short-, medium-, and long-range strikes against Russian military and economic targets using AI-enabled systems and a new paradigm for air power.

In a stunning acknowledgement of Russia’s struggles in Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin dramatically scaled back his annual military parade in May 2026 because of concerns about Ukrainian long-range strikes and increasing battlefield challenges in Ukraine. For many Russians, 2026 has been a difficult year. Everyday Russians are suffering from a sputtering economy, higher prices on groceries and other expenses, tax increases, significant internet restrictions, and an oppressive crackdown on freedom of speech—largely because of the war in Ukraine. In addition, major cities throughout Russia, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, have come under attack by Ukrainian drones and long-range missiles, not just towns and cities in Russia’s border region with Ukraine, such as Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk. Crimea has also come under withering attack by Ukraine, forcing Russia to close summer camps and beaches, disrupting fuel supplies, and causing electricity outages.

But much of the analysis on Russia’s battlefield performance has been anecdotal. This study examines several indicators of Russia’s battlefield performance compiled by CSIS: fatality and casualty rates, rates of advance of Russian forces as measured in meters per day, and Russian territorial gains in total square kilometers. It also collects and analyzes data on over 20,000 incidents involving Ukrainian strikes against Russian targets. What does this data suggest about Russia’s military performance in Ukraine?

First, Russian battlefield costs continue to mount, with as many as 450,000 battlefield deaths and 1.4 million casualties between February 2022 and June 2026. These rates are astounding. Russian fatalities in Ukraine are more than four times greater than all U.S. fatalities in all wars combined since World War II, and more than nine times greater than all Soviet and Russian fatalities in all wars combined since World War II.

In addition, Russia’s monthly casualty rates of over 30,000 per month in 2026 have likely exceeded Russia’s recruitment rates of roughly 27,000 new recruits per month. The Russia-Ukraine casualty rate has likely risen to nearly 8:1 in the first half of 2026, up from between 2:1 and 3:1 for much of the war, in large part due to Ukraine’s use of drones—including AI-enabled drones—as part of its aggressive air interdiction campaign.

Second, Russia’s ground offensive has largely stalled, with an average rate of advance of approximately 50 meters per day around Kostiantynivka, 70 meters per day around Pokrovsk, and 90 meters per day around Sloviansk. These are among the slowest rates of advance in any war over the last century.

Third, Russia’s territorial control in Ukraine shrank in the spring of 2026. Russian forces lost more ground than they captured in both April and May, a net loss of roughly 400 square kilometers and their first monthly net losses since August 2024—yet another sign of Russia’s military struggles.

There’s quite a bit more just in the summary, including some rather compelling graphics.

The bottom line is that, while Ukraine isn’t winning the war, Russia is losing. The death toll is staggering even in an autocratic regime that has a long history of attrition warfare. They’re grinding through soldiers at an unsustainable pace while getting nothing for it.

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15 responses to “Ukraine War Has Topped 2 Million Casualties”

  1. Wait…I thought Fatso ended this on “day one?”

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  2. Similar numbers from the ISW.

    https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/

    ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized or infiltrated 30.42 square kilometers in June 2026 and advanced or infiltrated at an average pace of 1.01 square kilometers per day. Russian forces comparatively seized 481.25 square kilometers in June 2025, advancing at an average pace of 16.04 square kilometers per day.

    Russian forces thus seized or infiltrated only 28.43 percent as much territory in the first six months of 2026 as they advanced into in the first six months of 2025.

    Ukrainian General Staff reports indicate that Russian forces suffered 39,490 casualties, including killed in action (KIA) and wounded in action (WIA), in June 2026. Russian forces therefore reportedly suffered around 1,298 casualties per square kilometer they seized or infiltrated in June 2026. Russian forces comparatively suffered 32,680 casualties in June 2025, an average of 68 casualties per kilometer taken. Russian forces suffered over 19 times more casualties per kilometer in June 2026 compared to June 2025.

  3. And a lot is happening with Crimea.

    Crimea declares an emergency situation. What is happening on the peninsula?

    On June 21, the separatist authorities on the peninsula suspended the sale of fuel to private individuals, which will be available only to government agencies. A couple of days later, on June 26, the Moscow-installed government declared an emergency situation in the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. According to the local governor, Sergey Aksyonov, the emergency situation would allow for the rapid resolution of tasks related to ensuring the stable functioning of key sectors.

    The rationale behind this decision lies in the increasing offensive conducted by Ukraine. The attacks targeted logistics chains, primarily road and rail networks, as well as ports connecting the Crimean Peninsula to the territory of the Russian Federation. Other objectives were oil facilities such as fuel storage facilities and tanker trucks.

    There have also been attacks on critical infrastructure, including the power grid, which led to a blackout, for example in Sevastopol, Yevpatoria, and other parts of Crimea.

  4. I always wonder what the average Russian knows. The gas shortage and the big fires on the outskirts of major cities are hard to hide. Do they know about the casualties? Of course the opinions that count are the elites, who have access to foreign sources. But what can even they do about it? One hates to see casualties, even Russian orcs, but what else can the Ukrainians do? I worry whether the Ukrainians will stay ahead in the adaptation cycle. But it’s in the nature of autocracies to not adapt well.

  5. Uh oh. No EDIT button. Back to careful proofreading.

    1. There should be an edit feature. Let me know if you still don’t have that functionality.

      1. Just posted on another thread. No edit feature as yet.

  6. They’re grinding through soldiers at an unsustainable pace while getting nothing for it.

    While I am far more empathetic toward the country that is being invaded, I’ve wondered who has been dying for Russia. According a CNN article citing the same CSIS study,

    The losses are not spread evenly across Russia, with poorer areas and ethnic minorities suffering significantly higher casualty rates. Stories of male populations of small remote villages being virtually wiped out are becoming more common in Russian opposition media.

    I’ve read elsewhere that that some of the highest casualty rates are among soldiers from Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, both of which have majority Turkic and Islamic identity.

    1. From what I read, the poorest regions like Dagestan in the Caucasus and Tuva/Buryatia (Buddhist minority in Siberia) have been hardest hit, along with poor regions everywhere regardless of ethnicity. 30-35% of Russian villages are dirt poor, no paved roads or running water, plus a ton of “deaths of despair” among alcoholic men. The huge sign up bonuses get more attractive in that squalor

      I am sure that Bashkortostan and Tatarstan have had higher casualties than Moscow or St. Pete, but they are oil rich regions. Although most of that wealth gets increasingly channeled to Moscow, I doubt they are poorer than average.

  7. Right, no edit button. I meant the highest casualty numbers, not rates.

  8. A few weeks ago I watched a debate between a pro-Ukraine activist and someone against giving aid to Ukraine. The anti- guy actually made the argument that since Ukraine seems to be doing so well since Trump ratcheted down aid, that suggests they’re better off without us. The pro- guy (whom even the anti- guy admitted was a lot more knowledgeable on the subject) countered that Ukraine would be doing much better with US help, and explained in some detail why.

    But what struck me was that for the past several years since the 2022 invasion, the most common argument I kept hearing from the anti- crowd was that Russia has so powerful a military that attempting to help Ukraine is an exercise in futility that only prolongs their inevitable defeat. Damned if you do, damned if you don’t. It’s like the old water test for suspected witches: if you escaped, that proved you were a witch, but if you drowned that proved your innocence.

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    1. dazedandconfused Avatar
      dazedandconfused

      What worries me most is this is a war on Russia’ border, and since the Russian public seems to have an embedded sense of entitlement to great-nation status similar to our own, they will refuse to “lose” this. The definitions of “defeat” and “victory” are not set, and can be applied to wildly varying end states.

    2. Sounds like the anti- crowd is unwilling to acknowledge that the Russian military has failed to meet their expectations, and that the arc of the conflict has bent toward less concern that military materiel (and intelligence) assistance from the West would lead to a broadside exchange between nuclear powers.

      It was a widely shared opinion in late Feb 2022 that Kyiv would fall to Russian forces. But it took just a few weeks for their military push and quick victory narrative to fall apart. Then Ukraine’s resolve and resourcefulness, combined with increasing numbers and capabilities of U.S.-provided weapons systems, continued to make Russia’s original goal improbable to impossible. And now Ukraine is more a western peer—developing, producing, and collaborating with allies on offensive and defensive drone systems. They still have a need for materiel assistance, but also have something to offer partner nations and companies. Surely the anti- crowd can see what’s been happening.

      1. dazedandconfused Avatar
        dazedandconfused

        What I’ve been noticing is the pro Russian bloggers and pundits are only talking about the damage they are doing to Ukraine, and the pro Ukrainians are only talking about the damage Ukraine is doing to Russia.

  9. I said a number of times before Ukraine should be accepted into NATO as fast as possible, because who in their right mind would want even the possibility of having to fight against them.

    This still holds, but I’d add they’re the first country to have developed and mastered the next means of modern warfare. Not only new weapons, but new techniques for their use, and have validated them in battle.

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