t a c i t u s thinks the new timetable for turning sovereignty over to an Iraqi successor government is dangerous and shameful.
Twice in American history we have failed to see through our responsibilities to a nation defeated in war. The American South was cut loose in 1876 to partially reimpose its own brand of social tyranny; and the Weimar Republic was simply allowed to decay, redefine its responsibilities, and slide into a worse horror than that which preceded it. In both cases, the lesson is plain: victory means hard responsibility, and shirking it bears bitter fruit.
Clearly, the outcomes in both cases were regretable. In the case of the American South, eleven years of Reconstruction was eleven years of unconstitutional suspension of the rights of the people in those states. The abrogration wasn’t in not continuing the military occupation but rather in the spinelessness of the federal judiciary in its unwillingness to enforce the 14th and 15th Amendments. In the case of Weimar Germany, the problem was the foolish reliance on the League of Nations, coupled with a reluctance to engage in peacetime interventionism abroad.
Tacitus thinks the Administration is caving in to the guerillas are driven by reelection politics. Further, he fears that a theocracy by the majority Shi’a is an inevitable result. I’m not sure why paying attention to what the electorate wants is a bad idea, so long as it isn’t the only consideration. And short of breaking Iraq into constituent states, it is unclear how to prevent the dominance of the government by the majority. Presumably, we’ll impose some version of a Bill of Rights and a federalist system into their constitution. Whether that will sustain itself in the long run is anyone’s guess. We can’t impose our will forever; either Iraq is going to be a sovereign state or it will be an American colony.
Dean Esmay thinks Tacitus is overlooking the big picture. He argues that Vietnamization was working splendidly until Congress suddenly defunded it. Because the American public lacks patience in its overseas commitments, the Administration’s options are limited. Therefore, turning things over to an elected government while remaining there for a number of years in a much less visible role is the best that can be hoped for. For Iraq to make the sort of transformation that Germany and Japan did after WWII is unrealistic; a state like Turkey would be a more reasonable goal.
There’s no reason to think the American public will oppose a long-term commitment in Iraq. We’ve maintained troops in Germany and Japan since WWII, in Korea since 1950, and Bosnia since 1995. What the public won’t tolerate is continued American casualties from the insurgency. We’ll likely have troops in Iraq indefinitely, but they need to be there in a background role rather than as an army of occupation. Our continued presence in that role continues to breed resentment and fuel the violence against us. Once we’ve turned day-to-day governance over to an elected Iraqi assembly, it will be much easier to be seen as liberators.
