Ralph Peters argues that, despite outward appearances, things are going phenomenally well for our forces in Iraq. Events like yesterday’s bombing of the UN heaquarters demonstrates the weakness of the enemy, not our failure:
Our enemies’ initial “Mogadishu Strategy” – based on the faulty notion that if you kill Americans they pack up and go home – was a disaster for them. Our response devastated their already-crippled organization. Now, with reduced capabilities and decayed leadership, they’ve turned to attacking soft targets. It’s the best they can do.
It’s ugly. But it’s an indicator of their weakness, not of strength.
Demoralized by constant defeats, our enemies have become alarmed by the quickening pace of reconstruction. Consequently, we will see more attacks on infrastructure, on international aid workers and on Iraqis laboring to rebuild their country.
We’ll also see al Qaeda and other terrorist groups become the senior partners among our enemies, as Ba’athist numbers and capabilities dwindle. There is more innocent blood to come.
Yet the bombing of the U.N. headquarters at the Canal Hotel was a self-defeating act. Even if it frightens the U.N. off (and it just might accomplish the opposite) the attack reminds the world yet again of the savagery of radical Islamic terrorists and the brutality of those whom we deposed in Baghdad.
Peters is right as far as it goes, but there are a couple of rather important caveats: Yes, when an enemy has to resort to asymmetrical attacks, it is a sign of his comparative weakness. It does not, however, follow that his defeat is imminent. These attacks are substantially more than a nuisance, as they undermine our attempts to rebuild the infrastructure and gain the confidence of the people. And they’re not going to go away any time soon. Second, I don’t think those who opposed the war are going to change their minds because of the actions of the other side. For one thing, all but the lunatic fringe already understood that Saddam was a tyrant and that murdering civilians was horrible. For another, until and unless we find WMD, the emphasis on that rationale for entry is going to be enough to fuel their opposition to our mission there.
This is an interesting analysis, too:
Why attack the United Nations? Other than the ease with which it could be struck? Several reasons.
First, the U.N. dealt a blow to the hardliners when the Security Council recently recognized the legitimacy of Iraq’s Governing Council. Second, the Ba’athists will never forgive the U.N. for its support, no matter how lukewarm, for sanctions and weapons inspections in the past – or for failing to restrain coalition forces last March.
And for al Qaeda and associated terrorists, the United Nations is a Western-dominated tool of Christians and Zionists – despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. We are not facing reasonable men. They have a deep and furious need to hate.
The attack on the U.N. headquarters also was an effort to undercut reconstruction efforts. Our enemies hope that, by attacking aid workers, they can prevent other international agencies from coming to Iraq, that they can drive a wedge between the coalition and the Johnny-come-latelies nudging their way into reconstruction programs.
This will be a moment of truth for the United Nations. America and its partners have demonstrated that we will not be deterred by bloodstained bullies. Will the U.N. honor its dead by showing some backbone? Or will it flee Baghdad, handing the terrorists a real, if minor, victory? If the United Nations discredits itself by running away, it will hasten its long decline. If it takes a stand against terror and goes right back to work in Iraq, it may regain a good bit of its faded luster.
The truck bomb didn’t simply attack the U.N. – it struck at the U.N.’s idea of itself. The lesson the U.N. must take away is that no one can be neutral in the struggle with evil.
