There is a mass of various posts and conversations on this site with the basic goal of trying to provide some key understanding of American political outcomes. This was the point, for example, in these two posts:
One of the things I was trying to get at was that once the dust settled after the midterms, there would be a lot of punditry trying to tell us how the outcomes provide a blueprint for the future of the Democratic Party (you know, the notion that a candidate “like X” is the way forward!).
But the evidence suggests, more or less in line with what I was saying months ago, that the issue for voters was Trump, not some specific kind of Democrat. This was the point I was trying to make in a series of posts that included the following:
- The “G” in GOP Must Stand For “Genius”!
- Trump Is Making the Midterms About Trump
- Please Pretend That Trump is on the Ballot!
Partly, this is because of the way midterm cycles go.
To wit, social science does not have the same kinds of precision that, say, chemistry does, but that does not mean we cannot systematically study and understand social phenomena. We know, for example, the observable patterns of midterm elections and the relationship of presidential popularity to those outcomes.
G. Elliott Morris provides the basics (and, to my point above about Trump, note that the title of his piece is, “Trump wasn’t on the ballot, but Trumpism was”).
By my calculations, we can expect the party in power to lose roughly 7.6 points of support from the last election, in terms of swing in vote margin over the intervening two years.
[…]
The president’s party lost House margin in 19 of the 20 midterms from 1946 to 2022, and the average loss was 7.6 points. The lone exception was 2002, when Republicans gained 4.6 points. This is about as ironclad a rule as they come.
So, as a minimum, it is pretty much as much of a guarantee that social science can provide that presidents lose seats at midterms. 2002 is the only outlier, but that is because 2001 was an outlier year for reasons that should be obvious.
Here are the data.

Now, of course, the GOP lost more than the 7.6 average. Morris breaks it down as follows:

Morris is planning ten more posts to go through all of this, but I think it is important to understand that 12.1 points of the swing towards Democrats is explainable by the average midterm shift (7.6) and Trump’s (un)popularity (4.5). That means, in simple terms, the things that a lot of pundits and consultant types are focused on, like candidate quality and the question of moderation/messaging, as well as turnout and other factors, are located in those 3.4 points.
This all conforms to the basic set of variables from the posts I linked above:
- Partisanship
- Prevailing national conditions
- Candidate quality
- Other factors, such as campaign spending
We start with a baseline of partisanship (more on that below) and then seek to understand deviations from preexisting partisan leans via the remaining factors. #2 is captured by the roughly 12.1 points above, with #3s and 4 accounting for 3.4 points.
The fairly uniform nature of the partisan shift across the country underscores that the main drivers were not about specific races in the main (certainly not in the way that provides an obvious blueprint).
As political scientist Seth Masket noted:
There is really no obvious formula for how Democrats should win going forward. One thing Democrats did well this year was to recruit candidates who could run strongly in their particular states. But even within regions, there was a great deal of variation. James Talarico ran in Texas as a white man preaching Christian love for strangers and those we disagree with; John Ossoff ran in Georgia as a white Jewish man who had no time for racist and antisemitic bullshit. They both won by double digits. Keisha Lance Bottoms got elected governor as a Black woman in Georgia; Scott Colum got elected senator as a Black man in Mississippi. All these things were considered unthinkable just a few years ago. Which of these is the obvious type of candidate for Democrats in 2028? Who knows? And I haven’t even gotten into the progressive Muslim in Michigan or the moderate minister in Kansas or the pro-choice pediatrician in South Carolina.
Indeed.
Also, indeed:
I doubt most Americans could tell you what Democrats stood for this year, no less who their leaders were. Yet that party just won massive record gains. It was enough to simply not be the party associated with Trump.
(Which is also why I don’t think that Congressional leadership matters as much as a lot of people think, especially electorally.)
Masket also provides an excellent illustration of why I place partisanship at the top of my variable list.
Below is a scatterplot showing the vote share for Biden in each state in 2020 paired up with the vote share for Harris in 2024. The correlation coefficient is .99. The red line represents the 2020 vote share, showing that Harris underperformed Biden almost uniformly across every state.

That is partisanship in clear evidence, but again, with one candidate underperforming another.
The same is true, but with candidates overperforming, in 2024 (the correlation coefficient is .94):

Masket’s piece is about some of his pet peeves concerning election coverage (they are peeves I share). One specific one that I agree with is that analysts need to stop talking about a “realignment.”
As Masket notes,
The term “realignment” gets thrown around a lot, but it’s generally understood to mean a durable shift in party coalitions. The shift of Black voters to Democrats and southern whites to Republicans, peaking in the 1960s, can be seen as a realignment. We’ve seen some minor realigning over the past decade-plus as Americans without a college degree have shifted from mostly supporting Democrats to mostly supporting Republicans, and vice versa for those with a college degree, but it’s been pretty gradual and hardly an upset of the whole party system.
1994 was a realignment election, insofar as we saw a substantial resorting of party affiliation around geography after that election that was durable. While there may have been some shifting in the two coalitions (like Hispanics who voted R in 2024 returning to the Ds), there is not a lot of evidence that some significant sorting of the coalitions has taken place.
This is why I am less convinced than some pundits that Texas, for example, is blue (if by that it means some permanent change to the state’s partisan lean) or that some magic formula has been unlocked by Democrats in the Midwest.
See also:
We shall see, of course, but vibes ain’t data.
More to come, no doubt, but I think that the best way to understand the outcomes from earlier this month is that it was a profoundly anti-Trump election more than anything else by far.








